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ABSTRACT
Evidence is a central concept in epistemology and more narrowly, theories of epistemic
justification. Evidence is commonly thought to be what justifies our beliefs. On this view, a
belief is justified for a person if that belief fits that person’s total body of evidence. But it is also
commonly thought that evidence isn’t the only thing that justifies a belief. Some epistemologists
even think that evidence isn’t what justifies a belief at all. Virtue epistemologists give epistemic
or intellectual virtues an important and fundamental role in theories of epistemic justification.
On such views, for a belief to be epistemically justified, the belief must be formed responsibly or
formed as the result of a reliable belief-forming process, faculty, or agent. Thus, virtuous
character, agency, and inquiry are thought to be central to epistemic justification. The pressing
issue to be explored in this dissertation is whether theories of epistemic justification in which
evidence is central are compatible with theories of epistemic justification in which virtue is
central. The aim of this dissertation is to argue for a hybrid view of epistemic justification in
which evidence and virtuous (reliable) inquiry both play a salient role in the epistemic
justification of a belief.
My hybrid or ‘two-component’ view of epistemic justification holds that a belief is
justified along two dimensions: the fittingness-dimension and the reliability-dimension. More
precisely, a subject’s belief p is categorically justified (justified ‘period’ or ‘full stop’) when it
fits the subject’s total body of evidence E (the fittingness-dimension), but that in addition, the
reliability of one’s evidence-gathering methods (virtuous inquiry) can also play a salient role in
increasing the degree to which p is justified (other things being equal) (the reliabilitydimension). Furthermore, I will argue that being justified along the fittingness-dimension is all
that is necessary for a belief to be justified full-stop (this also allows for the strength of one’s
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evidence to partly—sometimes wholly—determine the degree to which a belief is justified).
Being justified along the reliability-dimension can only increase the degree to which the belief is
justified.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
“A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence.”
-David Hume – An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Evidence is a central concept in epistemology and more narrowly, theories of epistemic
justification. Evidence is commonly thought to be what justifies our beliefs. On this view, a
belief is justified for a person if that belief is supported by that person’s total body of evidence.
But it is also commonly thought that evidence isn’t the only thing that justifies a belief. Some
epistemologists even think that evidence isn’t what justifies a belief at all. Virtue
epistemologists give epistemic or intellectual virtues an important and fundamental role in
theories of epistemic justification. On such views, for a belief to be epistemically justified, the
belief must be formed responsibly or formed as the result of a reliable belief-forming process,
faculty, or agent. Thus, virtuous character, agency, and inquiry are thought to be central to
epistemic justification. The pressing issue to be explored in this dissertation is whether theories
of epistemic justification in which evidence is central are compatible with theories of epistemic
justification in which virtue is central. The aim of this dissertation is to argue for a hybrid view
of epistemic justification in which evidence and virtue both play a salient role in the epistemic
justification of a belief.
I. Preliminaries
In general, an epistemically justified belief is one whose subject holds it in the right way.
Different theories of epistemically justified belief, or doxastic justification, provide different
accounts of what it is for a subject to hold a belief in the epistemically correct way. This sort of
justification is different from what is often referred to as propositional justification, in which
1

justification is a property of a proposition (rather than a belief) relative to a person.1
Propositional justification holds that a proposition can be justified for a person even if that
person doesn’t believe that proposition or even if she believes it for the wrong reasons entirely.
More formally:
Propositional Justification: proposition p is propositionally justified for a person S if and
only if S has reasons or evidence for p such that if S were to believe p and base her belief
that p on those reasons or that evidence, her belief that p would be doxastically justified.
Propositional justification is not the sort of justification that I’m concerned with. The sort of
justification I’m concerned with is doxastic justification.
Doxastic justification is a property of beliefs rather than of propositions. In this
dissertation I’m concerned with when a belief is epistemically justified. For a belief to be
justified, a person must have good reasons or sufficient evidence for it, but also the belief must
be based on those good reasons or evidence.2 This is otherwise known as the basing
requirement. Here is doxastic justification stated more formally:
Doxastic Justification: Belief p is doxastically justified for a person S if and only if S’s
belief p is propositionally justified for S and S bases her belief p on whatever it is that
makes p propositionally justified (i.e.—good reasons or sufficient evidence).
Unless otherwise specified, when I refer to ‘epistemic justification’ or ‘justification’ I’m
referring to doxastic justification.
One more crucial distinction needs to be made about the sort of doxastic justification I’m
concerned with. Importantly, we want to make sure that we’re not confusing different epistemic
properties. When we are talking about epistemic justification we are not talking about epistemic
blameworthiness or blamelessness. That is, it’s not the case that a belief is justified simply

1

I take this distinction between doxastic and propositional justification from Michael Bergmann (2006, p.4).
This general claim is not necessarily equating ‘good reasons’ with ‘evidence’. A ‘good reason’ could also refer to
something that justifies a belief other than evidence.
2
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because a person is somehow blameless or blameworthy for holding the belief. Bergmann calls
this sort of doxastic justification “subjective deontological justification” (2006, p.5). But this is
not the sort of justification I am concerned with. I’m concerned with what Bergmann calls
“ordinary justification” or a sort of justification that is more objective than subjective
deontological justification (2006, p.6). Bergmann characterizes this more objective sense of
justification by saying that it is the type of justification such that Jones’ belief that p could have it
and Smith’s belief that p could lack it even if both Jones and Smith are equally epistemically
blameless in believing in p (2006, p.5). To understand this distinction, consider this example by
Bruce Russell (2001):
Someone who grows up in a religious society and is taught to listen to the deliverances of
an oracle can be epistemically blameless in believing those deliverances even though her
belief may not really be supported by the evidence and so is objectively unjustified
(Russell, p.36; Bergmann 2006, p.5).
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman (1985) give another example:
A paranoid man might believe without supporting evidence that he is being spied on. This
belief might be a result of an uncontrollable desire to be a recipient of special attention. In
such a case the belief is clearly epistemically unjustified even if the belief is involuntary
and the person cannot alter the process leading to it. . . . The person who believes that he
is being spied upon as a result of an uncontrollable desire does not deserve to be blamed
for that belief. But there is a fact about the belief’s epistemic merit. It is epistemically
defective—it is held in the presence of insufficient evidence and is therefore unjustified
(Conee and Feldman, p.17; Bergmann 2006, p.5).
In both of these examples, the person is epistemically blameless for holding his belief, but it is
still objectively unjustified. Bergmann suggests that objective epistemic justification is of the
type that evidentialists like Conee and Feldman and Russell are concerned with. That is, when
evidentialists talk about epistemic justification, they are concerned with propositional
justification, in which a proposition can be justified even if a person doesn’t believe that
proposition and even if that belief doesn’t satisfy a basing requirement. But evidentialists also
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recognize an objective property of doxastic justification which is what S’s belief p has when its
content is propositionally justified for S and S bases p on whatever it is that makes its content
propositionally justified (Bergmann, 2006, p.6). Bergmann ultimately disagrees with the
evidentialists as to what is required for objective epistemic justification, but he does agree that it
is something of this sort (2006, p.5). I agree.
Another way to explain the type of objective epistemic justification I’m concerned with is
that it’s the kind of justification that makes a belief a much better candidate for qualifying as an
instance of knowledge than it would be if it lacked such justification. That is, when we talk
about epistemic justification we are talking about a positive normative status that makes a belief
a much better candidate for amounting to knowledge than it would be otherwise. Blameless
beliefs of the sorts in the cases above are not good candidates for knowledge.
II. Statement of the Problem
One prominent theory of doxastic justification is advanced by evidentialism. It holds that
the doxastic attitude that a person is justified in holding toward a proposition is the one that fits
the person’s evidence bearing on that proposition at some given time.3 Generally speaking, the
idea behind evidentialist accounts of doxastic justification is that justification turns entirely on
evidence. However, there are also other popular non-evidentialist theories of doxastic
justification that hold that epistemic justification does not turn entirely on evidence and that
epistemic or intellectual virtue concepts play a significant or fundamental role in justification.
Such theories are known as virtue theoretic accounts of epistemic justification.
Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, two prominent defenders of evidentialism, defend the
following evidentialist principle of propositional epistemic justification:

3

This also includes the belief being based on the evidence in question.
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EJ

Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and
only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t (Conee and Feldman, 2004,
p.83).4

According to EJ, epistemic justification turns solely on evidence. For example, when a
physiologically normal person under normal conditions sees a plush green field in front of him,
believing that he is seeing something green is the attitude toward this proposition that fits his
evidence. It is having the visual perceptual evidence of a plush green field that determines
justification.
Additionally, Conee and Feldman defend a view of doxastic justification, or what they
call, well-foundedness. In order for a doxastic attitude to be well-founded, the person must
possess evidence that on balance supports that attitude (have propositional justification) and
come to hold that attitude on the basis of that evidence (and not have any defeating evidence).
Here is Conee and Feldman’s well-foundedness more formally:
WF: S’s doxastic attitude D at t toward proposition p is well-founded if and only if:
(i)
having D toward p is justified for S at t; and
(ii)
S has D toward p on the basis of some body of evidence e, such that
a) S has e as evidence at t;
b) having D toward p fits e; and
c) there is no more inclusive body of evidence e’ had by S at t such that
having D toward p does not fit e’ (Conee and Feldman, 2004, p.93)
It is well-founded beliefs that I will be concerned with in this dissertation since in order to have a
fully fleshed-out and complete evidentialist theory of justification, that theory must have an
account of what it takes for someone to properly base his belief on his evidence. Why? Because
well-foundedness is important for the evidentialist analysis of knowledge. That is, according to
the evidentialist, a belief can’t count as knowledge if it isn’t properly based on the evidence one
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There are three doxastic attitudes: belief, disbelief, and suspension of belief. The justification for each of these
attitudes turns entirely on the evidence. As I mentioned earlier, I’m concerned with when a belief is epistemically
justified, but my discussion would equally apply to the other doxastic attitudes.
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has (at least, according to evidentialists of the Conee and Feldman type). Thus, wellfoundedness is what makes a belief a much better candidate for knowledge, unlike propositional
justification.
In contrast to Conee and Feldman’s evidentialist account of doxastic justification, there
are virtue theoretic accounts of doxastic justification which hold that justification does not turn
entirely on the evidence and that virtue plays a significant role, or even entirely determines,
whether a belief is epistemically justified. 5 Hilary Kornblith (1983) argues for a virtue
responsibilist view in which an agent is justified in his belief that p at time t as from time t'
(where t' is earlier than t) just in case all of the agent's actions between t' and t which affected the
process accountable for the presence of the belief that p at t were epistemically responsible.
Lorraine Code (1984 and 1987) also argues for the centrality of epistemic responsibility in
epistemology. She argues that epistemic justification is best understood as attaching to stable
dispositions to act in certain ways that have their source in virtue. James Montmarquet (1993)
argues for the view that S is justified in believing p insofar as S is epistemically virtuous in
believing p. John Greco (2000a) argues for the view that S is justified in believing p if and only
if S's believing p results from the dispositions that S manifests when S is motivated to believe the
truth (when S is thinking conscientiously). Linda Zagzebski (1996) argues for the view that a
justified belief is what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue, and who has the
understanding of his cognitive situation a virtuous person would have, might believe in like
circumstances. All of these accounts accept some sort of view of epistemic justification in which
concepts of intellectual virtue are central or primary. In none of these accounts of epistemic
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I am charitably interpreting each of these accounts as theories of doxastic epistemic justification.

6

justification does evidence have primary status. That is, they all reject well-foundedness as a
proper account of doxastic justification.
Jason Baehr (2011) offers a hybrid account of epistemic justification that is sympathetic
to both virtue accounts and evidentialism. Baehr challenges the sufficiency of EJ, but he does
not argue in favor of abandoning evidentialism, rather he aims to supplement evidentialism with
a particular constraint, according to which, under certain conditions, justification requires
intellectually virtuous agency (Baehr, 68). Baehr’s argument for this claim centers around two
types of issues: 1) cases in which the believer either fails to inquire or 2) inquires in some
defective manner, i.e.—there is a ‘mishandling’ of the evidence. Consider the following four
cases. Cases 1 and 2 are cases of defective inquiry. Cases 3 and 4 are cases of defective
‘doxastic handling’ of evidence.
CASE 1: GEORGE
George epitomizes the vices of intellectual laziness, apathy, and obliviousness. He goes
about his daily routine focusing only on the most immediate and practical of concerns:
feeding himself, getting to work on time, doing his job in a minimally satisfactory way,
paying the bills, etc. He lacks any natural curiosity and is almost entirely tuned out to the
news of the day. Unsurprisingly, George has many beliefs he should not and fails to believe
many things he should. In the former category is George’s belief that exposure to
secondhand smoke poses no signiﬁcant health risks. Given his extremely narrow and
practical focus, George is oblivious to all of the well-publicized research indicating the
hazards of secondhand smoke. In fact, George actually has positive evidence in support of
his belief. He recalls having learned from a reliable source some years ago that a
considerable amount of research had been conducted concerning the effects of exposure to
secondhand smoke and that this research had failed to establish any correlation between
such exposure and any serious health problems. And as far as George knows, the research
on this topic has not changed. Nor, we may suppose, does he have any reason to think that
it might have changed (Baehr, p.70).
Baehr argues that regardless of the type of epistemic justification George enjoys according to EJ,
there is another important sense in which these beliefs are unjustified. Specifically, while
George’s belief is well-supported by his evidence, the evidence is clearly not what it should be.
7

George has good evidence for his belief because of his intellectual “tunnel vision” (Baehr, p.71).
George ought to have considered important and widely-publicized research. Since George’s
belief is based on evidence that ought to be other than it is, he ought not to believe as he does. In
an important sense, George’s belief is unjustified. The evidence that George has is defective and
this defectiveness stems from his ‘epistemic malfeasance’. Had George been even minimally
attentive and discriminating, his perspective would have been very different and much more
accurate, i.e.—he would have had better evidence (Baehr, p.73).
Now consider a second case:
CASE 2: GERRY
Gerry holds the same belief as George and on roughly the same grounds. Therefore he too
has positive evidence for thinking that secondhand smoke is benign. Unlike George,
however, Gerry is not oblivious to the news of the day; in fact he is a reasonably inquisitive
person and enjoys checking things for himself. The problem is that his inquiries tend to be
insufﬁciently demanding and discriminating. They are prone to gullibility, carelessness,
and hasty generalization. Upon hearing news reports afﬁrming the danger of secondhand
smoke, Gerry decides to look further into the matter. The ﬁrst item he comes across
happens to be a report published by an organization with major ﬁnancial ties to the tobacco
industry. The report is aimed, not at a fair and balanced treatment of the issue, but rather
at exposing any apparent weakness or grounds for doubt in the recently publicized research.
To any reasonably intellectually rigorous or discriminating inquirer, the dubious nature of
the report would be evident. But to Gerry it is not. And the result is that Gerry’s total
evidence (which again includes his initial evidence for thinking that secondhand smoke is
not a health threat) supports his belief (Baehr, p.70-71).
Gerry’s evidence also well supports his belief but only because of his “undemanding and
undiscriminating habits of inquiry” (Baehr, p.71). Baehr says that it is clear that Gerry is also
unjustified.
In both of the above cases, George’s and Gerry’s beliefs are well-supported by the
evidence they possess. Thus, EJ is satisfied. However, the problem as Baehr sees it, is that the
reason these beliefs are well-supported has a lot to do with certain defects on the part of George
and Gerry, i.e.—tunnel vision and undemanding and undiscriminating habits of inquiry (Baehr,
8

p.71). Thus, George’s and Gerry’s beliefs are unjustified even though the evidence they have
supports their respective beliefs.
Let’s now consider cases 3 and 4. In these cases, the epistemic justificatory status of the
beliefs are affected by an occurrent mistake or defect by the person. More precisely, the
justificatory status of the person’s “doxastic handling” of information or evidence threatens to
defeat or undermine the person’s justification because of how the person treats or regards this
information or evidence at the time of belief (Baehr, p.75).
CASE 3: DAPHNE
[Like George above.] Daphne believes that exposure to secondhand smoke poses no
serious health risks; she also has some positive evidence in support of this belief. However,
she is neither intellectually lazy nor undiscriminating. Upon hearing about the relevant
research, she does some looking into the matter and nearly all the information she comes
across indicates that in fact environmental smoke is hazardous. Daphne’s problem is that
she is a hypochondriac raised by two chain-smoking parents. Owing to extreme anxiety
about her health, she cannot accept any of the relevant evidence; indeed, she quickly and
conveniently (though genuinely) forgets about or suppresses it. The result is that, as far as
she can tell, her evidence continues to support her belief (Baehr, p.75).
In this case Daphne is suppressing evidence she is aware of that would otherwise cast major
doubt on her belief. However, the evidence well supports Daphne’s belief. So, Baehr is pointing
out that even though Daphne’s evidence supports her belief, it is still in some important sense
unjustified and, like George, this results from her ‘epistemic malfeasance’ (Baehr, p.76).
CASE 4: DORIS
Doris also believes with some positive evidence that secondhand smoke is benign. Upon
hearing news reports to the contrary, she too engages in reasonably careful and
discriminating inquiry on the matter and in doing so encounters a host of data that threaten
to refute her belief. Like Daphne, Doris is unable to accept this data. But in Doris’s case,
this is due to her own extremely strong attachment to smoking. Her habit of smoking
wherever and whenever she wants represents one of few pleasures in her otherwise lonely
and unhappy existence. Unlike Daphne, Doris’ cognitive constitution is such that she
cannot simply ‘forget’ or suppress the relevant evidence. Instead she distorts or
misrepresents certain critical aspects of it. The result is that from her standpoint, the case
9

for thinking that environmental smoke is hazardous is weak and her belief remains wellsupported (Baehr, p.75-76).
Like Daphne, Doris’ belief is well-supported from her standpoint. Unlike Daphne, Doris doesn’t
suppress or ignore her evidence, but she does distort or misrepresent important aspects of it and
then forms her belief on the basis of the resulting perspective. Consequently, Doris’ belief is not
justified (Baehr, p.76).
Baehr argues that there is an important and necessary relationship between epistemic
justification and a person’s evidence. He spends a great deal of time arguing for the following
modified evidentialist principle:
E*

S is justiﬁed in believing p at t if and only if S’s evidence at t appears to S to support
p, provided that, if S’s agency makes a salient contribution to S’s evidential
situation with respect to p, S functions, qua agent and relative to that contribution,
in a manner consistent with intellectual virtue (Baehr, p.82).6

Baehr thinks that E* is a plausible evidentialist account of epistemic justification. E* essentially
states that evidentialism must be supplemented by the constraint which, when applicable,
requires epistemic agents to function in a manner characteristic of intellectual virtue. That is,
even though evidence is necessary for epistemic justification, when a person’s agency makes a
salient contribution to the evidence that person possesses in support of some proposition at a
given time, then the evidence is not enough to justify the person’s attitude. When gathering the
evidence, the person must have functioned in a manner consistent with employing intellectual
virtue.
In response to cases like GEORGE and GERRY above, Conee and Feldman (2011a)
argue that while George and Gerry should have gotten different evidence, such an evaluation is

6

In subsequent chapters I will be careful to refer to a belief being justified and not a person being justified. There is
an important reason for this distinction and it is crucial for my project. I will save this discussion for later but will
briefly say that the reason for this distinction is that only beliefs can be epistemically justified, not persons (or so I
will argue). Thus, E* should read “p is justified for S” instead of “S is justified in believing p”.
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an evaluation of their conduct and may be ‘unjustified’ in some sense here. For example, maybe
George was unjustified in inquiring into the health risks of secondhand smoke. But this
‘justiﬁcation’ claim about his inquiry is independent of whether his belief in the effects of
secondhand smoke, under his actual conditions, has the sort of justiﬁcation that is necessary for
knowledge. The same applies to Gerry. The evidence that George and Gerry have consists in
mental states and it is those mental states under the particular conditions and at that particular
time that constitutes the evidence that they have. It is this evidence, and only this evidence that
determines whether their beliefs are justified (Conee and Feldman, 2011a, p.313).
Conee and Feldman evaluate DAPHNE and DORIS somewhat differently, but with the
same result. If Daphne’s suppressing the evidence is understood as refusing to pay attention to
some defeating evidence, then her evidence does not support her belief on balance. If her
suppressing the evidence is understood as her immediately and completely forgetting the
defeating evidence, then her perspective is as if she had never had the defeating evidence. In
which case, she only has in her possession the initial supporting evidence. Thus, the belief that is
justified is the one Daphne’s evidence supports at that time. In Doris’ case, Conee and Feldman
say that if Doris’ ‘distorting’ of the defeating evidence results in her having different evidence
that does not at all defeat the initial support for her belief, then it is also as though she never had
the defeaters. Her belief about second hand smoke is the justified doxastic attitude she should
have. Thus, Conee and Feldman disagree with Baehr that Doris’ and Daphne’s beliefs are
unjustified. However, they do agree with Baehr that their respective inquiries are badly done as
a result of exercises of intellectual vices (Conee and Feldman, 2011a, p.314).
Feldman points to what he thinks is a crucial difficulty for the view that virtuous agency
somehow plays a role in epistemic justification. To understand this he distinguishes between two
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senses of the epistemic term ‘rational’ (Feldman, 2004b, p.233). First there is current-state
epistemic rationality, which is the sort of epistemic appraisal that concerns whether believing
some proposition is rational for some person at some exact time and in some particular
circumstance the person happens to be in. This is different from another sort of epistemic
evaluation, what Feldman calls methodological epistemic rationality. A belief is
methodologically rational if and only if it is formed as the result of good epistemic methods
(consideration of all the evidence, careful reflection, etc.).
Evidentialists like Conee and Feldman would contend that George, Gerry, Daphne, and
Doris are current-state rational, but not methodologically rational. In each of the above cases, it
would be irrational to believe differently given that their evidence quite clearly supports their
respective beliefs. Each person’s beliefs are precisely what they should be given the evidence at
that particular time and under those circumstances. “Questions about what I should do, or what I
should have done, with regard to evidence for a particular belief are independent of questions
about the relation that belief has to the evidence I have at a given time” (Feldman, 2004b, p.235).
Theories about current-state rationality are not theories of methodological rationality. Theories
about the conditions under which beliefs are current-state rational are theories concerned with
the conditions under which beliefs are well-supported by the evidence, i.e.—the fit between the
evidence one has and belief. Such theories have nothing to say about the methods used to gather
the evidence, what one should think about, or the methods by which beliefs should be formed.
Feldman thinks it’s unclear whether methodological epistemic rationality is even an
epistemologically central notion whatsoever (Feldman, 2004b, p.235). Instead, methodological
rationality seems to depend largely on practical matters. For example: are there more important
matters for George and Daphne to spend their time and energy on, what are the negative
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implications of forming such beliefs, etc.? These are questions that cannot be answered without
information about the agent’s goals and preferences. Feldman thinks that central epistemological
questions do not concern these sorts of practical issues, but rather are questions about the relation
of beliefs to evidence.
III. Goal and Structure of this Dissertation
Given the vast and thriving literature that favors some sort of endorsement of
methodological epistemic rationality (extant in virtue epistemology), as well as the existence of
many discontents about evidentialism as a theory of epistemic justification, it seems prudent to
explore the possibility that evidentialists like Conee and Feldman are wrong about
methodological rationality. I intend to explore this possibility. More precisely, I’ll explore the
relationship between the evidentialist principle of well-foundedness and epistemic virtue, and
their respective relevance to epistemic justification. My focus will be to examine the role that
intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual consistency,
intellectual courage, attentiveness, thoroughness, consistency, etc., play in the justificatory status
of a belief. In exploring this debate, there are important issues to resolve. One important issue
to resolve is whether well-foundedness is necessary and sufficient for doxastic justification. I
will argue that it is. However, I will argue that even if well-foundedness is necessary and
sufficient for justification, this doesn’t exhaust all the ways that the degree to which a belief is
justified is determined. That is, the conditions that evidentialists like Conee and Feldman
propose as minimally sufficient (i.e.—sufficient as well as necessary) for a belief's being wellfounded, are minimally sufficient for a belief's being justified period (justified ‘full stop’ or
‘categorically’ justified), but that there are other factors, namely factors related to epistemic or
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intellectual virtues, that also play a salient role in determining the degree to which that belief is
justified.
My position as stated in the last paragraph means that I agree with Conee and Feldman
that if a person’s belief is well-supported by her evidence and she properly bases her belief on
that evidence, then that belief is justified for her period. Thus, evidentialism is a satisfactory
theory of categorical justification. But, I don’t think that doxastic justification is solely a
function of one’s evidence. So I reject Conee and Feldman’s account of well-foundedness as
being a complete account of doxastic justification. I think that doxastic justification is also often
a function of whether a person gathered her evidence virtuously or viciously. I say ‘often’
because one doesn’t always engage in virtuous or vicious evidence-gathering methods (virtuous
or vicious inquiry). Given this fact, intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness, thoroughness,
intellectual courage, etc., are not a necessary condition for justification. Both Baehr and Conee
and Feldman agree with me on this point. Baehr says that the virtue requirement in E* is not a
necessary condition as it doesn’t have universal application. That is, it only applies when a
person’s evidential situation involves or implicates her agency in some way (Baehr, p.82). On
this point, Baehr says, “…justified…beliefs sometimes arise from the brute or default
functioning of a person’s basic cognitive machinery or endowment (not from an exercise of any
intellectual character virtues)” (Baehr, p.80). For example, “…while working late one night in
my well-lit study, the electricity suddenly and unexpectedly shuts off, immediately causing the
room to go dark. In response I automatically and without thinking form a belief to the effect that
the room has grown dark. Intuitively, my belief is justified” (Ibid). Conee and Feldman agree:
“We also think that virtuous inquiry is not necessary for having all of the justiﬁcation that
knowledge requires. This is illustrated by any example in which a conclusive case for some
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proposition is foist upon someone so forcefully as to overwhelm the person’s actively engaged
intellectual vices” (Conee and Feldman, 2011a, p.313). But contrary to Conee and Feldman, I do
think that in many cases of forming a justified belief, the fact that one engaged in virtuous or
vicious inquiry does often play role in determining the degree to which that belief is justified.
What I just said above does not mean that I wholly agree with Baehr either. Specifically,
I reject E*. I reject Baehr’s claim that engaging in vicious inquiry can render completely
unjustified, a belief well-supported by the evidence the person has at that time (such as in cases
1-4). That is, I reject E*’s constraint regarding when or under what conditions a belief being
supported by good evidence generates justification. To be more precise, I will argue that having
good evidence in support of a belief is sufficient to justify that belief for that person full-stop,
regardless of whether this evidence is against the backdrop of vicious inquiry. However, I do
accept a constraint in which engaging in vicious inquiry can play a salient role in decreasing the
degree to which a well-founded belief is justified. This is still a fundamentally important
difference between my view and Baehr’s.
I therefore accept something like the following account of doxastic epistemic
justification:
DEJ: A) S’s doxastic attitude D at t toward proposition p is well-founded if and only if:
(i) having D toward p is justified for S at t; and
(ii) S has D toward p on the basis of some body of evidence e, such that
a) S has e as evidence at t;
b) having D toward p fits e; and there is no more inclusive body of
evidence e’ had by S at t such that having D toward p does not fit e’
B) If S’s engaging in virtuous inquiry makes a salient contribution to S’s
evidential situation with respect to p, then, other things being equal, the degree to
which p is justified for S will increase.
C) If S’s engaging in vicious inquiry makes a salient contribution to S’s
evidential situation with respect to p, then, other things being equal, the degree to
which p is justified for S will decrease.
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I will only hint at this point as to how virtuous and vicious inquiry contribute to increasing or
decreasing the justificatory status of an already well-founded belief. It has to do with the fact
that, other things being equal, virtuous inquiry increases the probability that the evidence that
was gathered is not misleading. Likewise, other things being equal, vicious inquiry increases the
probability that the evidence that was gathered is misleading. The ceteris peribus (other things
being equal) clause is important because virtuous inquiry will not always make a justificatory
difference. For example, there are circumstances in which, all things considered, virtuous
inquiry cannot increase the degree to which a belief is justified (e.g., local and global deception
scenarios). Evidentialists will reject clauses B and C, but I think many virtue theorists will
embrace them. The rest of this dissertation is an argument in support of a hybrid view of
evidentialism and virtue epistemology in which evidence and often the nature of one’s inquiry
(whether it’s virtuous or vicious) both contribute to the justificatory status of a person’s belief.
My goal in this dissertation is to argue for the following claims: 1) There is a satisfactory
evidentialist account of categorical doxastic justification (i.e.—the concept of a belief's being
epistemically justified period or full stop) and 2) virtuous inquiry is a reliable belief-forming
process that can increase a justified doxastic attitude's degree of justification and vicious inquiry
is an unreliable belief-forming process that can decrease a justified doxastic attitude's degree of
justification. In arguing for 2, I want to point out that I’m following Alvin Goldman’s (1979)
view that justification is not a purely categorical concept. That is, certain beliefs are more
justified than others and one important component in determining the degree to which a belief is
justified is the comparative reliability of the belief-forming process that led to that belief (p.10).
Of course, evidentialists will agree that justification isn’t merely categorical, but they think that
the degree to which a belief is justified for a person is solely a function of the strength of the
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evidence the person possesses. I do agree that the strength of one’s evidence can increase the
degree to which that belief is justified, but I will also argue that the degree of justification is also
often a function of reliability. Thus, I will argue for a two-component theory of epistemic
justification in which justification is a function of one’s evidence but is also often a function of
reliability.
Here’s how I will proceed. Chapter Two distinguishes between two different kinds of
intellectual virtue properties—roughly, properties of inquirers (e.g., being open-minded) vs.
properties of inquiries (e.g., being conducted or inquiring open-mindedly). Here I will raise
objections to theorizing justified belief in terms of "inquirer-focused" properties. I will show
that these objections do not foreclose the possibility of theorizing justified belief at least partly in
terms of "inquiry-focused" properties. Here I will also give and defend a rough, preliminary
statement of an evidentialist view of justified belief in which the exemplification of "inquiryfocused" properties can increase or decrease the degree to which a doxastic attitude is justified.
Chapter Three discusses two major issues. First, I will discuss the distinctions between
different types of rationality: epistemic rationality, methodological epistemic rationality, and
instrumental or practical rationality. I defend evidentialism as an important source of epistemic
rationality from an initial objection to the effect that it simply conflates epistemic rationality with
instrumental rationality. I will also argue that methodological epistemic rationality is not merely
instrumental or practical rationality as Feldman claims, but that it also often plays an important
role in fixing the degree to which a belief is justified. I then discuss a second issue which is
whether an account of epistemic justification should be construed as synchronic or diachronic.
Roughly, a synchronic account of epistemic justification holds that a belief is justified if it is
based on good grounds at the time it is held (current time-slice justification). In contrast, a
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diachronic account of epistemic justification roughly holds that a belief is justified if it results
from responsible and/or reliable methods, proper practice, etc., leading up to the belief in
question (cross-temporal justification). I will defend a hybrid account. Also, throughout Chapter
Three I will discuss various arguments that support the evidentialist notion that having good
evidence in support of a belief is sufficient for that belief to be justified. This discussion will
help to motivate and set up a more fully fleshed out defense of evidentialism in Chapter Four.
Chapter Four is an extension of Chapter Three. Chapter Four motivates, presents, and
defends what I think are the best "evidentialist" necessary and sufficient conditions for justified
belief (full stop). Thus, Chapter Four fleshes out the details of an evidentialist account of
doxastic justification. In doing so I will appeal to Conee and Feldman’s work as well as what I
think is the most detailed account of evidentialism in the literature, i.e.—Kevin McCain’s (2014)
explanationist evidentialism.
Chapter Five further develops, argues for, and defends the aforementioned twocomponent evidentialist/reliabilist view of epistemic justification.
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CHAPTER TWO
Intellectual Virtues, Virtuous Inquiry, and Epistemic Justification
A good ‘theory-neutral’ definition of intellectual virtues is that they are characteristics or
traits that are conducive to intellectual, cognitive, or epistemic flourishing or excellence. This
chapter will explore the types of virtues that are significant to epistemic evaluations of belief
within the context of responsible and reliable inquiry. By ‘responsible and reliable inquiry’, I
simply mean the active and intentional process of attempting to find the true answer to some
question or problem in which a) intellectual virtues (conscientiousness, open-mindedness, careful
observation, fair-mindedness, tenacity, etc.) play a salient and prominent role and b) involves the
use of reliable belief-forming processes such as reason, vision, memory, and introspection (as
opposed to unreliable belief-forming processes such as tarot card or tea leaf reading).
One of two primary goals in this chapter will be to examine what is included in the
category of intellectual virtues. I take it as uncontroversial among epistemologists that the types
of virtues involved in responsible and reliable inquiry are the intellectual virtues. However, what
I take as controversial among epistemologists is what counts as an intellectual virtue and how
they figure into the epistemic evaluation of beliefs, i.e.—whether a belief counts as knowledge or
is epistemically justified. The divide in this controversy centers around two different
conceptions of intellectual virtues: intellectual character virtues and cognitive faculties.
Generally, intellectual character virtues are conceived of as traits or dispositions of
character manifested in someone’s agency. Examples include being persistent and thorough in
one’s analysis, being open-minded about new evidence, maintaining intellectual integrity, being
careful in one’s observations, etc. Cognitive faculties, on the other hand, generally include
vision, hearing, deductive and inductive reason, memory, introspection, etc. These faculties are
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often characterized as virtues, skills, or both. It is common for some epistemologists to deny the
relevancy of intellectual character virtues to epistemic evaluation. For example, Alvin Goldman
(1992) thinks that intellectual character virtues are of limited value in examinations of
knowledge and epistemic justification. It is also common among some epistemologists to reject
cognitive faculties as intellectual virtues. For example, Linda Zagzebski (1996) rejects the view
that cognitive faculties are intellectual virtues and argues that only intellectual character virtues
are of primary importance in epistemic evaluations.
The second primary goal of this chapter is to begin to argue for a plausible view for how
intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, careful observation, patience, etc.,
play a crucial and salient role in determining whether a belief is epistemically justified. Crucial
to my view is that it is not intellectual virtues of character that play a crucial and salient role in
the epistemic evaluation of belief, but intellectual virtues of inquiry. That is, virtues construed as
character traits or dispositions have no bearing on the epistemic status of a belief (i.e.—whether
the belief is epistemically justified/unjustified or counts as knowledge), but such virtues
construed as features or properties of inquiry do (e.g., inquiring open-mindedly being a feature
or property of some instances of virtuous inquiry). I will argue that this latter construal of
intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, careful observation, fair-mindedness, etc., is the only
viable way to make sense of how they bear on the justificatory status of a belief. To accomplish
this goal, I will argue that it is the reliability of what I call ‘virtuous inquiry’ that bears on the
justificatory status of a belief. By ‘virtuous inquiry’, I simply mean inquiry that is conducted in
an intellectually virtuous way or manner—e.g., open-mindedly, fair-mindedly, consistently,
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carefully, patiently, etc.7 On my view, virtuous inquiry is a particular type of inquiry performed
by an epistemic agent, where such inquiry is a reliable belief-forming process.8
This chapter is structured into three parts. In part I, I will briefly explain the difference
between moral and intellectual virtues. In part II, I will explain the two dominant views in virtue
epistemology: virtue responsibilism and virtue reliabilism. I will also point out problems with
each view. In part III, I will begin to defend the plausible view that virtuous inquiry, as a reliable
belief-forming process, often bears directly on the degree to which a belief is epistemically
justified.
I. Preliminaries – Moral vs. Intellectual Virtues
In exploring the virtues relevant to virtuous inquiry, it is important to distinguish between
moral virtues and intellectual virtues.9 Let me start with a working conception of character
virtues. Moral and intellectual virtues are a subset of character virtues. Character virtues are
essentially traits of character that someone possesses that we evaluate positively. Examples of
character virtues are courage, persistence, honesty, tolerance, fair-mindedness, humility,
kindness, cautiousness, determination, benevolence, and so on. Notice that many character
virtues are both moral character virtues and intellectual character virtues. As one example, fairmindedness involves consistency in evaluation. This ‘consistency in evaluation’ might apply to
the concern that all get their due (including oneself) in cooperative arrangements of mutual

7

Strictly speaking, only people (more generally, thinkers) can be open minded, intellectually virtuous, etc. Thus, it's
a category mistake to call an inquiry "open-minded". An inquiry can be conducted “open-mindedly” (i.e.—as an
open-minded person would conduct it). However, the adjectival expressions I use such as “open-minded inquiry”
and “intellectually virtuous inquiry” are just convenient shorthand for the more fundamental adverbial ones. The
same thing applies to expressions like “reasoning open-mindedly” and “open-minded reasoning”. This is important
to make this explicit from the beginning as I will slip back and forth between the different types of expressions.
8
In this chapter, I will refer to virtuous inquiry as a ‘reliable belief-forming process’. However, in later chapters I
will begin to refer to virtuous inquiry as a ‘reliable evidence-gathering process’. As will become apparent, this latter
description fits better with my own account of justification.
9
In making this important distinction in part I, I appeal to Jason Baehr’s account of virtues (2011, pp.1-2).
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benefit or it might apply to how one evaluates evidence. This distinction is important because it
helps us see the difference between moral character virtues and intellectual character virtues. I
turn to this important distinction now.
To understand this important distinction we have to understand the ends that different
virtues are concerned with. Moral character virtues distinctively involve motivations related to
ends such as social justice, the alleviation of pain and suffering, etc. These types of virtues are
concerned with the moral domain. Intellectual character virtues distinctively involve motivations
related to ends that have an epistemic or intellectual dimension such as truth, knowledge,
evidence, rationality, understanding, etc. These intellectual virtues are significant to responsibly
or reliably conducted inquiry. This is not to say that there isn’t a relationship between moral
character virtues and inquiry, but the relationship there has to do with whether one ought to
engage in certain inquiries as they relate to social justice, the alleviation of suffering, etc.
However, the type of virtues directly relevant to evaluations of responsible or reliable inquiry are
the intellectual virtues.
II. Virtue Responsibilism vs. Virtue Reliabilism
Virtue epistemologists all agree that intellectual virtues are cognitive excellences, but
there is an important disagreement about what sort of cognitive excellence they are and how they
figure into the analyses of knowledge and epistemic justification. The two standard views
among virtue epistemologists are virtue responsibilism and virtue reliabilism. The responsibilist
approach is character-based, while the reliabilist approach is faculty-based. A brief survey of
virtue epistemology will help map out these two approaches.
There are too many players to account for in the virtue epistemology literature, so I offer
what many take to be some of the key figures. Guy Axtell is largely credited with the distinction
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between ‘responsibilists’ and ‘reliabilists’ (1997). Key ‘virtue reliabilists’ include Alvin
Goldman (1992; 2001), John Greco (2000a; 2010), Alvin Plantinga (1993a; 1993b), and Ernest
Sosa (1991; 2007). Key ‘virtue responsibilists’ include Lorraine Code (1984; 1987), Jonathan
Kvanvig (1992), James Montmarquet (1993), Linda Zagzebski (1996), and Christopher
Hookway (2000; 2003).
II.1 - Virtue Responsibilism
Responsibilists generally conceive of intellectual virtues as states of character or deep
qualities of a person. Linda Zagzebski most prominently represents the responsibilist camp.10
Zagzebski proposes a motivation-based theory of virtue according to which the concept of a
motivation is fundamental, and the concept of a virtue is constructed out of the concept of a good
motivation (p.82). Zagzebski says that a virtue is an excellence as well as a ‘deep’ trait of a
person (p.89). However, on her view not all excellences are virtues (Zagzebski, p.102).
Zagzebski argues that virtues are acquired excellences and therefore they cannot be natural
excellences. It is often claimed that natural faculties (excellences) are intellectual virtues. For
example, Ernest Sosa (1985) and John Greco (1993) list such natural faculties as vision, hearing,
memory, and other cognitive faculties as intellectual virtues. Zagzebski thinks that in one sense
this is correct because we do sometimes call any human excellence a virtue. Nevertheless, she
argues for a much narrower Aristotelian view of virtue, namely that virtue is an acquired human
excellence.
For Zagzebski, the philosophical motivation for pointing out the category of acquired
excellences is the interest in focusing on those excellences we are responsible for (p.103). It is
necessary (but not sufficient) that a quality or trait be acquired if we are to be responsible for
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Jason Baehr (2011) also provides a nice discussion of intellectual character virtues and their role in epistemology.
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having it. For example, she says, “An animal acting on instinct alone does not have virtue, even
if the instinct is a good one, and the same goes for the human” (Zagzebski, p.103). However,
Zagzebski does concede that we might be able to shape or change some of our natural tendencies
through education. It seems that she has in mind here the fact that we can become better
reasoners or enhance our memory through education. If so, she thinks it might be appropriate to
call the resulting quality a virtue. However, Zagzebski argues, “…we do not praise the natural
faculty or capacity itself and blame the natural defect, and one reason for this is that these
qualities are wholly involuntary” (p.103). At least with respect to moral virtues, that which is
involuntary is outside the moral realm. But this voluntary/involuntary distinction largely
obscures a crucial distinction required in eliminating natural faculties from the category of moral
virtues, namely that a virtue is a deep quality of a person (Zagzebski, p.104).
A virtue is a deep quality of a person, closely identified with that person’s selfhood,
while natural faculties are only the “raw materials of the self” (Ibid).
Natural faculties, capacities, and talents may be praised in the same way we praise natural
beauty or strength, but we do not blame the lack of them. Virtues are qualities that deserve
praise for their presence and blame for their absence. Even greater blame is due to a person
who has the contrary of a virtue, namely, a vice, but we do not blame a person for having
the contrary of intelligence or good looks (Ibid).
A virtue derives its praiseworthiness from the fact that the person who possesses the virtue could
have developed the corresponding vice rather than the virtue they actually developed. “It is the
fact that the person could have gone either way that distinguishes virtue from certain other
excellences, particularly all those that are natural or inborn” (Zagzebski, p.105). Thus,
Zagzebski holds that virtues are states of excellence that a person develops over time, but who
could have developed the contrary vicious state instead. According to Zagzebski then, virtues
are not natural faculties, but traits of character.
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Another important feature that virtues possess is that they are formed through habituation
(Zagzebski, p.116).11 It takes time to develop virtues and vices. This fact is connected with the
responsibility persons have for having these traits of character. “The features of gradual
acquisition and entrenchment suggest that a virtue is a kind of habit…” (Ibid).12 This of course
brings up the issue of whether skills are virtues in some sense. Zagzebski argues that they are
not. She provides a number of differences between virtues and skills, but there is one difference
in particular that best captures this distinction in her view: “Skills serve virtues by allowing a
person who is virtuously motivated to be effective in action” (Zagzebski, p.113). Let us look at
some of the examples she provides.
First, Zagzebski discusses moral virtues and moral skills (p.113). Commonly used
examples of moral virtues are compassion, generosity, and courage. Examples of moral skills
that accompany each of these virtues are:
Skills of compassion: knowing what to say to the bereaved
Skills of generosity: being effective in giving to others
Skills of courage: knowing how to stand up to a tormentor
This also applies to the intellectual virtues (Zagzebski, p.114). Common examples of intellectual
virtues are:


Open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence



Fairness in evaluating the arguments of others



Intellectual perseverance, diligence, care, and thoroughness



Being able to recognize reliable authority

I will not go into detail about habituation. For more on Zagzebski’s analysis of habituation, see section 2.5 in
Virtues of the Mind.
12
Zagzebski does not think virtues are identical to habits. For more see p.116-117 in Virtues of the Mind.
11
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Examples of intellectual skills are (keeping in mind that many intellectual skills are not closely
associated with specific intellectual virtues):


Verbal skills: skills of speaking and writing



Mechanical skills: e.g., knowing how to operate and manipulate machines and other
physical objects



Mathematical skills and skills of quantitative reasoning



Spatial reasoning skills: e.g., skills at working puzzles

Zagzebski concludes that virtues and skills have numerous connections but that virtues are
‘psychically’ prior to skills (p.115). Virtues also have a broader range of application, whereas
skills are more context specific. To sum up her view, she concludes that virtues are different
from skills. Many virtues, but not all, have skills that correlate with them and allow the virtuous
person to be effective when acting, thus we would expect a person in possession of some virtue
to develop relevant skills. However, it is possible for someone to have a virtue but lack the
relevant skill. Essentially then, Zagzebski thinks that virtues precede skills and are strongly
connected to motivation, while skills are more connected to effectiveness in acting (p.116).
Now that we have Zagzebski’s account of virtue, we are prepared to understand her
accounts of knowledge and epistemic justification. I will begin with the latter. “A justified
belief is what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue, and who has the understanding of
his cognitive situation a virtuous person would have, might believe in like circumstances”
(Zagzebski, p.241). “An unjustified belief is what a person who is motivated by intellectual
virtue, and who has the understanding of his cognitive situation a virtuous person would have,
would not believe in like circumstances (Ibid).” On Zagzebski’s account then, in order for a
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belief to be epistemically justified it is necessary that the belief is formed as the result of
intellectually virtuous motivation.13
The first thing one might notice about Zagzebski’s account of epistemic justification is
that it seems to fail to account for putative cases of justified beliefs that do not meet her
conditions. If her view were correct, then it would seem that intellectually vicious persons,
young children, and many animals couldn’t have knowledge or justified beliefs. For example,
for many perceptual and introspective beliefs there is no requirement that they be virtuously
motivated for the belief to be justified. It would seem that I’m justified in believing that I see a
red object in front of me, that I don’t currently have a headache, that I’m currently sitting down,
or that I hear a high-pitched tone in my ear. In each of these cases, it would seem that I’m
justified in holding the perceptual or introspective belief I have at that moment whether their
formation was virtuously motivated or not. Thus, if there are cases of epistemically justified
beliefs that were not virtuously motivated, then it would seem that some of the conditions in
Zagzebski’s account of epistemic justification aren’t in fact necessary for justified belief.
Zagzebski might have a way to respond to this criticism. To get to this response we first
have to understand a bit about how she defines knowledge. According to Zagzebski,
“Knowledge is a state of cognitive contact with reality arising out of acts of intellectual virtue
(p.270).”14 She defines an “act of intellectual virtue” in the following way:

At times, I will use phrases such as ‘virtuous motivation’ or ‘virtuous motives’. Strictly speaking, it would seem
that only persons can be virtuous, but considering that Zagzebski and others commonly use these phrases in the
literature, they are difficult to avoid. What such phrases are referring to are the motivational component of a virtue.
The idea is that a belief is justified if it is what a person who is motivated by intellectual virtue and has a proper
understanding of the cognitive situation that person is in, might believe in that circumstance. This is what it means
to say that a belief was formed as the result of virtuous motives or virtuous motivation. It is not so much that the
motive or motivation is, strictly speaking, virtuous, but that these phrases refer to a belief’s formation being
virtuously motivated.
14
Zagzebski prefers this definition of knowledge to defining knowledge as a state of true belief arising out of acts of
intellectual virtue. The former definition has the virtue of being noncommittal on such questions as the object of
knowledge, the nature of truth, and the existence of propositions. She also thinks it allows a broader interpretation
13
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An act of intellectual virtue A is an act that arises from the motivational component of A,
is something a person with virtue A would (probably) do in the circumstances, is successful
in achieving the end of the A motivation, and is such that the agent acquires a true belief
(cognitive contact with reality) through these features of the act (Zagzebski, p.270).
The obvious difference between a justified belief and knowledge is that knowledge requires that
the belief be true or more broadly speaking is in cognitive contact with reality. A justified belief
is a belief whose formation was virtuously motivated, whether the belief is true (etc.) or not.
Zagzebski also raises the objection I just mentioned about perceptual beliefs. The
difference here is that the objection is directed at her conception of knowledge. She says that it
would seem that her definition of knowledge fails to account for “low-end” knowledge, or the
sort of knowledge that includes perceptual beliefs and short-term memory beliefs (Zagzebski,
p.277). That is, it seems that a person can have knowledge without satisfying Zagzebski’s
definition of knowledge, i.e.—there seem to be cases of knowledge where the formation of the
belief that amounted to knowledge was not virtuously motivated. On Zagzebski’s account of
knowledge, it would seem that only virtuously motivated persons could attain knowledge.
Zagzebski’s account of knowledge would seem too restrictive as an account of knowledge
because animals, children, and intellectually vicious persons could not have knowledge of any
kind no matter how trivial or how easily obtained.
The first thing that Zagzebski says in response to this worry is that her definition of an act
of virtue doesn’t require that a person actually possess the relevant virtue. Nevertheless, “…she
must act the way a virtuous person would characteristically act in that same circumstance, and
she must be successful because of these features of her act. What she may lack is the entrenched
habit that allows her to be generally reliable in bringing about the virtuous end” (Zagzebski,

of knowledge since knowledge may very well include “cognitive contact with structures of reality other than the
propositional” (p.271).

28

p.279). Presumably, this would allow those who lack or do not fully possess a virtue, to mimic a
virtuous person and perform the acts in question. However, as Jason Baehr points out, adopting
such a view suggests that Zagzebski’s view is not genuinely or sufficiently virtue-based (Baehr,
p.41). Baehr argues that, so construed, virtue is not doing any real explanatory work. On
Zagzebski’s view, beliefs amount to knowledge because they are formed as an intellectually
virtuous person would form them. However, in the cases of the perceptual beliefs in question,
the formation of the beliefs is merely brute or mechanistic (especially in the case of animals).
This means that young children and animals lack any sort of motivation component to their
beliefs whatsoever. “The upshot is that if this alternative formulation is correct, nothing having
to do with virtue per se explains why the beliefs in question amount to knowledge” (Baehr,
p.41).
Zagzebski’s response is that there actually are “low-end” motives in play where there is
“low-end” knowledge. In such cases, the intellectually virtuous person is (presumably)
sometimes skeptical of her own senses when there is contrary evidence and she sometimes
doubts her own memory when it is weak (Zagzebski, 1996, p.279). In cases of pain, she may not
question that she is experiencing pain, but she may question, from time to time, why her
introspection is trustworthy. Zagzebski maintains that most of the time the intellectually virtuous
person doesn’t engage in doubt or reflection about her perceptual and memory beliefs. However,
the reason for this is that the person maintains a “presumption of truth” in such cases unless
given reason to believe otherwise. This attitude is a virtuously motivated intellectual attitude, the
opposite of which is what Zagzebski calls “intellectual paranoia”. Thus, on this view, in cases of
“low-end” knowledge, beliefs are virtuously motivated and result from acts of intellectual virtue
(Zagzebski, p.280).
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This response doesn’t seem to help Zagzebski however. It doesn’t get around the
objection raised two paragraphs ago about young children and animals. Zagzebski’s account of
knowledge and epistemic justification is based on the assumption that there is some motivational
component of a virtue in operation. Again, this seems to be gratuitous when it comes to many
perceptual or memory beliefs. Baehr recounts the case of sitting in a brightly lit room, when
suddenly and unexpectedly, the lights go out and the room goes pitch black (Baehr, p.44). In a
case like this, you do not manifest any intellectual motives or action. Instead, you are overcome
with the belief that it is pitch black. The belief that it is now pitch black is immediate and
automatic. At no level do you seek the truth or engage in any introspection about the reliability
of your vision. There are numerous examples like this one that not only involve vision but the
other senses as well, e.g., when you hear a sudden bang or feel some intense pain. The same
goes for memory. There are memories that just “pop” into our mind, e.g., when we smell
cornbread and are reminded automatically and immediately of grandma’s house. In none of
these examples does anything like a motivational component of virtue appear to be operative.
These examples therefore undermine Zagzebski’s virtue-based account for not only knowledge
but for epistemic justification. That is, if we run the same arguments against Zagzebski’s view
of epistemic justification, we get the same results.
II.2 - Virtue Reliabilism
As we have seen, virtue responsibilists do not classify our various cognitive faculties or
abilities as intellectual virtues. Like virtue responsibilists, virtue reliabilists also recognize
intellectual character traits as intellectual virtues but also argue that reliable cognitive faculties or
abilities are intellectual virtues. These cognitive faculties or abilities include sense perception,
memory, reason, introspection, etc. On this view, anything with a function has virtues (natural or
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artificial) (Sosa, 1991, p.271). This would include things like hammers, people, machines, etc.
On this view, a virtue is a quality of a thing that enables it to perform its function well. The
function of the intellect is to attain truth and the faculty virtues (whether natural or acquired)
make this possible (Battaly, 2008, p.644). If the reliabilist conception of intellectual virtues were
correct, then virtue would indeed play a crucial and salient role in determining the epistemic
status of a belief (I will discuss this in detail below).
Two prominent virtue reliabilists are Ernest Sosa and John Greco. Ernest Sosa considers
cognitive faculties intellectual virtues (1991, Chapters 8, 13, and 16). He uses “virtue” and
“faculty” as synonyms (Sosa, 1991, p.138-9, 234-6, and 273-4). Finally, he refers to intellectual
virtues as “input-output devices” (Sosa, 1991, p.224) and “truth-conducive belief-generating
mechanisms” (p.271). On Sosa’s view, virtues are reliable in that they attain more true than false
beliefs.
Perhaps the most ardent critic of virtue responsibilism among the virtue reliabilists is
John Greco, so I’ll focus my discussion on his arguments. Greco argues for two claims: First,
contrary to Zagzebski, he argues that the intellectual virtues need not be acquired, need not
contain a “strong” motivational component, and need not be an “excellence” in the Aristotelian
sense. Instead, Greco argues that the essential component of an intellectual virtue is its “success
component” or its reliability (2000b, p.179). Second, Greco argues that even if Zagzebski is
right that the way human knowers are reliable is through exercising intellectual character virtues,
then this says something about the mechanics of human cognition rather than the actual
conditions for knowledge (2000b, p.180). I will explain both of Greco’s arguments in turn
below. However, before doing so, I should make a brief comment about the fact that what
follows focuses on knowledge rather than epistemic justification. The crucial point of what
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follows is to draw out the distinction between intellectual character virtues and faculty virtues.
Although this discussion focuses on how and what intellectual virtues are relevant to knowledge,
in doing so it will reveal the important role that virtues play in epistemic evaluation more
generally. This includes epistemic justification.15 First, let’s look at Greco’s two arguments for
the two claims I mentioned above.
Greco’s first argument is that Zagzebski makes Aristotle’s account of moral virtue
definitional of the concept of virtue in general and that this is problematic (2000b, pp.180-1).
That is, Zagzebski takes Aristotle’s view of moral virtues to be the model for understanding the
intellectual virtues, but there are other non-Aristotelian conceptions that differ in important ways.
It’s not important for this discussion to go into detail about these differences. What is important
is to point out that there are substantive differences between different accounts of virtue and that
we can’t just rely on Aristotle’s definition as the definition for virtue in general. Greco adds that
if we don’t make Aristotle’s definition of moral virtue definitional of the concept of virtue more
generally, then we can see that Zagzebski, Sosa, and Goldman (Greco too) can all appropriately
be labeled “virtue epistemologists”. As Greco points out, the defining characteristic of virtue
epistemology is that it makes the normative properties of persons conceptually prior to the
normative properties of beliefs. That is, justified belief and knowledge are defined in terms of
virtuous character. Greco argues that Zagzebski, like Goldman and Sosa (Greco too), do exactly
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Ultimately my goal is to evaluate epistemic justification, but I think the role that virtues of inquiry play in
knowledge is largely the same for epistemic justification. Consider what Greco says about knowledge and justified
belief: “On the present view knowledge and justified belief are grounded in stable and reliable cognitive character.
Such character may include both a person’s natural cognitive faculties as well as her acquired habits of thought.
Accordingly, innate vision gives rise to knowledge if it is reliably accurate. But so can acquired skills of perception
and acquired methods of inquiry, including those involving highly specialized training or even advanced technology.
So long as such habits are stable and successful, they make up the kind of character that gives rise to knowledge”
(Greco, 1999, p.287).
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this. Consequently, Greco argues that the real issue is what type of character is required for
knowledge and justified belief.
Greco argues that virtue reliabilists are correct in rejecting Zagzebski’s conception of
virtue. First, he argues that Zagzebski-type acts of virtue are not necessary for knowledge.
Greco asks us to consider a cognitive agent who never engages in Zagzebski-type acts of
intellectual virtue and yet can still be said to have knowledge:
He never manifests the characteristic motivations of these virtues, and is never successful
at bringing about their characteristic ends. For example, he never engages in acts that would
be considered fair-minded, open-minded, careful, or thorough. However, suppose that
despite all this the person is highly reliable in making correct judgments in certain
important domains; he is almost never wrong in these areas of his expertise, and in fact
outperforms other, more open-minded, fair-minded, careful and thorough persons. It seems
to me that such a person does not lack knowledge for lack of Zagzebski-type virtuous acts.
Rather, he acquires knowledge in some other way (2000b, p.182)
.
Greco has us imagine some non-human cognitive agent who is infallible in human domains of
inquiry, but who never manifested Zagzebski-type intellectual virtues. He thinks it’s obvious
that such agents would certainly be able to acquire knowledge, it would just be that they do so in
a different manner than we do. The idea also seems to be that an agent’s belief could be
epistemically justified even though it was not motivated by Zagzebski-type virtues. An agent’s
belief is epistemically justified if the belief is formed as the result of the agent’s reliability (even
if the belief is false). For example, vision is a normally reliable belief-forming process, so an
agent’s belief is justified if it is formed as the result of vision and there is no defeating evidence,
etc.
The second important claim that Greco argues for is that Zagzebski-type acts of virtue are
not sufficient for knowledge (2000b, p.183-4). As he points out, Zagzebski-type acts of virtue
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don’t require the agent to actually possess the virtue.16 Instead, it is possible for a vicious
cognizer or a child to essentially imitate an intellectually virtuous person. A virtuous act is
something that a virtuous person would (probably) do in the circumstances. But Greco points
out that this opens up such a view to an objection that is raised against early versions of process
reliabilism. Early versions of process reliabilism defined knowledge in terms of reliable
processes without distinguishing precisely what the relevant processes are. This brought up the
objection of fleeting processes. That is, it is possible for an agent to utilize a highly reliable
process for a very brief time, and possibly very accidentally. Yet surely, we wouldn’t attribute
knowledge to this person.
The example that Greco gives is of a poor math student who utilizes a correct algorithm
for solving some equation. In general, using the algorithm itself is a highly reliable process for
solving equations. However, this particular student rarely uses an algorithm correctly. In fact,
he usually chooses the wrong one or simply guesses at the answer. If so, then it seems incorrect
to say that he has knowledge when he uses this reliable process. The reason, according to Greco,
is that knowledge requires more from the agent. Simply adopting some reliable process is not
enough. The agent must be reliable. Such agent-reliability might be in the form of some sort of
reliable disposition to utilize reliable processes. However, in this case it is the agent-reliability
and not the process-reliability that is doing the work (Greco, 2000b, p.183).
Now, given that Zagzebski doesn’t require a knower to actually possess any intellectual
virtues, Greco thinks we can also characterize Zagzebski-type acts of virtue as fleetingprocesses. It might be that acting in the relevant way is highly reliable, but it would not be the
agent who is reliable. The agent would not have the disposition to act in a reliable manner, and
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A point I discussed in the last section.
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consequently would not have knowledge when she did act in this manner. Zagzebski does
require that an agent have a “motive disposition” (Fairweather and Zagzebski, 2001, p.5), but
this simply means that the agent possess a disposition to have the characteristic motivation of the
relevant virtue. The difficulty is that Zagzebski doesn’t require an agent to have a disposition for
success in achieving the characteristic end of the virtue. In the case of knowledge, this would be
arriving at true belief (Greco, 2000b, p.183). Greco suggests that one way to modify
Zagzebski’s view to deal with this objection is to add to her definition of an act of virtue that the
agent actually possesses the virtue. Since such virtues have a reliability component, this would
ensure that the agent who acts virtuously is reliable. But this brings up an important question:
“…what role do Zagzebski-type virtues as such play in the revised conditions for knowledge?”
(Greco, 2000b, p.184). Greco argues that they don’t make an important contribution whatsoever.
Greco distinguishes between two aspects of the success component of Zagzebski-type
virtues. First, the success component is defined in terms of the characteristic end of the relevant
virtue, e.g., the characteristic end of open-mindedness is reliable success at being open-minded.
Second, virtues involve success at achieving the final end of truth. Greco quotes Zagzebski here:
“The intellectual virtues are a subset of truth-conducive traits that are entrenched and whose
entrenchment aids their truth conduciveness” (Greco, 2000b, p.184; Zagzebski, p.178-9).
However, Greco points out that Zagzebski-type virtues are not necessarily truth-conducive. He
suggests that perhaps what Zagzebski really means is that in order for a character trait to be an
intellectual virtue, it must actually be truth-conducive.
Now, if the above is true, Greco argues that there is a problem. If we understand
intellectual virtues in the first way, then an agent could act virtuously but be unreliable, i.e.—
there is no agent-reliability. If we understand intellectual virtues the second way, it will be
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impossible to perform acts of virtue and not be reliable, so the above problem is avoided.
However, if this is the case, then the agent-reliability is doing the work and not the Zagzebskitype virtues as such. That is to say that the agent has knowledge because she is reliable and not
because she displays any of the other components of Zagzebski-type virtues. This shows that
Zagzebski-type virtues are not relevant to the definition of knowledge. (The same thing applies
to epistemic justification. It is the reliability component, not the motivation component of virtue,
which contributes to the justification of a belief.) If Zagzebski is correct about virtues, she has at
best given us a correct account of some special features of human cognition, i.e.—that humans
are agent-reliable by having and displaying these virtues. However, Greco thinks that if this
view is correct, it simply says something about the “mechanics of human cognition rather than
the conditions for knowledge” (2000b, p.184). Ultimately then, if Greco is correct about
Zagzebski-type acts of intellectual virtue, then they are neither necessary nor sufficient for
knowledge (the same issue applies to epistemic justification).
Jason Baehr (2011) provides a promising way to reply to virtue reliabilists such as Greco.
In particular, he offers an argument to support the view that intellectual character virtues
sometimes satisfy virtue reliabilist’s formal conditions for an intellectual virtue that is relevant to
the analysis of knowledge. In conjunction with this point, the fact that virtue reliabilists typically
view knowledge as true belief arising from an exercise of intellectual virtues, helps explain that
intellectual character virtues are indeed relevant to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge.
Greco, for example, defines an intellectual virtue as a personal quality that plays a critical and
salient role in a person obtaining the truth, i.e.—only if it best explains why a person reached the
truth (Greco, 2003; Baehr, p.52).17 Baehr argues that there are many cases where getting to the

It is important to understand what Greco means by ‘salient’. Generally, when Y occurs because X occurs, we
identify X’s occurring as a crucially important or salient part of the causal history behind Y’s occurring. For
17
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truth demands a great deal of agency and simply appealing to cognitive faculties to explain the
acquisition of truth is inadequate. It seems that in cases of “high-end” knowledge (e.g., scientific
knowledge), getting at the truth is largely explained in terms of the exercise of intellectual
character traits such as carefulness, thoroughness, tenacity, adaptability, creativity,
circumspection, attentiveness, patience, honesty, etc. (Baehr, p.53).
If we consider cases involving scientific investigation, it is clear that reaching the truth
isn’t just a matter of exercising our cognitive faculties such as vision, hearing, inductive
reasoning, etc. Baehr has us consider the following case as an example:
A field biologist is trying to explain a change in the migration patterns of a certain
endangered bird species. Collecting and analyzing the relevant data is tedious work and
requires a special eye for detail. The biologist is committed to discovering the truth, and so
spends long hours in the field gathering data. He remains focused and determined in the
face of various obstacles and distractions (e.g., conflicting evidence, bureaucratic
roadblocks, inclement weather conditions, boredom, etc.). He picks out important details
in environmental reports and makes keen discriminations regarding the composition and
trajectory of several observed flocks. As a result of his determination and careful methods
of inquiry, he discovers why the birds have altered their course (p.53-4).
In this case, the biologist reaches the truth largely due to manifesting certain intellectual
character traits. That is, these intellectual character traits seem to account for or best explain
why the biologist reached the truth. The biologist discovers the reason behind the alteration in
migratory pattern because of his “…patient, focused inquiry and his refined powers of
observation and discrimination” (Baehr, p.54). From this, Baehr concludes that intellectual
character virtues do sometimes satisfy the virtue reliabilist’s conditions for an intellectual virtue.
That is, in certain cases, intellectual character virtues can and do play a critical and salient role in
reaching the truth (Baehr, p.54).

example, to say that a fire was caused by S’s negligence is not to say that it caused the fire by itself, but it is to say
that S’s negligence is a salient part (perhaps the most salient part) of the total set of causal factors (Greco, 2003,
p.118).
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Virtue reliabilists, according to Baehr, claim that the difference between intellectual
character virtues and faculty virtues, or cognitive abilities and skills, has to do with the source or
origin of a belief. A true belief counts as knowledge if and only if its source is reliable and
cognitive faculties are the only reliable sources of belief. If true, this would provide a principled
exclusion of intellectual character virtues as reliable sources of belief. However, as Baehr says,
this is all dependent upon what precisely a “source” of belief is. Baehr suggests that on a broad
construal, something is a source of a belief if and only if it is the cause or salient cause of a belief
(p.56). On this broad construal, Baehr thinks that intellectual character virtues are obviously
sources of belief (consider the biologist example). On a narrow conception of a “source” of
belief, something is a source of belief if and only if it generates beliefs independently of other
beliefs or generates them in an immediate and non-inferential way (Baehr, p.57). On this
conception, things like memory, introspection, intuitive reason, and the sensory faculties are all
sources of belief, while the intellectual character virtues are not. However, Baehr thinks there is
good reason for virtue reliabilists to deny such a conception.
If the narrow conception of a source of belief were correct, then virtue reliabilists
wouldn’t be able to account for cognitive faculties that do not operate in an immediate and noninferential way. This narrow conception would rule out things like explanatory reasoning,
deduction, and induction. Luckily, the reliabilist does not rule out such faculties. They are
exemplars of what reliabilists consider intellectual virtues. If they did not accept this broader
conception of intellectual virtues, then it would severely limit the class of things we could know,
or be justified in believing, to the immediate and non-inferential. Baehr also denies that there is
some less restrictive conception of intellectual virtue that would include these inferential and
non-immediate cognitive faculties, while excluding the intellectual character virtues. He says
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(and this is important), “This is because an exercise of character virtues is sometimes (perhaps
always) manifested in and partly constituted by an operation of faculty virtues” (Baehr, p.58).
To see this, Baehr thinks it’s important to notice that explanatory reasoning, deduction,
and induction are better classified as activities rather than as “mere default modes of cognitive
functioning” (p.58). That is, there is a more active dimension to the exercise of these former
faculties than the latter. Again, consider a scientist (such as the biologist) who acts out of openmindedness, thoroughness, tenacity, a genuine commitment to the truth, etc. Baehr asks how we
should understand the connection between the scientist’s acts of reasoning and her exercise of
various character virtues. One way to look at it is that traits like open-mindedness, tenacity, a
commitment to the truth, etc., motivate her to continue her inquiry (or, I would add, engage in
the inquiry to begin with). This seems obvious, but these traits might also lead the scientist to
think through the data in a reasonable way or to draw valid conclusions from the data. The
scientist’s open-mindedness might help her avoid making logical errors or perceive otherwise
unnoticed logical connections. Baehr argues (and this is crucial) that we cannot draw sharp
distinctions between the scientist’s reasoning on the one hand, and her exercise of openmindedness on the other. It is not the case that she displays open-mindedness and then reasons
in the relevant ways. Instead, her exercise of open-mindedness is partly constituted by her acts
of reasoning (Baehr, p.59).
Baehr further argues that the relation between intellectual character virtues and standard
reliabilist virtues also extends to the functioning of basic cognitive faculties. The biologist gets at
the truth about a change in migration patterns as the result of exercising certain intellectual
character virtues. “As he studies the birds’ new winter habitat, he notices or sees certain subtle
but critical geographical details that would normally go unnoticed” (Baehr, p.59). Baehr asserts
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that the exercise of the relevant character virtues in this case is partly constituted by the operation
of his visual faculty, i.e.—his inquiring in a careful and attentive way just is (or mostly is) a
matter of making certain visual observations.
Essentially, Baehr thinks that intellectual character virtues are personal qualities that
often play a critical and salient role in a person obtaining the truth, i.e.—they often best explain
why a person reached the truth. Thus, intellectual character virtues are often a reliable source of
belief. However, this view is not without some significant problems.
Ernest Sosa (2015) finds Baehr’s arguments unconvincing. According to Sosa,
“Knowledge is analyzed as belief whose correctness manifests the believer’s pertinent
competence” (Sosa, 2015, p.40). Consequently, the relevant reliabilist intellectual virtue
(competence) must be one whose exercise can constitute knowledge. Sosa claims that
knowledge is belief that is correct, that thus succeeds, through the exercise of competence. But
Sosa restricts the “through” part of this definition because a belief might attain correctness
“through” competence merely because the exercise of some competence puts one in a position to
know.18 This is not sufficient for the correctness of that belief to constitute knowledge.
For, that exercise of competence may not immediately take the form of the correctness of
a belief. It may rather take the form of putting one in a position to exercise a competence,
such as sorting by eyesight, whose exercise does amount to a correct belief, a correct
sorting” (Sosa, 2015, p.41).
Sosa’s claim is that certain competences might put one in a position to know something, which is
different from the exercise of that competence taking the form of the correctness of belief. To
make this point clearer, Sosa has us consider a very simple example:
Suppose a mysterious box lies closed before us, and we wonder what it contains. How can
we find out? We might of course just open the lid. In pursuit of this objective we will then
exercise certain competences, perhaps even character traits (if the box is locked, or the lid
Sosa says that to be “in a position to know” that p is to possess the complete competence whose manifestation in a
true belief that p would constitute one’s knowledge that p (Sosa, 2015, p.43).
18
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stuck), such as persistence and resourcefulness. And perhaps these qualities (in certain
contexts, and in certain combinations) do lead us reliably to the truth. Nevertheless, the
exercise of such intellectual virtues need not and normally will not constitute knowledge,
not even when that exercise does indirectly lead us to the truth (Sosa, 2015, p.42).
This is different than what happens when we finally open the box and look inside of it. Once we
look in the box then we have an immediate answer to the question of what is in the box—say,
that there is a necklace in the box—through a perceptual belief which manifests certain cognitive
competences for gaining visual experience and belief. A belief manifesting such a competence
and, more importantly, one whose correctness manifests such a competence, does constitute
knowledge (Ibid). It may be that certain intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness or
intellectual courage may put one in a position to open the box in the first place, but on Sosa’s
view manifesting such virtues is not constitutive of knowledge. Thus, there are intellectual
virtues whose manifestation helps to put you in a position to know and other intellectual virtues
whose manifestation in the correctness of a belief thereby constitutes knowledge (Sosa, 2015,
p.43). Intellectual character virtues such as open-mindedness, intellectual courage, etc., are not
directly knowledge-constitutive virtues.
Sosa thinks that ‘knowledge-constitutive competences’ are of main interest to virtue
reliabilism. On the other hand, epistemically important character traits such as openmindedness, intellectual courage, persistence, etc., are of interest to epistemology more broadly
and are worthy of serious study, but they aren’t central in traditional epistemology. They are
only “auxiliary” intellectual virtues (Sosa, 2015, p.42).
Marlin Sommers finds Baehr’s arguments unconvincing for similar reasons.19 He argues
that Baehr’s arguments do not adequately support the claim that virtue reliabilist accounts of
knowledge should include intellectual character virtues, and there is reason to think these virtues
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Marlin Sommers. “Can Character Intellectual Virtues Be Reliabilist Virtues?” (Unpublished).
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will not fit into reliabilist accounts. In response to the biologist case, Sommers asserts, “…the
virtues involved seem to explain why the agent obtained specific beliefs about the subject at all
rather than why he obtained true as opposed to false beliefs.” The idea is that if the biologist had
not manifested certain intellectual character virtues he never would have engaged in the inquiry
in the manner he did and consequently wouldn’t have obtained any new findings. Any true
beliefs the biologist might have formed would have been vague, broad, and uncertain. Sommers
argues that the true beliefs in the biologist case are because of intellectual character virtues but
that is the not the kind of ‘because’ for reliabilist theories. Sommers points out that a virtue can
bear on epistemic conduct without being epistemic in the more specific sense required by
reliabilist theories. For example, it might require intellectual courage to engage in the type of
research some biologists engage in, but this doesn’t mean that this courage explains the
biologist’s successful inquiry, i.e.—the sort of excellence performed by the biologist to get to the
truth. Character virtues call for specific actions but they are not themselves skills that an agent
can employ during inquiry to get to the truth.
I think Sosa’s and Sommer’s arguments can also be run as objections against the role that
intellectual character virtues play in the epistemic justification of beliefs. Suppose the biologist
case is concerned with epistemic justification. The possession of certain intellectual character
virtues such as intellectual courage, allows the biologist to improve his epistemic position with
respect to his inquiry. That is, intellectual courage is crucial in getting the biologist to engage in
the type of research that he needs to in order to form justified beliefs about the migratory patterns
of the birds in question. However, the biologist’s belief is not justified ‘because’ of intellectual
courage, rather it is partly justified ‘because’ of the reliable belief-forming skills and processes
that he engaged in to form his belief about the migratory patterns of the birds in question. In
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other words, the biologist needed intellectual courage to engage in the relevant research in the
first place, but what contributed to the epistemic justification for his belief was the reliable
belief-forming skills and processes he used during his research.
I would also like to add that various intellectual character virtues are crucial during the
biologist’s research, i.e.—not just as a cause of the biologist engaging in the research in the first
place. For example, it might require further intellectual courage to continue to engage in
research or it might require a certain amount of open-mindedness to open up new directions of
research, but these intellectual character virtues do not play a role in the actual justification of
beliefs. However, these intellectual character virtues are crucial in the sense that without them,
the biologist might never have engaged in the research in the first place or decided to engage in
certain observations during his research. Essentially, intellectual character virtues create
opportunities for the biologist to explore, but are not relevant to a belief’s justification.
I think these criticisms of Baehr’s view are important and accurate. However, these
criticisms have no bearing on the view of intellectual virtues that I will argue for in part III. I
agree that intellectual character virtues do not play a crucial role in determining the epistemic
status of a belief. However, my view is fundamentally different from Baehr’s view. I'm
interested in the relationship between virtuous inquiry and a belief’s epistemic justificatory
status. This means that, strictly speaking, I'm not concerned with intellectual character virtues
whatsoever. Rather, I'm concerned with intellectual virtues of inquiry, i.e.—intellectually
virtuous inquiry, not intellectually virtuous character. As I see it, the intellectual virtues that are
directly pertinent to a belief’s justification are not properties of a person, but properties of
inquiry. Hence, I’m not going to argue that what does the explanatory work in the formation of
certain justified beliefs are intellectual character virtues, but rather reliable-belief forming
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processes (in this case virtuous inquiry). This should provide at least a good idea for what I’ll
argue for in part III.
III. Virtuous Inquiry as a Reliable Belief-Forming Process
In part III I will begin to make sense of the role that ‘intellectual virtues’ like openmindedness, fair-mindedness, careful observation, patience, etc., or what I call virtues of inquiry,
play in a belief’s justificatory status.20 Again, I wish to reinforce a crucially important
distinction between virtues of character and virtues of inquiry. As we have seen, virtues of
character also include open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, courage, patience, etc., but they are
virtues that make up an agent’s character, i.e.—the agent possesses these virtues as traits of deep
character. They are dispositions that motivate the agent to act in certain ways. For example, in
the biologist case above, the biologist possesses the virtue of intellectual courage and this
courage motivates him to engage in certain types of research. However, it is not this courage
that explains why the biologist reaches the truth, i.e.—the resulting true belief is ‘because’ of the
biologists courage but in the wrong sense of ‘because’. Rather it is the biologist’s excellent
performance in using reliable belief-forming processes that we credit with reaching the truth.
The biologist engages in the research because of intellectual courage, but he reaches the truth
because of his excellent skill as a researcher. Thus, it is not character but reliable belief-forming
processes that are relevant to the justificatory status of a belief. That is, characterizing
intellectual virtues as virtues of inquiry rather than of character allows us to make sense of the
‘because’ relation that is important to a belief’s epistemic status, i.e.—whether the belief
amounts to knowledge or is justified.
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Importantly, however, what follows is not the full account of my view, but a rough sketch of some of the key
pieces. A full account will be fleshed out in Chapter Five.
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Virtues of inquiry are properties of inquiry. They are not character traits possessed by
an agent. Instead, these virtues belong to certain types of inquiry, i.e.—inquiry that is conducted
the way an intellectually virtuous person would conduct an inquiry (e.g., inquiring openmindedly, inquiry involving careful observation, inquiring patiently, etc.).
On my view, an agent need not possess any of the intellectual character virtues in order to
engage in virtuous inquiry. In other words, engaging in virtuous inquiry can be accidental or
simply done on a whim. An agent who has an intellectually vicious character can inquire openmindedly without possessing the character virtue of open-mindedness. For example, a person
who is otherwise disposed to be close-minded can inquire open-mindedly and be successful in
doing so, i.e.—reaching the truth because he inquired open-mindedly. Virtuous inquiry is a
reliable belief-forming process that is part of the agent’s excellent performance or activity in
forming a belief. It is ‘because’ of the virtuous inquiry that the agent formed the relevant belief.
Rather than conceiving of the intellectual virtues that play a salient role in determining
the justificatory status of a belief as character virtues, we should view them as virtues of inquiry.
Virtues of inquiry are properties or qualities of inquiry that, under certain conditions and with
respect to certain propositions, are reliable means to reaching the truth or avoiding error. In this
sense, intellectual virtues, as virtues of inquiry, often play a critical or salient role in determining
the justificatory status of a belief. To illustrate my point, let’s look at Sosa’s ‘mysterious box’
and Baehr’s ‘biologist’ examples.
Take Sosa’s example first. It is true that manifesting certain intellectual character virtues
puts you in a position to know or form a justified belief with respect to what is in the ‘mysterious
box’. But the manifestation of such intellectual character virtues is not constitutive of
knowledge or justified belief. It is when you open the box and look inside that the intellectual
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virtues constitutive of knowledge and justified belief are properly manifested. However, once
you open the box and your visual perception is engaged, it is not just any sort of visual
perception that plays a crucial and salient role in forming a true belief about what’s in the box,
but careful and attentive observation. ‘Carefulness’ and ‘attentiveness’ are specific properties of
the inquiry being used to directly answer the question of what is in the box, i.e.—carefully and
attentively inspecting the contents of the box using one’s vision. Someone could look into the
box, but do so in a cursory or perfunctory manner and therefore not pick up the same visual
information as someone who carefully and attentively observed what was in the box. A
perfunctory visual examination may only yield visual perceptions that are vague and indefinite
(perhaps something shiny and platinum colored), while careful and attentive visual observation
will likely yield visual perceptions that are distinct and definite (a necklace that is shiny and
platinum colored). Importantly, all of this takes place after the box has been opened and the
person looks inside of the box. The carefulness and attentiveness in this case are part of the
visual process of observing what’s inside the box. It is not as if a person is careful and attentive
and then visually observes what’s inside the box. Instead, the visual process of observing what’s
in the box is partly constituted by its being done carefully and attentively.
Baehr would say that the exercise of the relevant character virtues in this ‘mysterious
box’ case is partly constituted by the operation of his visual faculty, i.e.—his inquiring in a
careful and attentive way just is (or mostly is) a matter of making certain visual observations.
But this is incorrect. The ‘carefulness’ and ‘attentiveness’ are not character traits, rather they are
properties of a type of visual observation, i.e.—careful and attentive visual observation. Part of
what constitutes a successful inquiry into answering the question of what is in the box is visually
observing what's inside the box in a careful and attentive manner. It is the visual observation as
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a form of inquiry that is relevant to knowledge and justification, and carefulness and
attentiveness are properties of this particular instance of visual observation. The same thing
applies to the reasoning employed in the biologist case.
Again, consider the biologist who acts out of open-mindedness, thoroughness, tenacity, a
genuine commitment to the truth, etc. Remember, Baehr asks how we should understand the
connection between the biologist’s acts of reasoning and her exercise of various character
virtues. We saw that one way to look at it is that traits like open-mindedness, tenacity, a
commitment to the truth, etc., motivate her to continue her inquiry once she has engaged in the
inquiry. That is, it’s not just that open-mindedness, tenacity, a commitment to the truth, etc., put
her in a position to know or form justified beliefs because these traits might also lead the
biologist to think through the data in a reasonable way or to draw valid conclusions from the
data. The biologist’s open-mindedness might help her avoid making logical errors or perceive
otherwise unnoticed logical connections. Again, Baehr argues that we cannot draw sharp
distinctions between the biologist’s reasoning on the one hand, and her exercise of openmindedness (for example) on the other. It is not the case that she displays open-mindedness and
then reasons in the relevant ways. Instead, her exercise of open-mindedness is partly constituted
by her acts of reasoning. Baehr’s mistake is in thinking that what is relevant to knowledge and
justification are intellectual character virtues. Sosa’s and Sommer’s objections hold if we think
of the intellectual virtues in play as character virtues, but these objections are beside the point if
we conceive of the intellectual virtues directly pertinent to knowledge and justification as
properties of inquiry. Then it makes sense to say that the biologist’s reasoning is partly
constituted by its being conducted open-mindedly.
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Reasoning can have different properties, e.g., properties such as ‘hastiness’ or ‘closemindedness’ and properties such as ‘impartiality’ or ‘open-mindedness’. The reliability of the
reasoning a person engages in is determined (largely) by the properties of that reasoning. So, if
the reasoning is conducted in a hasty and close-minded manner (vicious inquiry), then it will be
less reliable (other things being equal) than if the reasoning is conducted in an impartial and
open-minded manner (other things being equal). Hence, it is not the biologist’s intellectual
virtues as character traits that are directly relevant to her belief amounting to knowledge or being
justified, rather it is intellectual virtues conceived as properties of inquiry that are directly
relevant.
III.1 - Virtuous Inquiry and the Problem of Strange and Fleeting Processes
One concern about my view is that it seems to suffer from some of the same problems
that plague simple process reliabilism. Simple process reliabilism roughly holds that a belief is
justified or amounts to knowledge if it was formed as the result of a reliable belief forming
process. Greco (1999 and 2010) does a nice job of highlighting this problem. The problem is
that simple process reliabilism is too weak because not all reliable processes can give rise to
knowledge or justified belief. One major worry is that simple process reliabilism can’t solve
“The problem of strange and fleeting processes” and that on my conception of virtuous inquiry
as a reliable belief-forming process, it will often count as a strange and fleeting process. For
example, a person may inquire virtuously, but do so out of some unexplained urge or completely
by accident or on a whim. That is, an agent might accidentally or unwittingly engage in virtuous
inquiry, and even if engaging in such inquiry is normally reliable, we wouldn’t ascribe
knowledge or justification to this person’s subsequent belief. Take Laurence Bonjour’s (1980)
now famous case of Norman the Clairvoyant as an example of the problem:
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Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant
with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any
kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power, or for or against the
thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the President is in New
York City, though he has no evidence either for or against his belief. In fact the belief is
true and results from his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in which it is completely
reliable (p.62).
A common intuition is that Norman does not know (nor is he justified in believing) that the
President is in New York City even though his belief was the result of his reliable belief-forming
clairvoyant power. There are no reasons Norman is aware of for his belief, rather he just finds
himself with this belief. Upon reflection, he finds that his belief is without support. However, in
this case a reliable process forms Norman’s belief. Yet Norman is unaware that it was formed
this way. Hence, we are reluctant to say that Norman has knowledge or even justification in this
case. The same thing allegedly applies to my conception of virtuous inquiry. In the same way
that Norman’s belief isn’t justified or doesn’t count as knowledge even though his belief is the
result of a reliable belief-forming process, an agent’s belief that was formed accidently or
unwittingly by engaging in virtuous inquiry is also not justified.
In cases where a strange and fleeting process is used, the belief is formed by a reliable
process but in some sense the reliability of the process is accidental, lucky, or something else.
This would seem to apply to cases in which someone accidentally or unwittingly engages in
virtuous inquiry.
Greco requires that we amend simple process reliabilism and require a disposition to use
the process in question. In doing so, Greco argues we should adopt the following principle:
Agent Reliabilism: a belief p has positive epistemic status for a person S just in case S’s
believing p results from stable and reliable dispositions that make up S’s cognitive
character.
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Greco’s view is called agent reliabilism because the dispositions referred to are dispositions that
make up the agent’s character (1999, p.287-88). If a belief is the result of the agent’s stable and
reliable dispositions, then this solves the problem of fleeting processes. Furthermore, these
stable and reliable dispositions are not strange because they are part of the agent’s
intellectual/cognitive character.
The key to avoiding the strange and fleeting process objection is to ground the resulting
belief in an agent’s stable and reliable cognitive character. To say that a belief results from an
agent’s stable and reliable cognitive character is to say that the belief can be credited to the
agent. That is to say that the belief is not the result of luck, but the result of his own cognitive
abilities. Greco’s account of credit attribution is as follows:
S deserves intellectual credit for believing the truth regarding p only if
a. Believing the truth regarding p has intellectual value.
b. Believing the truth regarding p can be ascribed to S, and
c. Believing the truth regarding p reveals S’s reliable cognitive character.
Alternatively: S’s reliable cognitive character is an important necessary part of the
total set of causal factors that give rise to S’s believing the truth regarding p.
And hence:
S knows p only if believing the truth regarding p reveals S’s reliable cognitive
character. Alternatively: only if S’s reliable cognitive character is an important
necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to S’s believing the
truth regarding p (Greco, 2003, p.123).
If the belief is not creditable to the agent’s stable and reliable cognitive character, then there is a
risk that the belief is the result of some strange or fleeting process (or possibly luck or something
else). On Greco’s view, it would seem that my account of virtuous inquiry is missing this
important credit component because virtuous inquiry is not creditable to someone with a stable
vicious cognitive character. More precisely, the issue is that if virtuous inquiry is not expressive
of or grounded in an agent’s stable and reliable cognitive character, then any belief that results
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from such inquiry cannot count as knowledge or be justified. Thus, it is Greco’s stability
requirement that is problematic for my view. I will address this problem below, but first I would
like to highlight another potential problem for my view related to the present one.
Greco argues for an additional requirement in order for his agent reliabilism to deal with
the problem of strange and fleeting processes. He argues that cases like the Norman case can be
underdescribed regarding the issue of what he calls cognitive integration (Greco, 2010, p.152).
That is, cognitive processes associated with clairvoyance are not sufficiently integrated with
other of the person’s cognitive dispositions (faculty virtues) so as to count as being part of
cognitive character. A disposition is part of cognitive character only if it is both (a) stable in the
relevant sense, i.e.—stable across close possible worlds and (b) well integrated with the agent’s
other cognitive dispositions.21 It might be that clairvoyance is a process that produces only a
single belief and it is completely unrelated and insensitive to other dispositions governing the
formation and evaluation of belief. On the other hand, the senses, memory, introspection,
reason, etc., are typically well-integrated with and sensitive to the agent’s other cognitive
dispositions.
There are two important aspects to cognitive integration: 1) if the products of a
disposition are small in number and rare, and have little relation to other beliefs in the cognitive
system, then the disposition is not well-integrated and 2) the beliefs in the system must be
sensitive to counterevidence, or defeating evidence, i.e.—if the beliefs are insensitive to reasons
that count against them, then they are not well-integrated. Greco writes, “In general, it would
seem, cognitive integration is a function of cooperation and interaction, or cooperative
interaction, with other aspects of the cognitive system” (Greco, 2010, p.152). This would mean

21

Importantly, Greco is speaking of human cognition. That is, there may be cases where clairvoyant knowledge
exists that involve cognitive agents who are very different from ourselves (Greco, 2010, p. 155).
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that many strange and fleeting processes, although reliable belief-forming processes, are not well
integrated with other aspects of the agent’s cognitive system, and therefore the beliefs that result
from such processes do not count as knowledge nor would they be epistemically justified.
What is of concern is whether this conception of cognitive integration also weighs against
my view of virtuous inquiry. However, from this point on I will focus on the issue of
justification rather than both justification and knowledge. This is because I’m ultimately
concerned with the role that virtuous inquiry plays in determining the justificatory status of a
belief. Even though Greco focuses on knowledge, his arguments equally apply to justification. I
will argue that Greco’s stability requirement is not necessary for a belief to be justified (I remain
neutral about its role in knowledge). That is, I will reject the view that stable and reliable
dispositions are an important necessary part of the total set of causal factors that justifies S’s
belief that p. However, I do agree that for a reliable process such as virtuous inquiry to play a
salient role in determining the justificatory status of S’s belief that p, it must be well-integrated
with the rest of S’s cognitive system. I will argue that even if virtuous inquiry does not reflect
the person’s stable and reliable dispositions, it is nevertheless well-integrated with the rest of S’s
cognitive system.
The remainder of part III will proceed as follows. First I will address the stability
requirement issue and then I will address the cognitive integration issue. Additionally,
examining these worries will allow me to flesh out some of the details of my account of virtuous
inquiry and the role it plays in epistemic justification. However, a full account of my view will
have to wait until later chapters.
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III.2 - Virtuous Inquiry and Greco’s ‘Stability’ Requirement
The first issue I will examine is whether my view of virtuous inquiry must satisfy
Greco’s stability requirement. The idea is that the agent’s cognitive faculties and habits are by
definition stable and reliable dispositions (Greco, 1999, p.287). So, any reliable process that
reflects or reveals the agent’s stable and reliable cognitive dispositions is not strange or fleeting
because the cognitive dispositions of an agent themselves are not strange or fleeting processes.
They are not strange because they are part of the agent’s cognitive character. They are not
fleeting because they are stable dispositions and are not the kind of thing an agent can adopt on a
whim or engage in an irregular fashion. This would seem to weigh against my view since I
claim that a normally intellectually vicious agent could (accidentally or unwittingly) engage in
virtuous inquiry even though such inquiry isn’t grounded in or reflective of that agent’s stable
and reliable character and that the reliability of that inquiry can still contribute to the justificatory
status of the agent’s belief.
As an example of a strange process, Greco considers the case of the ‘Serendipitous Brain
Lesion’ (2010, p.149). Suppose an agent has a rare brain lesion that reliably causes the true
belief that one has a brain lesion. Like clairvoyance, the worry is that even if the process is
perfectly reliable, it doesn’t seem that one can have knowledge or be justified in believing that
one has a brain lesion on this basis. An example of a fleeting process is best exemplified in the
case of the ‘Careless Math Student’ (Ibid). Suppose that a student is taking a math test and
adopts a correct algorithm for solving a math problem. However, suppose that the student has no
idea that the algorithm is the correct one but simply makes a lucky guess when choosing it, i.e.—
he could just as easily have picked the incorrect algorithm. Using the algorithm to solve the
math problem counts as a reliable process, but it would seem incorrect to say that the student
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knows or is justified in believing the answer to the problem because there are nearby possible
worlds where the student does not use the right algorithm. The algorithm is perfectly reliable,
but the student is not reliable.
The reason Greco thinks that processes like clairvoyance, serendipitous brain lesions, and
luckily chosen algorithms aren’t reliable is because they are not properly grounded in the
knower’s stable cognitive virtues (or abilities, or excellences) (Greco, 2010, p.150). It would
seem that in order for my view to completely avoid the fleeting processes objection, virtuous
inquiry must also be grounded in the agent’s stable and reliable cognitive ability. The math
student’s belief is not justified precisely because he himself is not reliable. That is, his use of the
algorithm is not grounded in a stable and reliable cognitive ability and so there will be close
possible worlds where he chooses the wrong algorithm instead of the correct one. A cognitive
virtue by definition is stable and for them to be reliable, they must be stable across close possible
worlds.
Now, the problem in the brain lesion case is that there is a lack of cognitive integration.
As Greco puts it, “That is, the cognitive processes associated with the brain lesion are not
sufficiently integrated with other of the person’s cognitive dispositions so as to count as being
part of cognitive character” (Greco, 2010, p.152). Therefore, a disposition is part of cognitive
character only if it is both (a) stable in the relevant sense, and (b) well-integrated with other of
the person’s cognitive dispositions. Remember that there are a couple of key aspects of
cognitive integration. The first aspect concerns the range of outputs: if the products that result
from a disposition or process are rare, and if they have little or no relation to other beliefs in the
system, then the disposition or process is poorly integrated. The second aspect of cognitive
integration is sensitivity to counterevidence or to defeating evidence. In other words, if the
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relevant beliefs aren’t sensitive to reasons that count against them, then they are also not wellintegrated.
Greco claims that cognitive integration is a function of cooperation and interaction
(cooperative interaction) with other aspects or parts of the cognitive system (Ibid). Like the
student’s use of the algorithm, the brain lesion is not well-integrated with the rest of the
cognitive system. It is a process that produces only a single belief (that one has a brain lesion)
and it has no relation to other beliefs in the system. Also, the brain lesion is insensitive to other
dispositions or processes involved in the formation and evaluation of belief.22
So how is this a problem for my view of virtuous inquiry as a reliable belief forming
process? Take the following example:
Intellectually Vicious Vic: Vic has an intellectually vicious character. He exemplifies the
following intellectual vices: close-mindedness (fails to give consideration to competing
evidence), unfair-mindedness (engages in selection-bias), sloppy when making
observations, imprecise in his analyses, inconsistent in applying standards of evidence, and
lacks patience and thus rushes through his inquiries.
These intellectual vices are not reliable belief-forming processes. They are generally unreliable
in helping a cognitive agent get to the truth. Indeed, they are hindrances to getting to the truth.
Further, these vices reflect Vic’s stable and unreliable cognitive character. So, engaging in
virtuous inquiry would not reflect Vic’s stable and reliable cognitive character because his
cognitive character is stable and unreliable. It is completely out of character for him to engage
in virtuous inquiry. Hence, Vic’s stable and reliable cognitive character is not a part of the total
set of causal factors that give rise to his believing the truth regarding something like, say, climate
change. I believe this is correct, but it doesn’t impugn my view.

There are worries about the reliabilist’s ability to explain how reliabilism can be sensitive to defeating evidence.
However, this requires a separate discussion and goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. For a more thorough
discussion of the problem of defeating evidence for reliabilism, see Greco (2010) Chapter 10.
22
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Greco’s stability requirement isn’t necessary in order for a reliable process to contribute
to a belief’s justification. The key to my view is that the reliability component of virtuous
inquiry is found in the inquiry’s success rate at uncovering evidence that is not
misleading. Evidence plays a primary role in my account of epistemic justification. That is,
what justifies a belief full stop, is the evidence that bears on that belief. However, if an agent’s
well-founded belief is based on evidence that he gathered as the result of virtuous inquiry (and
there are no defeaters), the reliability of that inquiry can increase the degree to which that belief
is justified by increasing the probability that the evidence is not misleading. Whether virtuous
inquiry reflects the agent’s stable and reliable character doesn’t matter. Virtuous inquiry as a
process is the only thing that needs to be reliable. In all nearby possible worlds, the process of
virtuous inquiry still increases the probability that the evidence gathered by the inquiry is not
misleading (other things being equal). This is the case regardless of whether the agent is reliable.
The problem of strange and fleeting processes is not relevant to my account because my account
requires evidence to play a primary role in a belief’s justification and virtuous inquiry’s role in
determining the justificatory status of a belief is connected to its reliability in gathering nonmisleading evidence. More straightforwardly, virtuous (reliable) inquiry has a higher probability
of gathering non-misleading evidence (other things being equal) regardless of whether the
agent’s cognitive character is stable and reliable. Thus, Greco's stability requirement is not
necessary for a process to contribute to a belief’s justification.
Furthermore, for virtuous inquiry to contribute to the justificatory status of a belief, it
doesn't matter whether engaging in virtuous inquiry is accidental or unintentional. Vic could
completely lack any awareness of the virtuous nature of his inquiry and still inquire virtuously.
He could also inquire virtuously by accident or on a whim. Virtuous inquiry is either reliable or

56

not. It doesn’t matter whether inquiring virtuously was accidental or done on a whim. If the
inquiry was virtuous, and therefore reliable, then the probability that Vic’s evidence is not
misleading is still increased (other things being equal).
Since, there is no stability requirement, there is no reason that a process can’t be ‘strange’
(i.e.—not part of nor revealing of an agent’s enduring intellectual/cognitive character) and still
contribute to the justificatory status of a belief. Virtuous inquiry does not necessarily reveal an
agent’s stable and reliable cognitive character and can still be a reliable belief-forming process
that plays a salient role in determining the justificatory status of that agent’s belief. Additionally,
virtuous inquiry can also be a ‘fleeting’ process (i.e.—the kind of thing an agent can adopt on a
whim or engage in an irregular fashion) and still play a salient role in determining a belief’s
justificatory status. However, in order for virtuous inquiry to play a salient role in determining
the justificatory status of a belief, I do think that as a reliable belief-forming process, it must be
well-integrated with a person's other cognitive faculties. I believe it is. I turn to that brief
discussion now.
III.3 - Virtuous Inquiry and Cognitive Integration
I see no reason to think that inquiring virtuously (whether out of character or not) is not
well-integrated with the person's other cognitive faculties. Remember that Greco argues that
many fleeting processes, although reliable belief-forming processes, are not well-integrated with
other aspects of the agent’s cognitive system, and therefore the beliefs that result from such
processes are not justified (or do not count as knowledge). I agree, but I will argue that virtuous
inquiry is a well-integrated cognitive process and so cognitive integration is not a problem for
my view. That is, virtuous inquiry as a reliable belief-forming process is (or can be) properly
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integrated with an agent’s other cognitive processes, but that this is required for a different
reason than the one Greco offers.
Virtuous inquiry is a reliable belief-forming process. For example, reasoning is a
quintessential reliabilist faculty virtue. But it isn't simply reasoning that plays a role in
determining whether a belief is justified, but good reasoning, which in many cases might be
reasoning open-mindedly or reasoning carefully, etc. Reasoning open-mindedly and
carefully is a process. You can't separate the ‘open-mindedness’ and the ‘carefulness’ from the
reasoning. The idea is that reasoning open-mindedly would raise the justificatory status of
certain beliefs because engaging in such reasoning is generally more reliable in gathering nonmisleading evidence, compared to reasoning close-mindedly which is not reliable. This also
applies to faculty virtues like vision. In many instances it is not completely accurate to say that
vision is the reliable process that gathered some body of evidence, but good vision, and often
times good vision just is visually examining something carefully and attentively. If you strip
vision of the carefulness and attentiveness, its reliability will likely decrease.
Additionally, the process of virtuous inquiry has a wide range of outputs. That is, the
products resulting from virtuous inquiry are many and varied. Virtuous inquiry generates a high
yield of beliefs. Further, virtuous inquiry usually involves many different processes working
together, i.e.—the senses, memory, various types of reasoning, etc. All of which are wellintegrated with one another. That is, these different processes are not isolated from one another
and work together during the process of inquiry. For example, reasoning open-mindedly is often
well-integrated with using one’s vision carefully and attentively.
Furthermore, the beliefs that result from virtuous inquiry are sensitive to
counterevidence, or to defeating evidence. When we engage in virtuous inquiry, we carefully
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check and double check data, consult colleagues, check proofs, check arguments for validity,
cogency, and fallacies, make careful observations, conduct complex experiments, raise new
questions, etc. Engaging in such activities often requires the full range of our cognitive system.
Furthermore, the various processes involved in virtuous inquiry are related to one another and
sensitive to the outputs of other processes governing the formation and evaluation of belief. For
example, good inductive reasoning is sensitive to new data gathered from visual observation,
good memory is well-integrated with sound deductive reasoning (remembering logical fallacies
properly), and so on.
Now, if this picture is correct, then I will have succeeded in providing a plausible
account of the role that the intellectual virtues play in epistemic justification. More precisely, I
have argued that what we should be concerned with when trying to understand the role of virtue
in epistemic justification is to focus our attention on virtues of inquiry rather than virtues of
character. Too many problems beset analyses of knowledge and epistemic justification that
appeal to Zagzebski-type character virtues. On the other hand, an analysis of knowledge and
justification that makes sense of virtues as virtues of inquiry has the benefit of comporting well
with certain reliabilist accounts of knowledge and justification. That is, virtuous inquiry is a
reliable belief-forming process that plays a key role in determining the degree to which a belief is
justified. Of course, my discussion of virtuous inquiry in this chapter only provides some of the
material needed to provide a fuller account of how virtuous inquiry plays a salient role in the
justificatory status of a belief.
IV. Vicious Inquiry
Throughout this chapter my focus has been on intellectual virtues and virtuous inquiry
and the role that virtuous inquiry as a reliable belief-forming process plays in determining the
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degree to which a belief is justified. This is because my main concern is with the role that
virtuous (reliable) inquiry plays in epistemic justification. A thorough discussion of the nature of
intellectual vices and vicious inquiry therefore goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. Thus,
I will not discuss intellectual vices and vicious inquiry to the same extent as I’ve discussed
intellectual virtues and virtuous inquiry. However, my view of justification also entails that
vicious (unreliable) inquiry often plays a salient role in determining the degree to which a belief
is epistemically justified. So, I would like to briefly say something about intellectual vices and
vicious inquiry. Importantly, many of the same arguments I made in this chapter about
intellectual virtues and virtuous inquiry apply mutatis mutandis to intellectual vices and vicious
inquiry (with certain exceptions of course).
The intellectual vices are counterparts (largely) to intellectual virtues. Intellectual vices
include, for example, close-mindedness, self-deception, obtuseness, hastiness, unfairmindedness, etc. Just like the intellectual virtues, I conceive of the intellectual vices relevant to
epistemic justification as properties of inquiry rather than as traits of character. In the
‘Intellectually Vicious Vic’ example Vic inquires viciously. That is, his inquiry is conducted
close-mindedly (fails to give consideration to competing evidence) and unfair-mindedly (engages
in selection-bias), he is sloppy when making observations, imprecise during his analyses,
inconsistent in applying standards of evidence, and lacks patience and thus rushes through his
inquiries. Vicious inquiry is an unreliable belief-forming process that often plays a salient role in
determining the degree to which a belief is justified. Again, the idea is that when a person
inquires viciously, that person engages in flawed or unreliable evidence-gathering methods.
Evidence gathered as the result of unreliable evidence-gathering methods is more likely to be
misleading evidence. The greater the probability that a body of evidence is misleading, the less
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justified is the belief that is supported by that evidence. Thus, vicious (unreliable) inquiry often
plays a salient role in decreasing the degree to which a well-founded belief is justified.
Importantly, however, vicious inquiry cannot render a well-founded belief unjustified. From
here on out, most of my focus will tend to be on virtuous inquiry.
V. Virtuous Inquiry as a Reliable Evidence-Gathering Method
Thus far I have been discussing reliable belief-forming processes and have deemed
virtuous inquiry such a process. However, as I indicated in the last section, it is more accurate to
say that virtuous inquiry is a reliable evidence-gathering process or method. This is due to the
fact that virtuous inquiry plays a very specific role in my account of justification. That is,
inquiring virtuously increases the probability that the evidence gathered is not misleading and
therefore the degree to which a well-founded belief is justified is increased. The opposite applies
to vicious inquiry. I make this point because from now on I will refer to virtuous inquiry as a
reliable evidence-gathering process or method and vicious inquiry as an unreliable evidencegathering process or method.
VI. Conclusion
In Chapter Two I distinguished between two different kinds of intellectual virtue
properties—roughly, properties of inquirers (e.g., being open-minded) vs. properties of inquiries
(e.g., being conducted open-mindedly). I raised objections to theorizing justified belief in terms
of "inquirer-focused" properties. I argued that these objections do not foreclose the possibility of
theorizing justified belief at least partly in terms of "inquiry-focused" properties. Further, I gave
a rough, preliminary statement of an evidentialist view of justified belief in which the
exemplification of "inquiry-focused" properties can increase or decrease the degree to which a
doxastic attitude is justified.
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In Chapter Three I will discuss the relationship between epistemic rationality,
instrumental or practical rationality, and methodological epistemic rationality. I will defend the
view that epistemic rationality (justification) is distinct from instrumental rationality and that
methodological epistemic rationality (virtuous inquiry being a type of methodological epistemic
rationality) is not merely a form of instrumental rationality (as Feldman suggests) but is also an
important source of epistemic rationality (justification). This is important for understanding how
virtuous inquiry is relevant to epistemic justification. I will then argue that epistemic rationality
is best understood by appealing to a diachronic approach to epistemic justification rather than a
synchronic approach. This discussion will begin to motivate and defend evidentialist necessary
and sufficient conditions for categorical epistemic justification (which I will continue to
motivate and defend in much greater detail in Chapter Four), as well as present arguments that a
conception of evidentialism as a theory of categorical justification is compatible with my twocomponent theory of epistemic justification. More precisely, I will begin to motivate my twocomponent view of justification which holds that an evidentialist theory of categorical
justification is compatible with the fact that reliable evidence-gathering methods (e.g., virtuous
inquiry) can play a salient role in increasing the degree to which a belief is justified.
.
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CHAPTER THREE
Epistemic Rationality
I now wish to switch gears and begin to evaluate two issues of fundamental concern to
my project. One fundamentally important issue to sort out is what kind of rationality we are
talking about when we discuss epistemic rationality.23 First, I will examine a view of epistemic
rationality that maintains that epistemic rationality just is a species of instrumental or practical
rationality. I will conclude that epistemic rationality is not a species of instrumental rationality.
In doing so, we will see that there is a plausible evidentialist conception of epistemic rationality
(what Feldman calls ‘current-state epistemic rationality’) that clearly demarcates itself from
instrumentalist rationality. Second, I will discuss whether virtuous inquiry (what Feldman calls
‘methodological epistemic rationality’) is an important source of epistemic rationality or is
merely a species of instrumental rationality. I will argue for the former view. Importantly, I will
not be arguing that there are two types of epistemic rationality, but that there are (at least) two
things that contribute to epistemic rationality, i.e.—the evidence supporting a belief and the
reliability (or unreliability) of the inquiry used to gather that evidence.
The other fundamentally important issue I will discuss, which falls out from the first
issue, is whether theoretical approaches to epistemic rationality are best conceived as synchronic
or diachronic. I will begin to defend a diachronic approach to epistemic rationality that contains
both evidentialist and reliabilist components. I will then further develop this two-component
theory of epistemic rationality/justification in the next two chapters.

Throughout this chapter I will use the phrase ‘epistemic rationality’ which I take to be equivalent to ‘epistemic
justification’.
23
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Let me begin to motivate the discussion by considering once again the biologist example
from the last chapter:
A field biologist is trying to explain a change in the migration patterns of a certain
endangered bird species. Collecting and analyzing the relevant data is tedious work and
requires a special eye for detail. The biologist is committed to discovering the truth, and so
spends long hours in the field gathering data. He remains focused and determined in the
face of various obstacles and distractions (e.g., conflicting evidence, bureaucratic
roadblocks, inclement weather conditions, boredom, etc.). He picks out important details
in environmental reports and makes keen discriminations regarding the composition and
trajectory of several observed flocks. As a result of his determination and careful methods
of enquiry, he discovers why the birds have altered their course.
In this case, the biologist forms a belief about the migratory behavior of a certain bird species.
This belief is no doubt formed on the basis of some very plausible evidence. However, it would
seem that another important aspect of this case is that the biologist forms his belief as the result
of good epistemic methods (virtuous inquiry), i.e.—perseverance, tenacity, careful observation,
etc. One way to look at this is that the methods the biologist employs in his research actually
expand the type and amount of evidence he has. It appears that without these good epistemic
methods, the biologist would not have gathered the strong evidence he now has. It would seem
that the good research methods he used contributed to the rationality of his belief. To see this
better, imagine the biologist used bad epistemic methods, i.e.—laziness, irresoluteness, reckless
observation, etc. It seems obvious that the data he collected as a result would very probably be
defective and/or restricted. Consequently, we would say that his belief is irrational as a result of
employing bad epistemic methods.
While the foregoing remarks seem plausible initially, Feldman would argue that this
paints an incorrect picture of the nature of epistemic rationality. Feldman distinguishes between
two senses of epistemic terms such as ‘rational’ (Feldman, 2004b, p.233). One type of epistemic
appraisal concerns whether a person is rational in believing a proposition at an exact time and
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under the exact conditions the person is in at that precise time. Feldman says that this is an
assessment of the person’s current-state epistemic rationality of believing the proposition.
Another possible type of epistemic appraisal of a belief concerns the methods that led to the
formation of that belief. Feldman calls this methodological epistemic rationality. Beliefs are
methodologically rational if and only if their formation results from good epistemic methods
(such as virtuous inquiry).
In the version of the biologist case where he employs bad epistemic methods, it might be
that he is methodologically irrational. That is, one can contend that the biologist should have
been more persistent, tenacious, and careful in his observations. If he would have done so, he
would have gathered better evidence. Because the biologist did not do these things, he is
methodologically irrational. On the other hand, Feldman would argue that it is reasonable to
maintain that the biologist’s belief is current-state rational. If the biologist has not considered
whether the methods he is using are good or bad, it would be quite irrational for him to believe
anything else. In other words, the evidence the biologist gathered clearly supports his belief
(maybe that there is no conclusive explanation why the birds altered their course). Given the
situation the biologist is in, the resulting belief is precisely what he should (epistemically) hold.
This brings up an important issue: if virtuous inquiry is just methodological epistemic
rationality (as construed by Feldman), then how could it play a crucial role in determining the
justificatory status of a belief? On Conee and Feldman’s evidentialist view, the only thing that is
relevant to whether a belief is justified is how the evidence bears on a belief, i.e.—whether the
belief fits the evidence one has. ‘Justification’ claims about methods of inquiry are independent
of whether the belief is justified under the actual conditions at a given time (Conee and Feldman,
2011, p.313).
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There are two important issues related to this distinction that need further examination.
The first issue concerns whether virtuous inquiry amounts to merely methodological rationality,
or what is often called practical or instrumental rationality, and whether such rationality is
different in kind from the type of epistemic rationality important for determining a belief’s
justificatory status. This brings up the second issue which is whether an account of epistemic
justification should be construed as synchronic or diachronic. Roughly, a synchronic account of
epistemic justification holds that a belief is justified if it is based on good grounds at the time it is
held (current time-slice justification). In contrast, a diachronic account of epistemic justification
roughly holds that a belief is justified if it results from responsible and/or reliable methods,
proper practice, etc., leading up to the belief in question (cross-temporal justification).24
I will examine both of these issues in turn. I will begin by examining the relationship
between epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality. In doing so, I will look at works by
Thomas Kelly (2003; 2007) and Adam Leite (2007). At issue is whether epistemic rationality
just is instrumental rationality or whether they represent two separate and distinct types of
rationality. I will argue for the latter view. I will then argue that although virtuous inquiry has a
strong instrumental component, i.e.—is largely a means-end or goal oriented process, its
relevance to epistemic normativity (in this case whether a belief is epistemically justified) is due
to its reliability as a reliable belief-forming process. As a result, I will propose that if belief
formation involves virtuous inquiry, then the belief can derive its degree of epistemic
justification from two sources: 1) the strength of the evidence that supports that belief and 2) the
reliability of virtuous inquiry (vicious inquiry can decrease the degree to which a belief is
justified). In making this argument I will examine works by Feldman (2000; 2004a), Conee and
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Later in this chapter, I will provide a more specific and formal definition of what constitutes synchronic and
diachronic accounts of epistemic justification. For now I offer these rough definitions.
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Feldman (2011), Trent Dougherty (2010; 2011; 2012), Guy Axtell (2011; 2012), Keith DeRose
(2011), and Mylan Engel (1992).
I. Epistemic Rationality and Instrumental Rationality
Before digging into part I, let me say a bit more about what I just said in the last section.
I take Feldman’s current-state epistemic rationality to be equivalent to what Thomas Kelly calls
epistemic rationality. Kelly defines epistemic rationality as the type of rationality a person
exhibits when that person believes propositions strongly supported by that person’s evidence and
refrains from believing propositions that are improbable given that person’s evidence (Kelly,
2003, p.612). Kelly’s example is that if I have strong, undefeated evidence that the butler
committed the crime, and my belief that the butler committed the crime is based on that
evidence, then my belief is epistemically rational. Notice that this is an evidentialist conception
of epistemic rationality (justification). It is different from what responsibilists and reliabilists
consider epistemic rationality. The responsibilist defines epistemic rationality as (roughly) belief
that is formed responsibly. The reliabilist defines epistemic rationality as (roughly) belief that is
reliably formed. For the evidentialist, it is how evidence bears on a belief that solely determines
its epistemic rationality. It is this conception of evidentialist epistemic rationality that is in
question in this chapter.
I will also argue that methodological epistemic rationality is not equivalent to what is
referred to as instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality is the type of rationality one
displays in taking the means to one’s ends (Kelly, 2003; 2007; Leite 2007; Lockhard 2013). As
Kelly puts it, “Thus, if I have the goal of asking the speaker a question, and I know that I will
only be able to ask the speaker a question if I raise my hand, then (all else being equal) it is
instrumentally rational for me to raise my hand” (Kelly 2007, p.612). This implies that it’s
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instrumentally rational for a person S to do X if and only if S believes that doing X will help S
achieve some goal S has. However, I will argue that instrumental rationality doesn’t exhaust the
ways in which the methods or processes used to form a belief contribute to a belief’s rationality.
More precisely, I will argue that the methods or processes used to form a belief can contribute to
both instrumental and epistemic rationality.
Thus, according to methodological epistemic rationality, a belief is rational if and only if
its formation results from good epistemic methods, regardless of whether the person has any
epistemic goal or believes that doing X will help S achieve some epistemic goal (in this case, the
formation of true beliefs). Instrumental rationality is a practical or means-end rationality,
whereas methodological epistemic rationality is akin to a reliable process like virtuous inquiry.
This doesn’t mean that a reliable process isn’t utilized as a means to one’s end. The key here is
that a reliable process isn’t merely a means to one’s end. A reliable (or unreliable) process might
also contribute to the justificatory status of a belief. Thus, the type of rationality relevant to
merely meeting one’s ends is practical or instrumental rationality, but this is not the sort of
rationality relevant to epistemic rationality (or so I will argue). From this point on I hold firm to
this important distinction between instrumental rationality and methodological epistemic
rationality.
Given the preceding discussion, there are two main issues that need examination in part I.
The first issue is whether epistemic rationality just is instrumental rationality. That is, I wish to
examine whether epistemic rationality is just a species of instrumental rationality. In doing so I
will defend Kelly’s conception of epistemic rationality from instrumentalist conceptions of
rationality. The second issue is whether epistemic rationality and methodological epistemic
rationality constitute two different types of epistemic justification. I will argue that this is a false
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distinction and that there is only one type of epistemic rationality. However, as I’ve said, I will
argue for a different conception of epistemic rationality than the one defended by Kelly and
Conee and Feldman. I will defend a conception of epistemic rationality in which evidence and
virtuous inquiry both play a salient role in determining the justificatory status of a belief.
I.1 - Thomas Kelly’s Argument
Kelly examines the relationship between epistemic and instrumental rationality (as
defined above). He asks whether epistemic rationality is just a species of instrumental
rationality, i.e.—instrumental rationality in the service of one’s cognitive or epistemic goals
(2003, p.613). This is known as the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality. Kelly
asks what the relationship is between the rationality one displays in responding to evidence in the
epistemically appropriate manner, and the rationality one displays in acting so as to acquire that
evidence. For example, if I want to know the identity of the person who committed the crime
(the butler) I will need to engage in the activity of looking for evidence which bears on the
question. I have the goal of learning a certain truth (who committed the crime), which gives me
an instrumental reason to act in a certain way, i.e.—other things being equal, it is rational for me
to engage in the activity of looking for evidence. This is an example of instrumental rationality
in the service of one’s cognitive goals. Suppose further that I’m able to uncover strong evidence
that the butler committed the crime. “The character of this evidence singles out a certain
response on my part as the epistemically rational response: it is rational for me to believe that the
butler committed the crime” (Ibid). The instrumentalist wants to assimilate the rationality of
responding to the evidence in the epistemically appropriate way to the rationality of looking for
that evidence in the first place. Kelly thinks it is a fundamental mistake to think about epistemic
rationality in this manner.
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Kelly thinks that the most serious reason to reject the instrumentalist conception of
epistemic rationality is that what a person has reason to believe does not seem to depend upon
the content of any goals he/she might possess. Having an instrumental reason is to have the
relevant goal. I have a reason to raise my hand because I have the goal of being called on by a
speaker. Without such a goal, there would be no reason to raise my hand. In this way, an
instrumental reason is a hypothetical reason in the sense that it depends for its existence on the
fact that the individual for whom it is a reason possesses a particular goal or goals. Kelly thinks
this contrasts with the categorical character which epistemic reasons seem to have. By
‘categorical’ I take Kelly to mean that epistemic reasons do not depend for their existence on the
fact that the individual for whom they are reasons possesses a particular goal or goals.25
According to the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality, facts about what I have
reason to believe are contingent on my having specific goals (Kelly, 2003, p.621).
Kelly rejects the instrumentalist conception. He argues that whether we have epistemic
reasons to believe something has nothing to do with having particular goals. Kelly says,
“However, from the fact that some subjects are matters of complete indifference to me, it does
not follow that I will inevitably lack epistemic reasons for holding beliefs about those subjects”
(Kelly, 2003, p.621). Kelly points out that there are many subject matters for which many people
have no preference for having true beliefs, as well as subjects in which people might prefer
having no beliefs whatsoever. Take the following example by Kelly:
Thus, I tend to see newly-released movies after many of my friends. During the interval
of time which is bounded on one side by my friends’ viewing of the movie and bounded
on the other side by my viewing the movie, I often make a conscious, deliberate effort to
avoid finding out how the movie ends—since doing so might very well interfere with my
I don’t want the reader to confuse the way Kelly uses the term ‘categorical’ with how I have been using the term.
On my view, ‘categorical’ refers to beliefs that are justified absolutely, full-stop, period, etc. However, on my view
(like Kelly’s view), whether a belief is supported by the evidence does not depend on the fact that the individual
possesses a particular goal or goals.
25
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enjoyment when I do see it (When conversations about the movie begin in my presence, I
either excuse myself or, reminding the discussants that I have yet to see the movie, implore
them not to “give away” the ending, and so on.) That is, I quite deliberately take steps to
avoid acquiring information about the movie. Sometimes these efforts are successful,
sometimes they are not. When they are unsuccessful—as when someone inconsiderately
blurts out the ending in my presence—it does not follow that I have no epistemic reasons
to believe the propositions which he asserts (Kelly, 2003, p.626).
On Kelly’s view, whether he has the goal of finding out how the movie ends makes no difference
as to whether he is epistemically justified in believing how it ends once someone inconsiderately
blurts out the ending. To think this way is to conflate (1) the reasons which one may or may not
have to seek out further evidence which bear on the truth of some proposition, and (2) the
reasons which one may or may not have to believe that proposition.26
In defense of this, Kelly says that in avoiding finding out how the movie ends, he wants
to avoid acquiring reasons for believing the truth about how the movie ends. However, he says
that if the possibility of acquiring reasons for believing the truth of some proposition is
contingent upon having some goal that would be better promoted by believing the truth about
that proposition, then this project is incoherent, i.e.—“…there is no need to deliberately avoid
the acquisition of epistemic reasons to believe propositions about subjects with respect to which
one has no desire to believe the truth, for one knows a priori that there are no such reasons.
(Indeed that there could not be such reasons)” (Kelly, 2003, p.628). But, Kelly points out that
this project is not incoherent.
Kelly says that he might have epistemic reasons to believe the truth about how the movie
ends despite not having the relevant goal of finding out the ending. This is apparent when one
acquires an unwanted belief—because a friend blurted out the end of the movie or by
accidentally reading about it in a magazine headline. We would explain that forming a belief
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This is similar to the point made by Sosa and Sommers in Chapter Two.
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about how the movie ends is not just a matter of psychological compulsion. That is, it makes
sense to explain why the unwanted belief was formed by citing one’s epistemic rationality, along
with the fact that the person was presented with the relevant epistemic reasons. However, we
can’t make sense of this if the instrumentalist conception of rationality is correct. Kelly writes,
“Put simply: one cannot immunize oneself against the possibility of acquiring reasons for belief
by not caring about the relevant subject matter” (Ibid). The idea is that I come to have reasons to
believe how the movie ended whether I wanted them or not. Thus, with respect to the issue of
whether epistemic rationality just is a species of instrumental rationality, Kelly says:
When it is instrumentally rational for me to Φ, this is because Φing promises to promote
some goal or goals which I possess. The attempt to assimilate epistemic rationality to
instrumental rationality founders on the fact that one can have epistemic reasons to believe
propositions even in cases in which it is clear that one’s believing those propositions holds
no promise of advancing any goal which one actually possesses” (Kelly, 2003, p.630).
Being epistemically rational is not contingent on the goals that one possesses. Our goals are
what motivate us to inquire into some subject matter in the first place, but we can acquire
epistemic reasons to believe some proposition even if we lack the relevant goal to find out the
truth of that proposition.
I.2 - Adam Leite’s Reply to Kelly
Although Adam Leite is not a committed instrumentalist, he offers a response to Kelly’s
argument on behalf of the instrumentalist. The first thing Leite points out is that Kelly’s
evidentialist conception of epistemic rationality is one that the instrumentalist need not accept in
the first place. He argues that Kelly’s characterization is question-begging in one important
respect: “The instrumentalist need not accept that this is a kind of rationality at all—except
insofar as one has the goals (whatever they might be) which would make such behavior
instrumentally rational” (Leite, p.457). Instead, Leite offers a more ‘neutral’ characterization
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which involves the question, “What ought I believe?”. He argues that this question can be
answered only given a specification of one’s goals. Leite agrees with Kelly that in order to
provide an all things considered answer to the question “What ought I believe?”, one would have
to specify one’s other goals and one’s preference rankings for which goals one wants satisfied
the most. And in order to provide a purely epistemic answer, one would have to specify one’s
cognitive goal (if any) (Leite, p.457; Kelly, 2003, p.619-620). With this in mind, Leite offers the
following instrumentalist conception of rationality:
…the instrumentalist can offer an explanatory story roughly along the following lines:
given that one has such-and-such cognitive goals, the rational thing for one to do is to
believe (only) propositions that are strongly supported by one’s evidence—since that’s the
best way for one to achieve one’s cognitive goals (Leite, p.657).
What Leite argues is that Kelly conflates questions about evidence with questions about what
one ought to believe. In other words, we cannot explain epistemic rationality without appealing
to cognitive goals. Kelly on the other hand, thinks that evidence can provide reasons for anyone
to believe a proposition regardless of their goals.
In order to understand Leite’s response to Kelly, we need to look at one of Kelly’s
examples:
If both of us know that all of the many previously-observed emeralds have been green, then
both of us have a strong reason to believe that the next emerald to be observed will be
green, regardless of any differences which might exist in our respective goals … in arguing
for my conclusions…, I think of myself as attempting to provide strong reasons for
believing my conclusions, and not as attempting to provide strong reasons for believing my
conclusions for those who happen to possess goals of the right sort (Leite, p.458; Kelly,
2003, p.621).
Leite says that if you and I both know that all the previously-observed emeralds were green, then
we both know something that provides strong evidence that the next emerald we both observe
will also be green. He says that the instrumentalist can hold this view regardless of differences
that might exist between our respective goals. Leite goes on to say that “…the instrumentalist
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can plausibly hold that this shared evidence provides me with a reason to believe that the next
emerald will be green only insofar as I have a goal which would be served by believing what the
evidence supports about this matter” (Leite, p.658). He has us imagine someone who simply has
no project at all to which the color of the next emerald would be relevant. Leite asks whether
this person is being irrational—not doing what he has most reason to do—if given the evidence
before him he simply fails to form the belief that the next observed emerald will be green. Leite
says this person is not being irrational.
Leite makes the following comparison:
I’m standing next to a door at a convention center. I idly notice that all of the many
people I’ve seen come out of the door have been accompanied by dogs. I am certainly
not being irrational if I fail to form the belief that the next person to come out of the door
is likely to be accompanied by a dog. Perhaps I’m busy thinking about things of greater
interest or importance to me. More generally, as I go through my day, I gain all sorts of
evidence supporting all sorts of beliefs. But I don’t form most of them, and it hardly
seems plausible that I have any reason to do so, given that they are about matters of
complete indifference to me (Leite, p.458).
Leite agrees with Kelly that in arguing for our conclusions we regard ourselves as providing
reasons for anyone. However, Leite claims that when we argue for a conclusion, we think the
reasons we offer are good ones for anyone concerned to form a true belief about the subject in
question. But he says he doesn’t think that just anyone must be concerned with forming a belief
about the subject in question. Even if that person is in possession of good evidence to form a
true belief, we wouldn’t think him irrational if he doesn’t form a belief on the subject in
question. The reason for this is because we don’t think that at that moment the person has any
particular reason to form a belief on the subject in question (Leite, p.459).
Take Kelly’s example of someone trying to avoid finding out how some movie ends.
Leite argues that an instrumentalist can coherently describe such cases. On an instrumentalist
picture, what this person is trying to do is avoid acquiring evidence about how the movie ends.
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Leite thinks that there is no incoherence in this project since the existence of evidence about this
matter is not contingent upon the person’s possessing some goal which would be better promoted
by believing the truth about the movie. The instrumentalist can argue that in fact, even though
the person has good evidence about how the movie ends, he does not have reason to believe how
the movie ends, inasmuch as doing so would not serve his goals, cognitive or otherwise (Leite,
p.659-70). Leite’s argument hinges on the following claims:
Having epistemic reasons to believe that p is having epistemic reasons to do something: to
form a belief on a certain subject matter. But the mere possession of strong evidence
doesn’t give me a reason to form a belief. There are many propositions which it would be
pointless for me to bother to take any attitude towards, even though I possess strong
evidence in their favor. I can’t justly be charged with irrationality—even with epistemic
irrationality—for failing to do so. Even if I have evidence which could serve as an
epistemic reason for believing p, I don’t have any reason to believe that p (Leite, p.461).
In order for someone to have a reason to believe that p, it’s not enough just to have (strong)
evidence of p. One must have a reason to believe what the evidence supports and that requires a
goal or interest in the truth about p. That is, even if the person possesses strong evidence that p
is true and even recognizes he possesses such evidence, he still might not have any reason to
believe that p is true.
I.3 - Kelly’s Reply to Leite
Kelly thinks that the distinction between having evidence for p and having a reason to
believe p would be a useful distinction for the instrumentalist. However, he is skeptical that such
a distinction can be made. Instead, Kelly offers an alternative view of the nature of evidence in
which evidence is itself a normative concept, just like reason for belief (Kelly, 2007, p.467). As
an example, he considers a standard Bayesian explication of evidence, according to which to
regard something as confirming evidence for some hypothesis is to regard it as a reason to
increase one’s confidence that the hypothesis is true, while to regard something as disconfirming
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evidence is to regard it as a reason to decrease one’s confidence. Given such an explication,
Kelly says, “…there is an internal connection between recognizing something as evidence and
recognizing it as a reason to change one’s present view” (Kelly, 2007, p.467-68).
Kelly claims that on any view according to which evidence is a normative concept, there
is no distinction between having evidence that p is true and having reasons to believe that p is
true. When offering evidence for p, one is ipso facto providing reasons to believe that p is true.
Kelly points out that on Leite’s view the following should not seem paradoxical:
I have overwhelming evidence that p is true. But I have no reason to believe that p is true
(Kelly, 2007, p.468).
Kelly thinks that there is something very wrong with this.
Kelly suggests that Leite’s examples all have something in common. They are
constructed such that it seems natural that the person has not actually considered the relevant
proposition (Ibid). For example, in the convention center case above, the person is described as
being ‘busy thinking about things of greater interest or importance’. Kelly says, “It is perhaps
unsurprising that we hesitate to convict an individual of irrationality for not believing a
proposition that is seemingly so far removed from his or her attention” (Ibid). However, as Kelly
points out, the instrumentalist is not concerned with what the person is attending to, but whether
the person possesses some relevant goal with respect to the subject matter. Instead, we should
consider someone who explicitly attends to p in that instance, is fully aware of the strong
evidence in his possession that p is true, yet does not take up the belief that p. Kelly thinks it is
far more difficult to avoid the verdict that the person has failed to respond rationally, even if it is
stipulated that he has no goal whatsoever which would be better achieved by believing the truth
about whether p. Kelly says, that on Leite’s view, it is mysterious why an explicit judgment to
the effect that one’s evidence strongly supports p normally results in a belief that p is true.
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I.4 - Instrumental Rationality vs. Methodological Epistemic Rationality
We have seen that instrumental rationality is the type of rationality one displays in taking
the means to one’s ends. It involves goal-oriented or goal-directed activity on the part of the
epistemic agent. This goal-directed activity is for the purpose of achieving some goal that a
person has—in this case, an epistemic goal. However, as I mentioned earlier, instrumental
rationality doesn’t exhaust the ways in which the methods or processes used to form a belief
contribute to the belief’s rationality. According to methodological epistemic rationality, a belief
is rational if and only if its formation results from good epistemic methods, regardless of whether
the person has any epistemic goal or believes that doing X will help S achieve some epistemic
goal (in this case, the formation of true beliefs or gathering non-misleading evidence). That is,
the person need not have any goal in order for a belief to have methodological epistemic
rationality/irrationality. A belief can be reliably formed and evidence can be reliably gathered,
regardless of whether the person knew she was using methods that would (probably) achieve her
goal of forming a true belief or gathering non-misleading evidence. That is, a subject who's not
explicitly aiming to form true beliefs or gather non-misleading evidence could nevertheless do
so. Of course, whether this picture of rationality is correct requires more discussion.
Furthermore, methodological epistemic rationality doesn’t create a problem for the type
of epistemic rationality that Kelly endorses if we take his view to hold that a belief is justified
full-stop if there is good evidence to support it.27 On this view, if a person’s belief that p at a
given time t fits the evidence the person has at t, then that person has reason to believe p,
regardless of whether the methods she used to form that belief were epistemically good methods.
This is precisely the view I’m defending. Additionally, on my view methodological epistemic
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rationality, or what I call virtuous inquiry, is compatible with this evidentialist view of
categorical epistemic justification. I will discuss this point in the section below.
I.5 - Two Components to Epistemic Rationality?
I take Kelly’s argument against the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality to
be convincing. However, I’m interested in exploring whether epistemic rationality can only be
cashed out in evidentialist terms. That is, on an evidentialist view of epistemic rationality, it is
solely the evidence bearing on a person’s belief that makes believing p epistemically rational. I
think that the evidentialist is correct insofar as evidence is a normative concept. My aim in this
chapter is to determine whether evidence is the only normative component to epistemic
rationality. I contend that it isn’t.
I have already argued in Chapter Two why I think virtue responsibilist accounts of
epistemic normativity are unsuccessful. Instead, I argued that a conception of intellectual virtues
in which these virtues are also properties of inquiry rather than just traits of character, offers a far
more promising account of how intellectual virtues (and intellectual vices) figure into
determining the justificatory status of a belief. I argued that virtuous inquiry is a reliable
evidence-gathering process, the reliability of which plays a prominent role in determining the
justificatory status of beliefs. But in order for this argument to be successful, I have to show that
all epistemic normativity isn’t simply reducible to evidential fit. Doing so will go a long way in
helping to provide a plausible account of the direct role that virtuous inquiry plays in epistemic
justification.
Although I agree with Kelly’s view about the normativity of evidence, it is crucial to
point out that his view does not rule out the possibility that the reliability of virtuous inquiry can
help determine the degree to which a belief is rational/justified. Specifically, although virtuous

78

inquiry is a means-end or goal directed process, the resulting rationality is not necessarily merely
instrumental.
Someone who engages in virtuous inquiry is concerned with discovering some truth or
fact of the matter. A person inquires to uncover information of interest to that person. Virtuous
inquiry is a means-end process and a person uses virtuous inquiry as a tool to secure some end.
Thus, virtuous inquiry has an important practical or instrumental dimension to it. For example, a
scientist who engages in virtuous inquiry is engaged in a process that is an effective means to
his/her end. The biologist engages in virtuous inquiry to understand the migratory pattern of a
certain bird species. It is instrumentally rational for the biologist to engage in virtuous inquiry if
he is interested in achieving his goal of understanding the migratory pattern of this bird species.
On Kelly’s evidentialist view, however, what makes the biologist’s belief epistemically
rational is that the evidence he uncovered as the result of his virtuous inquiry gives him an
epistemic reason to believe that the bird species has a particular migratory pattern. That is, the
belief fits the evidence that p, in this case that the bird species has migratory pattern X. On this
conception of epistemic rationality, there is no other source of epistemic rationality except for
evidential fit. Virtuous inquiry may well have been an effective means to attain the evidence that
the biologist needed, but this is merely instrumental rationality. At least on this evidentialist
picture.
Again, I think that Kelly’s argument (if sound) only establishes that epistemic rationality
is not just a species of instrumental rationality. It establishes that evidence is a normative concept
and provides a reason for belief regardless of one’s aims or goals. But what Kelly’s argument
does not establish is that evidential fit is the only normative component to epistemic rationality.
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Virtuous inquiry is certainly an instrumental tool for reaching one’s goal of gathering
good evidence, reaching the truth, etc., but its instrumentality is not its epistemic normative
component. Again, its normative component is its reliability in uncovering good evidence and
reaching the truth. Now, it may seem that I’m begging the question with respect to the reliability
of virtuous inquiry, i.e.—that reliability is a robust normative concept in epistemology.
However, that is not what I wish to argue for at this point. Instead, I simply wish to argue that if
reliability can help determine whether and/or the degree to which a given belief is epistemically
justified/rational and if virtuous inquiry possesses such reliability, then virtuous inquiry could
obviously play a prominent role in determining to what extent a belief is epistemically
rational/justified. Again, Kelly’s view does not rule this out.
Key to this view is that epistemic rationality need not have anything to do with reliability.
That is, I do not claim that if there is epistemic rationality, then there is reliability. However, I do
think that in order to be epistemically rational/justified (whatsoever) one’s belief must fit one’s
total evidence. More generally, in order for a belief to be epistemically justified it must have
good reasons to support it. Practical reasons are not epistemic reasons. Epistemic reasons to
believe some proposition are evidence. Such evidence is truth indicative. As Kelly says,
“…one’s evidence is what one has to go on in arriving at a view” (Kelly, 2008, p.942). McCain
says that in order for any items of evidence to be something that one has to go on in arriving at a
view, one has to be aware of that evidence in some sense (McCain, p.10).28 He says that it
would seem strange to say that “S knows that p, but she also has no evidence for believing that p
is true” (McCain, p.1). The same thing applies to justification. On this view, evidence is a
primary and necessary source of epistemic normativity, but it need not be the only source. This
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I will discuss what evidence is in Chapter Four. Very briefly, all evidence consists of mental states. Of course,
not all mental states are evidence.
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means that epistemic rationality/justification comes in degrees. That is, if evidential support is a
primary and necessary source of epistemic rationality, then 1) a belief is categorically justified
(justified period or full stop) if it is supported by the person’s evidence, which means that 2) any
additional sources of epistemic normativity will increase the belief’s degree of epistemic
rationality/justification.
Of course, the strength of one’s evidence also largely contributes to the degree to which a
belief is justified (assuming there is no defeating evidence). That is, two people can have
different bodies of evidence in which one body of evidence provides strong support for belief p
and the other body of evidence provides weaker support for belief p. The two people have
belief’s that are both supported by the evidence and therefore both beliefs are epistemically
rational/justified full stop, but to different degrees because of the varying strength of each
person’s evidence. But this doesn’t mean that the strength of one’s evidence is the only thing
that determines degrees of justification. For example, suppose there are two biologists.
Biologist A has gathered evidence X, while Biologist B has gathered evidence Y. But, Biologist
A engaged in virtuous inquiry while gathering his evidence and Biologist B engaged in vicious
inquiry while gathering his evidence. Suppose that both bodies of evidence equally support p.
That is, absent any other evidence and as far as anyone can tell, both bodies of evidence provide
equally compelling reasons to believe p. My intuition is that Biologist B’s belief p is
epistemically rational/justified given his body of evidence, but that Biologist A’s belief p has a
higher degree of epistemic rationality/justification because he gathered his evidence by engaging
in virtuous inquiry, i.e.—using a reliable evidence-gathering process. Biologist B used an
unreliable (vicious) evidence-gathering process and therefore the degree to which his wellfounded belief is justified is diminished.
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What is crucial to my claim is that there can be strong supporting evidence for
propositions which are in fact false. That is, evidence is fallible. We can have what we consider
strong evidence that supports p that we later find out was misleading. Even strong evidence can
support false beliefs. This is why reliability is important. The more reliable an evidencegathering process is, the more likely it is that the evidence it has uncovered is not misleading.
Thus, if a belief is well-supported by one’s evidence and the evidence was gathered using a
reliable evidence-gathering process, then other things being equal, there is a higher degree of
epistemic rationality. However, this claim will require further defense on my part and doing so is
one of the primary goals of this dissertation.
This of course brings up the important issue of whether a synchronic or a diachronic
approach to epistemic rationality/justification is the correct approach. More formally and more
precisely, a synchronic view of epistemic justification/rationality holds the following:
Belief B's justificatory status at a time t is fixed entirely by the "non-historical" (or, "nonbackward-looking") properties that B has at t.
Evidentialism is a synchronic approach to epistemic rationality/justification in which a belief B’s
justificatory status turns entirely on the total evidence E that subject S possesses at time t. In
contrast, a diachronic view of doxastic justification/rationality holds the following:
Belief B’s justificatory status at t is fixed at least partly by some of B's "historical" (or
"backward-looking", or "pre-t") properties.
Responsibilist and reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification are examples of diachronic
approaches to epistemic justification/rationality. I turn to this important discussion in part II of
this chapter below. I will argue that a diachronic approach does a much better job than a
synchronic approach in accounting for everything that contributes to a belief’s epistemic
rationality/justification.
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II. Synchronic vs. Diachronic Accounts of Epistemic Justification
In part II of this chapter, I will continue to defend my two-component theory of epistemic
justification. I will examine whether Kelly and Conee and Feldman have given us sufficient
reasons to believe that a synchronic account of epistemic justification is correct, i.e.—one that
rules out diachronic conceptions of epistemic justification. Thus, I will examine both synchronic
and diachronic approaches to epistemic justification. I will argue that both approaches are
required in order to give a full account of epistemic justification. That is, I will argue for two
claims. First, that the evidentialist conception of justification provides a satisfactory synchronic
account of categorical justification. This simply means that if person S has evidence e at time t,
e supports S’s belief that p at time t, and S bases p on e at t, then p is justified (well-founded) for
S at t (justified period). But the second claim that I will continue to defend is that this
synchronic account of categorical justification fits within a broader diachronic account of
justification in which the reliability of virtuous inquiry plays a salient role in fixing the degree to
which a belief is justified.
Importantly, I’m not arguing for two different types of epistemic justification, i.e.—
synchronic and diachronic justification. Rather I’m arguing that there are two different
approaches to epistemic justification, i.e.—synchronic and diachronic approaches. My view
simply entails that there are two different dimensions along which a belief can be justified: 1) the
synchronic dimension in which a belief is justified by the evidence one has and 2) the diachronic
dimension in which the degree to which the belief is justified is increased if the evidence that
supports that belief was gathered virtuously (reliably).29 But all of this is still referring to one
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I will refine this distinction in Chapter Five. Ultimately, I will argue for a two-component view of epistemic
justification in which a belief can be justified along two dimensions: (1) the fittingness-dimension and (2) the
reliability-dimension.
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type of epistemic justification. Another way to say this is that while epistemically justified
beliefs can result from non-virtuous inquiry, well-founded beliefs that result from virtuous
inquiry are (other things equal) more epistemically justified than beliefs that result from nonvirtuous inquiry.
First, let us look at Feldman’s view of epistemic justification as it relates to synchronic
and diachronic issues. Feldman argues that evidentialism is a synchronic approach to epistemic
justification (Feldman, 2004a, pp.188-89). The rational thing to do at any one moment is to
follow the evidence you have at that moment. Evidentialism is not concerned with how to
conduct inquiry over periods of time. In other words, it is not concerned with how one should
gather evidence, when one should seek out additional evidence, etc. These are diachronic
questions. Feldman claims that diachronic questions are moral or prudential questions rather
than epistemic questions. Feldman says, “If the fundamental epistemic goal is just to have
reasonable beliefs, then nothing about evidence gathering techniques or the like follows as a
means to that goal” (Feldman, 2004a, 188). He thinks that whether you should gather more
evidence or how you should gather evidence depends upon what topics are of interest to you, and
you should do so only if having a true belief about the subject matter of the proposition makes a
moral or prudential difference and only if gathering more evidence or using certain methods to
obtain evidence improves your chance of getting it right (Feldman, 2004a, p.189). Evidentialism
provides no guidance for what to do about such questions.
II.1 - Trent Dougherty’s Defense of Feldman—Reducing Responsibility
Trent Dougherty (2010) offers a defense of Feldman’s view. He argues for the thesis that
“.…any normativity concerning belief that goes beyond fitting the evidence, and in particular
epistemic responsibility, is either moral or instrumental” (Dougherty, 2010, p.534). In support of
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this thesis, Dougherty offers a reductionist argument in which all instances of epistemic
responsibility are in fact either 1) forms of instrumental rationality or 2) moral responsibility
insofar as there is anything defective beyond one’s beliefs not fitting the evidence one has at the
time. Thus, he is making the following identity claim:
Identity Each instance of epistemic irresponsibility is just an instance of purely nonepistemic irresponsibility/irrationality (either moral or instrumental).
This is to be understood as a conditional: If X is an instance of epistemic irresponsibility, then X
is just an instance of either moral irresponsibility or instrumental irrationality (Dougherty, 2010,
p.537).
Dougherty’s argument is a reductionist argument and he argues that we should prefer
reductionistic theories because of their simplicity (Dougherty, 2010, p.537). He says that the
only thing necessary to make the reductionist thesis more choice worthy is to demonstrate that it
can explain the same data as the non-reductionist theory. That is, if there are two theories that
are both capable of explaining the data, then we epistemically ought to choose the more
parsimonious of the two. Dougherty thinks it is obvious that it is much simpler to posit fewer
basic normative categories. Hence, if his argument is successful, then he thinks it more likely
that evidentialism is the more acceptable view of epistemic normativity. Here is Dougherty’s
core argument more formally:
Core Argument
(1) The responsibilist is already committed to the existence of synchronic justification,
moral rectitude, and instrumental rationality.
(2) We ought not multiply types of norms without necessity.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------(3) So if epistemic responsibility can be explained in terms of synchronic justification,
moral rectitude, or instrumental rationality, then the reduction ought to be accepted.30
It’s important to point out that Dougherty uses the terms ‘synchronic justification/rationality’ and ‘diachronic
justification/rationality’. He defines synchronic rationality as rationality in which a belief fits the evidence at a
particular time and diachronic rationality as a cross-temporal assessment of rationality (Dougherty 2010, p.538). He
30
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Dougherty’s aim is to defend the antecedent of the conclusion of this argument, which would
establish his reduction (Dougherty, 2010, p.544).
To get his reductionist argument going, Dougherty offers an anecdote that seems to be
problematic for evidentialism:
I have a friend—let’s call him ‘Craig’—who is a ‘special creationist’. That is, he thinks
that the major species of animals were created separately—as opposed to their having a
common ancestor—and that this occurred 6,000 to at most 8,000 years before present (YBP
is a common metric in sciences that deal with the distant past). I was frustrated with the
persistence of this unfortunate belief. The problem, though, didn’t seem to be that his
beliefs didn’t fit his evidence—they did seem to fit his evidence, for he had read very
narrowly on the subject and had been raised and schooled all his life in an apparently
reliable community which sustained this belief in the usual social ways, and which had
reasonable-sounding stories for why people deny their views. Rather, the problem seemed
to be precisely that he only had the very limited evidence he had, since I’d often
recommended books challenging his views (Dougherty, 2010, p.538).
According to Dougherty, it appears that Craig’s belief is synchronically rational, i.e.—it seems to
fit the evidence he had during that current time-slice. 31 However, his belief was not
diachronically rational, i.e.—cross-temporally rational. Now in order to assess the diachronic
justification of Craig’s belief we have to look at it over some particular interval of time.

also uses the phrase ‘synchronic (evidential) justification’. I believe the way he uses these terms is a mistake. It
leads the reader to believe that there are two types of justification instead of one, i.e.—synchronic justification and
diachronic justification. Throughout this chapter I have used the phrases ‘synchronic accounts/approaches to
epistemic justification/rationality’ and ‘diachronic accounts/approaches to epistemic justification/rationality’. This
is crucial if we want to maintain that there is only one type of justification that we are trying to explain. I will be
concerned with synchronic and diachronic accounts/approaches, which I believe is the real concern in this debate.
31
Contrary to Dougherty’s claim, I don’t think that Craig’s belief is clearly justified prior to getting additional
evidence from another person. Craig seems to have done some reading on the subject of special creationism, albeit
narrowly, which doesn’t seem to constitute sufficiently strong evidence to support his belief. The rest of his
evidence also seems pretty flimsy. Craig doesn’t seem to have enough evidential support for his belief to be even
weakly justified. Just because Craig has some evidence that supports his belief doesn’t mean his belief is justified.
That is, mere evidential support isn’t enough for propositional justification. Feldman supports this same point with
an example: If you learn from a reliable weather report that there’s a 51% chance of rain tomorrow, then while your
total evidence now supports the proposition that “It’ll rain tomorrow”, you’re not yet justified in believing it’ll rain
tomorrow (Feldman, 2003, p.15). Evidential support must be sufficiently strong for propositional justification.
However, even if there is a question about whether Craig's evidence supported his belief initially, I don't think it
causes any major problems for Dougherty's example because we can just suppose for the sake of argument that
Craig's belief fits his evidence sufficiently for propositional justification and then proceed with the rest of
Dougherty's argument.
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Consider the time at which it is suggested to Craig that he read some books that provide strong
arguments against the young-Earth creationist view. Suppose Craig refuses to read these books.
This appears to be a case of epistemic irresponsibility (suppose there is no good reason why he
shouldn’t read them). Furthermore, it seems that Craig has no new evidence since he has refused
to read the books (I will address this below since this doesn’t actually seem to be the case).
However, evidentialism requires that a change in the epistemic status of a belief must issue from
a change in evidential status. To see this challenge more clearly, Dougherty provides the Craig
Argument more formally:
The Craig Argument
(1) In the case of Craig the creationist, there is a change (a drop) in epistemic status of his
belief.
(2) However, there is no change in his evidential status.
(3) If 1 and 2, then Identity is false, unless the negative evaluation can be explained by
instrumental irrationality or moral irresponsibility.
(4) The negative evaluation can’t be explained in terms of practical irrationality.
(5) The negative evaluation can’t be explained in terms of moral irresponsibility.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(6) So Identity is false. (Dougherty, 2010, p.539)
This argument is supposed to weigh in favor of the irreducibility thesis against the reductionist.
This is a valid argument, but Dougherty argues that it is not sound. Since his identity thesis is
disjunctive, his strategy is to argue (~4 v ~5).
Importantly, Dougherty acknowledges that premise (2) may also be false. It is
controversial whether the disagreement of an epistemic peer constitutes evidence against one’s
belief. He thinks that it does constitute evidence against one’s belief. If so, then (2) is false and
Craig’s refusal to read the suggested books means that he is ignoring important evidence against
his belief (ignoring his reliable friend’s suggestion). So there is a good evidentialist explanation
for why Craig’s justification drops, i.e.—because his belief no longer fits the evidence (or at
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least, doesn't fit the expanded body of evidence as well as it fit the initial body of evidence).
Craig’s belief at time t (before his reliable friend’s suggestion) is justified because his belief fits
his evidence, but his belief at t + 1 (after his reliable friend’s suggestion) is no longer
evidentially justified (or less justified) because he gets partially defeating evidence from his
friend’s testimony. Craig ought to suspend judgment. Thus, the change in the epistemic status of
Craig’s belief is a change in synchronic justification over two times (t and t+1). So the
appearance of epistemic irresponsibility in this case can be partly explained by the fact that Craig
is not being sensitive to the evidence he has. Dougherty argues that this can be explained by a
couple of things: 1) it could be the result of some cognitive dysfunction, but then it hardly seems
that we could blame Craig for holding the belief he does (unless maybe the dysfunction was selfinflicted) or 2) through some discrete act that is a case of instrumental irrationality or purely
moral irresponsibility (Dougherty, 2010, p.539-40). Let’s look at how Dougherty cashes this out.
Dougherty holds that if there is any sort of evaluation of a belief other than evidential fit,
then the evaluation is either instrumental or moral. There is either something at stake in the
matter or there is not. If there is nothing at stake, then there is nothing irresponsible in not being
diligent and thorough. If there is something at stake, then it is related to one’s own interests or
the interests of others. If it is related to one’s own concerns then it is easily explained in terms of
instrumental irrationality. If it concerns the interests of others then you either have a duty to
promote their interests or you don’t. If you don’t then there is no irresponsibility. If you do, then
the irresponsibility is moral. All cases of epistemic irresponsibility (other than not being
sensitive to one’s evidence) can be explained in one of these two ways (Dougherty, 2010, p.53940).
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However, Dougherty points out that the Craig case can be retold so that his belief does fit
the evidence and yet there is still irresponsibility. The question is whether this causes problems
for the evidentialist. Dougherty thinks not. Suppose now that premise (2) is true (there is no
change in Craig’s evidential status), but this time Craig lowers his credence to the right degree of
belief such that his belief now fits his evidence (which includes his friend’s testimony). There is
peer disagreement that serves as evidence against Craig’s view, but a suspension of judgment is
not required. In this case, Dougherty stipulates that Craig’s credence is still very high. With (2)
set to true, there is a potential counter-example to the following evidentialist thesis:
S’s belief B at t is subject to negative epistemic evaluation only if B fails to fit S’s evidence
at t (Dougherty, 2010, p.541).
An epistemically responsible agent is one who considers his reliable friend’s testimony as
evidence against his own belief. If Craig is aware of this fact, wants to have true beliefs about
creationism, recognizes that he has the time to read the books, and has no moral obligation not to
read them, then he is clearly instrumentally irrational for failing to read the books. That is, he is
failing to attempt to secure his goal or end by what is—by his own lights—an effective means.
Hence, premise (4) is false.
Now, if Craig is blamed for not caring enough about the truth as a reason for failing to
read the books, then such blameworthiness might be construed as a type of moral
blameworthiness. It might be that to lack a sufficient desire for the truth makes someone a
morally bad person somehow. For example, someone might have a moral duty to his/her
community to believe certain things that contribute to the well-being of that community. This
might include the duty to provide an accurate account of the nature of the world to one’s
offspring. If this is what is happening in Craig’s case, then the failing is due to moral
irresponsibility. Hence, premise (5) above is false (Dougherty, 2010, p.542).
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If Dougherty’s arguments are sound, then he has successfully defended the antecedent in
the conclusion of his Core Argument. That is, he has established that epistemic responsibility
can be explained in terms of synchronic justification, moral rectitude, or instrumental rationality.
Hence, his reduction goes through (or at least, he has successfully defended such a reduction
from one interesting argument to the contrary, i.e.—The Craig Argument).
II.2 - Responses to Dougherty—Recovering Responsibility?
Guy Axtell (2011) provides a lengthy response to Dougherty in an attempt to make a case
for diachronic approaches to epistemic justification. In particular he defends a responsibilist
view of epistemic justification in which the methodology we use, intellectual virtues in play, etc.,
play a prominent role in a belief’s epistemic justificatory status. Axtell provides many arguments
against Dougherty which I do not have the space to address. However, many of his arguments
can be handled by the arguments I made against responsibilism in Chapter Two. Having said
that, there are important points that he makes that do support my two-component view of
epistemic justification.
As we have seen, evidentialism holds that when a person’s belief fits the evidence, then
all other forms of negative evaluation concerning belief are either moral or instrumental. Among
the criticisms Axtell has against this view is that it is belief-centric. That is, Axtell thinks that it
is a mistake to apply conceptions of epistemic normativity solely to beliefs. Instead, he thinks
there is an important sense in which epistemic normativity applies to persons (agents) and their
habits and dispositions (Axtell, 2011, p.432 and 434). Axtell takes personal justification to be
more basic than doxastic or propositional justification (or at least considers it to be an important
source of justification). More precisely, he claims that there is more to epistemic normativity
and to an appropriate understanding of responsibility-relevant norms than evidential fit.
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Axtell believes that the evaluation of persons (agents), as opposed to the evaluation of
only beliefs (cognitive states), is properly part of the theory of knowledge, and that the
evaluation of persons is never wholly captured by a synchronic approach to justification
abstractable from motivational factors and from habits of inquiry. Axtell thinks the latter is
properly part of the theory of knowledge. Dougherty rejects such a view. Dougherty argues that
persons can only be evaluated for their actions or their properties. Beliefs are not actions, but
acts of inquiry are. For example, walking to the library, checking out a book and reading it,
interviewing witnesses, and conducting experiments, are all types of actions. According to
Dougherty, “….such acts are just as easily evaluable morally and rationally when they are aimed
at forming true beliefs as they are when aimed at finding a girlfriend” (Dougherty, 2011, p.627).
But what about properties of a person?
Dougherty argues that epistemically evaluable properties cannot be actions, but maybe
they are habits or dispositions. However, he thinks there is a difficult generality problem that
plagues such a view. He asks us to consider the following dispositions: “to inquire diligently; to
inquire diligently on matters non-religious; to inquire diligently on matters horticultural; to
inquire diligently on Tuesdays; to inquire diligently after having had coffee; to inquire diligently
on matters caffeinated” (Ibid). How much narrower can these norms be, he asks? And what
about other types of dispositions such as to play games fairly? Dougherty asks, “Is there a sui
generis, emergent kind of laudatory normativity which evaluates such dispositions?” (Ibid). His
conclusion is that whether it makes sense to evaluate someone’s dispositional properties doesn’t
give us any reason to postulate new types of fundamental normative categories outside of the
moral, evidential, and practical. Again, Dougherty holds that every proposed example of
epistemic irresponsibility is either moral irresponsibility or instrumental irrationality.
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Furthermore, Dougherty argues “….that when a morally irresponsible action has to do
with a belief the irresponsibility doesn’t take on some sui generis ‘epistemic’ nature any more
than forgetting to feed the cat takes on a sui generis, emergent ‘feline irresponsibility’”
(Dougherty, 2011, p.626). This also applies to intellectual dispositions and habits,
mutatis mutandis.
The bad habit of over-feeding the cat does not imply the existence of some sui generis,
emergent cat normativity. It’s just a bad habit that involves a cat. The habit of underfeeding a mind doesn’t imply the existence of some sui generis, emergent epistemic
normativity. It’s just a bad habit that involves a mind. Some people are quite generally
prudent, others quite generally imprudent, and others spotty. But it would be profligate to
posit an emergent form of normativity for every hole in someone’s prudence (Dougherty,
2011, p.629).
Just because some practical aim is ‘epistemic’ in nature, doesn’t mean that some new natural
kind of normativity is created, any more than in a case where the practical aim is distinctively
automotive (Dougherty 2011, p.630).
Dougherty argues that the same thing applies to moral irresponsibility such as forgetting
to mail an important check, drinking too much, or spending too much on a new watch. All of
these forms of irresponsibility fall under the same category of moral irresponsibility. It wouldn’t
make sense to break these items up into different categories of irresponsibility because they are
too dissimilar from one another, i.e.—memorial irresponsibility, bodily irresponsibility, and
fiscal responsibility. Dougherty argues that these are all cases of moral irresponsibility in
different domains of life. The same line of thinking applies to cases of epistemic irresponsibility.
There is no new, natural kind of normativity called epistemic irresponsibility but instead there is
a form of moral or practical failure that has epistemic consequences (Dougherty, 2012, p.282).
But before we concede to Dougherty, perhaps we should further consider the view that
there is some such thing as ‘personal justification’ in a bit more detail.
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II.3 – Doxastic Justification vs. Personal Justification
Mylan Engel (1992) argues that there are two types of justification: doxastic justification and
personal justification. He argues that the following equivalency thesis is false:
(ET) S is epistemically justified in believing that p iff S's belief that p is epistemically
justified (Engel, p.135).32
The left-hand side of this biconditional is evaluating S (the person), as being epistemically
justified and therefore it is persons or (more broadly) cognizers that are being evaluated. The
right-hand side of this biconditional is evaluating the justificatory status of S’s belief. Engel
argues that the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the biconditional are not equivalent and
that both persons and beliefs can be epistemically evaluated. The idea is that people are often
epistemically evaluated in terms of the reasoning that led to their beliefs, e.g., if they have
reasoned well regardless of the belief they have adopted. People’s beliefs are also positively
epistemically evaluated even when their belief was arrived at in an epistemically irresponsible
way. Engel has us consider the following example to illustrate his point:
Consider Sally the misinformed logic student. Sally is told by her incompetent logic
instructor that modus ponens is an invalid argument form. Not realizing her instructor's
incompetence, she comes to regard modus ponens as an invalid form. One day, in a moment
of wanton logical abandon, she comes to hold a belief on the basis of a modus ponens
argument with obviously true premises. Here we have a situation where Sally's belief is
perfectly reasonable (since it follows from obviously true premises), but Sally is unjustified
in believing it (because, given her situation, she is being epistemically irresponsible in
using modus ponens). Thus, her belief is evaluated positively, while she is evaluated
negatively, in direct contradiction to the claim that beliefs and believers cannot be evaluated
independently (Engel, p.135-36).

32

I have been concerned with doxastic justification or what it means for a belief to be justified. I do think that the
left-hand side and the right-hand side of ET are not equivalent. However, I disagree with Engel that each side of the
biconditional represents a distinct type of justification, i.e.—doxastic vs. personal. It is a category mistake to say
that a person is epistemically justified in believing some proposition. It is doxastic attitudes towards a proposition
that are epistemically justified or unjustified for a person.
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Thus, according to Engel, we have two different domains of epistemic evaluation: personal
justification and doxastic justification.
Engel defines these two different domains of epistemic evaluation in the following
general way (Engel, p.136):
(PJ) Personal justification is a normative notion in terms of which persons are evaluated
from the epistemic point of view.
(DJ) Doxastic justification is a normative notion in terms of which beliefs are evaluated
from the epistemic point of view.
Beginning with (DJ), Engel says that for a belief to be epistemically justified is for that belief to
have positive epistemic status. But this is too trivial, so he says we need to ask the question
differently. Instead, we need to ask when from the epistemic point of view, should a belief be
evaluated positively. The epistemic point of view is defined by the goal of maximizing truth and
minimizing falsity in a large body of beliefs, so we get:
(Al) S's belief B has positive epistemic status iff B is true (Engel, p.137).
He says that this is because from an epistemic point of view, true beliefs are better than false
ones. But since this is simply a restatement of the epistemic goal itself, we need a way to
evaluate beliefs that will tell us which beliefs promote this epistemic goal of gaining truth and
avoiding error apart from their actual truth-value.
Engel thinks that it is objective probabilities that allow us to evaluate beliefs
epistemically. From the epistemic point of view, beliefs that are objectively more probable are
better than beliefs that are objectively less probable (Engel, p.137-38). This gives us the
following:
(A2) S's belief B has positive epistemic status iff B has a sufficiently high objective
probability of being true (Engel, p.138).
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When we put (A2) together with the earlier point that a belief is doxastically justified if and only
if it has positive epistemic status, then we get the following non-trivial definition:
(DJ’) S's belief B is doxastically justified iff B has a sufficiently high objective probability
of being true (Ibid).
Engel says (DJ’) correctly describes which beliefs we want to count as epistemically justified
(beliefs best suited for maximizing truth and minimizing falsity). Thus, we have a prima facie
working conception of doxastic justification. Engel next considers personal justification.
Engel is concerned with the reading of (PJ) in which S does in fact believe some
proposition, as opposed to being personally justified if he were to so believe (Engel, p.138-39).
Given this, Engel starts with what he thinks is obvious: when we evaluate person S as
epistemically justified or unjustified, we are evaluating him positively or negatively from an
epistemic point of view. When we do so we are praising and blaming S epistemically. Thus,
Engel gives us a first approximation of personal justification (Engel, p.139):
(PJj) S is personally justified in believing that p iff S is worthy of epistemic praise for
believing that p.
(PJu) S is personally unjustified in believing that p iff S deserves epistemic blame for
believing that p.
A person merits epistemic praise or blame for believing a certain proposition depending on
whether he has been epistemically responsible in coming to believe that proposition. Being
epistemically responsible entails reasoning carefully, checking her work, considering defeaters,
weighing the evidence, etc. Being epistemically irresponsible involves recklessly adopting
beliefs, ignoring counter-evidence, etc. Thus, we get a revised definition of personal justification
(Engel, p.140):
(PJj) S is personally justified in believing that p iff S has come to believe that p in an
epistemically responsible fashion.
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(PJu) S is personally unjustified in believing that p iff S has been epistemically
irresponsible in coming to believe that p.
Hence, Engel’s conception of personal justification is connected to notions of epistemic praise,
blame, responsibility, and irresponsibility.
Engel argues that most epistemologists have conflated personal with doxastic
justification. On his account therefore, there are two types of epistemic evaluation. When we
evaluate a person we are evaluating whether they were epistemically responsible. When we
evaluate a belief we are evaluating whether it is doxastically justified, i.e.—whether it is
sufficiently objectively likely to be true. Engel provides three examples that he thinks reveal
these two types of epistemic justification. I will argue that his analyses of these examples is
misguided and that we can better account for what is going on in these examples by appealing to
the important distinctions that evidentialists such as Conee and Feldman, Kelly, and Dougherty
make with respect to epistemic and instrumental rationality. This negative verdict on Engel will
support the view that I am trying to establish, which is that there is only one type of epistemic
justification. Furthermore, it will help establish the plausibility of evidentialism as a correct
synchronic approach to categorical justification.33
Engel offers three cases that serve as internalist counter-examples to the externalist
theory of process reliabilism.34 He has us consider a simplified version of process reliabilism:
(PR) S's belief that p is justified in W (world) if it results from a belief-forming cognitive
process [BCP] which is W-reliable (Engel, p.141).

I’m not saying that I think that evidentialism captures everything that is relevant to evaluating a belief as
epistemically justified. What I’m trying to emphasize here is that evidentialists of the sorts I have discussed and will
discuss, provide a satisfactory account of when a belief is justified period. But as I argued earlier in this chapter,
this doesn’t rule out other ways to assess a belief’s justification, i.e.—the degree to which the belief is justified given
that the evidence justifying that belief was gathered through virtuous inquiry.
34
The rough idea of internalism is that justification is solely determined by factors that are internal to a person.
Externalists deny this, asserting that justification depends on additional factors that are external to a person. The
evidentialist theories we have considered are internalist. Virtue responsibilism and virtue reliabilism are externalist.
33

96

A BCP is W-reliable iff the indefinite probability of beliefs produced by that BCP in W
being true beliefs in W is high. Definite probabilities attach to propositions, while indefinite
probabilities are ‘dyadic’ relations relating classes by specifying the probability of a member of
one class being a member of a different class. Standardly, the indefinite probability of A being a
B is identified with the actual relative frequency with which A’s are B’s. Engel claims that (PR)
provides an important conceptual connection between justification and truth.
Since (PR) asserts that S's belief that p is justified in W if it is produced by a W-reliable
BCP, and since, by definition, the indefinite probability of beliefs produced by W-reliable
BCPs being true beliefs in W is high, it follows that justified beliefs in W have a high
indefinite probability of being true beliefs in W (Engel, p.141-42).
Engel maintains that a counter-example to (PR)’s necessity needs to include an intuitively
justified belief even though it was produced by an unreliable BCP.
Engel: Case 1
Consider the following:
Consider a possible world W where, unbeknownst to us, Descartes' evil demon hypothesis
is true and where we are unfortunate enough to reside. In W, virtually all of our beliefs turn
out to be false, owing, of course, to the clever manipulations of the demon. Consequently,
the BCPs (e.g. perception, memory, and inference) which have produced our beliefs are
unreliable in W. So, according to (PR), virtually all of our beliefs are unjustified in W, since
they are produced by BCPs that are unreliable in W (Engel, p.142).
In response to Case 1, Stewart Cohen and Keith Lehrer (1983) argue that this result is untenable:
The truth of the demon hypothesis also entails that our experiences and our reasonings are
just what they would be if our cognitive processes were reliable, and, therefore, that we
would be just as well justified in believing what we do if the demon hypothesis were true
as if it were false (Cohen and Lehrer, p.192; Engel, p.142).
The idea is that our experiences and reasonings in W are phenomenologically indistinguishable
from what they would be in a verific world W* where our beliefs would be justified. But since
our experiences and reasonings are what justify our beliefs, we are intuitively just as well
justified in W as we are in W*. Because we are justified in holding our beliefs in W despite the
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fact that they were produced by unreliable BCP’s, the result is that reliable production is not
necessary for epistemic justification and therefore (PR) is false. Before getting to Engel’s
analysis of this case, let’s look at Case 2.
Engel: Case 2
Cohen raises another purported counter-example to (PR)’s necessity:
Consider another demon world W' whose sole inhabitants are A and B. Now imagine that
A is a good reasoner, i.e. reasons in accordance with the canons of inductive inference,
whereas B engages in confused reasoning, wishful thinking, reliance on emotional
attachment, guesswork, etc.35
In world W’, the demon makes BCP’s like inductive inference just as unreliable as BCP’s such
as wishful thinking, etc. According to (PR), reliability is the defining feature of justificationconferring BCPs. Hence, in W’ the unreliable BCP of inductive inference is no more
justification-conferring than wishful thinking, etc. Cohen therefore notes:
Since the beliefs of A and B are both produced by unreliable processes (the evil demon sees
to this), a reliabilist theory of justification must render identical epistemic appraisals of
both sets of beliefs.36
A reliabilist theory must maintain that neither A’s nor B’s beliefs are justified in W’. However,
Cohen asserts:
Plainly, this cannot be correct. A's beliefs are conditioned by the evidence whereas B's
beliefs are not. A is a good reasoner whereas B is not. A's beliefs are reasonable whereas
B's beliefs are not. There is a fundamental epistemic difference between the beliefs of A
and the beliefs of B. But the Reliabilist does not have the theoretical means to display this
difference.37
On Cohen’s view, the fundamental epistemic difference between A’s and B’s beliefs is that A’s
beliefs are supposed to be justified while B’s beliefs are unjustified. Thus, because A’s

Paraphrased from Stewart Cohen's doctoral dissertation “Justification and Truth”, in manuscript, p. 10; Engel,
p.143.
36
Ibid, pp.10-1; Engel, p.143.
37
Ibid, p.11; Engel, p.143.
35
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unreliably produced beliefs are intuitively justified, reliable belief production is not necessary for
epistemic justification and therefore (PR) is false (Engel, p.143).
Engel contends that neither of these purported counter-examples (Case 1 and Case 2) are
sound since they conflate personal justification with doxastic justification. He argues that in
Case 1, internalists find the result unacceptable because intuitively we are equally justified in W
as we are in W* since our reasonings and experiences are the same in both worlds. But Engel
says that our being justified in both worlds is irrelevant to whether our beliefs are justified in
both worlds. He agrees that we are not personally unjustified in either world since we could
hardly be blamed for believing as we do. However, he argues that the evaluation that our beliefs
in W are unjustified reveals the right result according to (PR). That is, in an evil demon world all
of our beliefs are produced by highly unreliable BCP’s and therefore, the indefinite probability
of these beliefs being true beliefs is extremely low (at or approaching zero). Engel asserts the
following:
Obviously, objectively improbable beliefs run counter to the epistemic goal of maximizing
truth and minimizing error, since they virtually ensure error, and there is nothing
epistemically positive about beliefs which virtually ensure error. This suggests that
intuitively our demon-manipulated, objectively improbable beliefs are in fact unjustified.
Consequently, in the first example, (PR) yields the right doxastic justification evaluations,
after all (Engel, p.144).
What is crucial to Engel’s claim is the fact that the determining factor in whether a belief is
doxastically justified is whether the belief has a high probability of being true.
Engel contends that the second counter-example fails for much the same reason as the
first. That is, Cohen also conflates personal justification with doxastic justification. Implicit in
Cohen’s argument is that the epistemic difference between A’s beliefs and B’s beliefs is that
since A is a good reasoner and B is not, A’s beliefs are justified but B’s are unjustified.
However, Engel argues that Cohen’s analysis is mistaken. He says there is a definite epistemic
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difference between person A and person B. Person A presumably reasons in an epistemically
responsible manner, while person B does not. Therefore, A is personally justified in his beliefs in
W’, while B is personally unjustified in his beliefs in W’. However, being personally justified is
not the same as a belief being doxastically justified. In this case, A’s beliefs are not doxastically
justified (Engel, p.145). I now turn to explaining why I think Engel’s analyses fail.
Engel’s analysis of Case 1 fails because he is not sensitive to evidentialist accounts of
epistemic justification. A more plausible analysis of Case 1 is that in both W and W* our beliefs
are justified period (categorically justified or justified full-stop) because we have the exact same
evidence in each world. Given that we have no evidence whatsoever that our BCP’s are
unreliable, we have no good reason, i.e.—we have no evidence—to suspect that our reasonings
are bad. Thus our total evidence supports our belief. That is, we have no defeating evidence to
suggest that we have misleading evidence. Our beliefs are epistemically justified because of the
evidence. In both worlds there is the same strong evidential fit between our evidence and our
beliefs. Of course, this doesn’t rule out that there are other factors other than evidential fit that
can contribute to a belief’s epistemic status (I will put this issue aside for now). This does
suggest that evidential fit is necessary for epistemic justification. I agree.
Furthermore, Engel argues that in an evil demon world all of our beliefs are produced by
highly unreliable BCP’s and therefore, the indefinite probability of these beliefs being true
beliefs is extremely low (at or approaching zero). He goes on to say that “objectively
improbable beliefs run counter to the epistemic goal of maximizing truth and minimizing error,
since they virtually ensure error, and there is nothing epistemically positive about beliefs which
virtually ensure error”. There are two problems with Engel’s view here. First, his view is
dialectically improper. That is, this claim is question-begging. It assumes that a belief’s being
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properly based on strong supporting evidence isn’t a positive epistemic state of affairs. This is
highly implausible, even if the belief is in fact false and couldn’t have easily been true.38 Engel’s
view ignores the fallible nature of evidence, i.e.—that even strong supporting evidence can be
misleading. Second, as Kelly correctly argued, one’s goals are irrelevant to whether one’s belief
is epistemically justified. The fact that using these unreliable BCP’s involves failing to reach
one’s goals in reaching the truth, is relevant to whether one is instrumentally rational. Thus,
knowingly using an unreliable process is an instrumentally irrational means to achieving one’s
end of forming true beliefs, but despite this fact, one’s belief is epistemically justified in W and
W* because one’s belief is supported by the evidence. Of course, whether one is instrumentally
rational in W or W* is another issue and one I won’t explore here. I conclude that Engel’s
analysis of Case 1 fails to establish his thesis.
Though I would like to reinforce that even if a belief is well-founded, using an unreliable
BCP can decrease the degree to which that belief is justified. But again, an unreliable BCP
cannot render a well-founded belief completely unjustified. Thus, even though two people, one
in W and one in W*, have precisely the same evidence and both of their beliefs are well-founded,
the person’s beliefs in W are justified to a lesser degree since BCP’s in W are unreliable. Other
things being equal, evidence gathered using unreliable BCP’s is more likely to be misleading
evidence, hence the degree to which that belief is justified decreases. Of course, all things
considered, by their very nature all BCP’s in W are unreliable so all evidence gathered by BCP’s
in W will be misleading. On the other hand, a person’s well-founded belief in W* that was
formed using BCP’s that are reliable is justified to a higher degree since evidence gathered by
reliable processes is more likely to be non-misleading evidence. Reliability isn’t necessary for

38

Thanks to E.J. Coffman for suggesting this point.
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justification but it can play a salient role in fixing the degree to which a well-founded belief is
justified.
Engel’s analysis of Case 2 also fails for much the same reason as his analysis of Case 1.
He says there is a definite epistemic difference between person A and person B, which is that
person A presumably reasons in a responsible manner, while person B does not. Therefore, A is
personally justified in his beliefs in W’, while B is personally unjustified in his beliefs in W’.
However, being personally justified is not the same as a belief being doxastically justified. In
this case, A’s beliefs are not doxastically justified. I argue that if there is no epistemic difference
between A’s and B’s belief it’s because their beliefs are based upon the same evidence (assuming
that they have the same evidence in this case). However, if their evidence differs, then there will
be a difference in epistemic justification. But Cohen maintains that A’s belief is conditioned by
the evidence and B’s is not. Thus, A has good epistemic reasons to hold his beliefs (assuming his
beliefs fit the evidence), but B does not because his beliefs are not conditioned by the evidence.
For a belief to be well-founded a person must properly base his belief on his total body of
evidence.
Furthermore, if the evil demon has rendered both A’s and B’s BCP’s unreliable then
there’s no sense in which these processes could contribute to the positive justificatory status of
their beliefs. It was stipulated that they are unreliable processes, so there is no difference in
reliability between inductive inferences on the one hand and confused reasoning, wishful
thinking, reliance on emotional attachment, guesswork, etc., on the other (at least in the world
they are in). Thus, A’s and B’s respective beliefs have a different epistemic status because A’s
beliefs are conditioned by the evidence while B’s is not. That is, A has epistemic reasons to hold
the beliefs he does while B does not. Hence, Engel’s analysis of Case 2 fails to establish his
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thesis. However, I would like to add that if there were some third person C in a verific world,
who properly based his belief on precisely the same evidence as person A, and like A was a good
reasoner, etc., person C’s beliefs would be justified to a higher degree than A’s beliefs. A’s
beliefs are conditioned by the same evidence as C’s beliefs so both of their beliefs are wellfounded, but the BCP’s that A uses are unreliable and C’s are reliable.
Engel: Case 3
Engel also addresses (PR)’s sufficiency. He considers the ‘Norman the Clairvoyant’ case
as a case that purports to establish the insufficiency of (PR). I discussed this case in Chapter
Two, but I think it’s instructive to revisit it in order to see why Engel’s analysis of it fails to
establish his thesis that much of the confusion in epistemology can be attributed to a confusion
between personal and doxastic justification.
Here’s the Norman case again:
Suppose that Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or
reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power, or for
or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the
President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief.
In fact, the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in
which it is completely reliable.
Engel says that one might think that Norman is epistemically unjustified because Norman has no
evidence of the President’s location and he is unaware that he has this clairvoyant power. From
Norman’s perspective it would seem as if his belief just popped into his head out of nowhere.
Thus, it would be epistemically irresponsible for him to hold such a “spontaneously occurring
ungrounded belief” (Engel, p.146). But Engel thinks this only shows that Norman is personally
unjustified in believing the President is in New York City. However, he says this is irrelevant to
whether Norman is doxastically justified, i.e.—whether Norman’s belief is justified. His belief is
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the result of a highly reliable BCP. Beliefs that result from such a BCP have a very high
indefinite probability of being true beliefs and are therefore justified from the epistemic point of
view. Likewise, Norman’s situation is very much like a child’s situation with respect to that
child’s perceptual beliefs. The child has no rationale for her perceptual beliefs and yet she is
most certainly justified in holding them. Thus, Norman’s belief is justified, but relative to other
things he believes, he is epistemically irresponsible in holding the belief and is therefore
personally unjustified in doing so. In other words, the fault lies with Norman and not with his
belief. Hence, if (PR) is viewed as an account of doxastic justification, i.e.—as a theory of
justified belief, then the Norman case fails to impugn (PR) (Engel, p.145-46).
I think Engel gets this case wrong for two important reasons. First, recall the issue from
Chapter Two that cases like Norman’s can be underdescribed regarding the issue of cognitive
integration. That is, cognitive processes associated with clairvoyance are not sufficiently
integrated with the rest of the person’s cognitive system. Clairvoyance is a process that is
completely unrelated and insensitive to the rest of the person’s cognitive system governing the
formation and evaluation of belief. The senses, memory, introspection, reason, etc., are typically
well-integrated with and sensitive to each other as well as the rest of the person’s cognitive
system. Hence, if we take cognitive integration into consideration, Norman’s belief isn’t
justified.39
Furthermore, Engel’s parity case of a child’s perceptual beliefs doesn’t help establish that
Norman’s belief is justified. Unlike Norman’s clairvoyant power, a child’s perceptual faculties
are well-integrated with the rest of that child’s cognitive system. Also, unlike Norman, the child

This doesn’t mean that some epistemic agent (say some alien from another planet) couldn’t have a clairvoyant
ability that is well-integrated. This is a purely contingent matter. However, Norman’s case is not such a case. This
is a point that Greco himself makes (Greco, 2010, p.155).
39
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has perceptual evidence that supports the beliefs formed as a result of those perceptual processes.
Of course, one might think that Norman might have evidence that his belief is justified because
his belief is accompanied by some sort of feeling of ‘correctness’ or something. Much the same
can be said about memorial beliefs. However, unlike Norman’s clairvoyant belief, memorial
beliefs are usually well-integrated with other beliefs formed as the result of the person’s wellintegrated cognitive system. But it’s also important to note that no such feeling of ‘correctness’
occurs in this case. Norman just finds himself believing that the President is in New York City.
That’s all. Finally, because Norman’s clairvoyance isn’t well-integrated, his belief isn’t sensitive
to counter-evidence or defeating evidence. This is because Norman’s belief isn’t well-integrated
with his other beliefs formed as the result of his other well-integrated cognitive faculties. Given
this, it would be strange to grant that Norman’s belief is justified.
The second reason Engel gets this case wrong is because he misses a crucial reason why
Norman’s belief is not doxastically justified, namely that he lacks any evidential basis for
holding such a belief and that he confuses this with Norman being epistemically irresponsible. It
is not Norman who is unjustified, but his belief that is unjustified. His belief is not epistemically
justified because Norman lacks sufficient evidence to support his belief. From his perspective he
lacks the necessary epistemic reasons to believe that the President is in New York City, i.e.—he
lacks proper evidence. Therefore, the evidentialist is better able to explain why Norman’s belief
is unjustified.
Furthermore, the fact that Norman believes the President is in New York City without any
evidence to support such a belief can best be explained by his being instrumentally irrational.
Believing something because you are suddenly overcome by that belief is not a reliable means to
achieving the end of forming true beliefs and avoiding false ones. It is instrumentally irrational
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for someone to use such a means to achieve this end, unless they are aware that it is a successful
means to that end. Suppose Norman is unaware that he is clairvoyant but finds that these beliefs
that pop into his head are highly correlated with actual states of affairs that have obtained in the
world. For example, he is unaware of his clairvoyance, but he finds that anytime he has had
beliefs about the President’s location, they have been correct. Suppose that his beliefs about the
President’s location have been correct 100% of the time over a thousand separate instances. If
this were true then we would have to say that Norman is both epistemically and instrumentally
rational. He is epistemically rational because now he has one thousand pieces of evidence to
support the belief that anytime he has had a belief about the President’s location in the past he
has been correct and he has good inductive reason to believe that such beliefs will be correct in
the future. Individually, these beliefs don’t amount to any significant evidence, but together
these beliefs provide a strong evidential case that such beliefs are correct. Likewise, once
Norman discovers this correlation, he is also instrumentally rational when he uses these beliefs
as a means to figuring out where the President is located. Using these beliefs is instrumentally
rational because doing so is a reliable practical method for figuring out the President’s
whereabouts if one has the goal of doing so.
Therefore, rather than appealing to PJ’ and DJ’, Norman’s case can be better explained by
adopting an evidentialist account of epistemic justification.
In sum, Engel makes three mistakes in his analysis of the Norman case: 1) he fails to
recognize that Norman’s clairvoyance lacks cognitive integration; 2) he confuses epistemic
irresponsibility with instrumental irrationality; and 3) he fails to recognize the role that evidence
plays in doxastic justification.

106

Engel’s analyses of the three cases above fail to adequately defend (PR) as a theory of
doxastic justification. Furthermore, his analyses fails to establish that the wide acceptance of
these counter-examples is due to a conflation of personal and doxastic justification. This is
because Engel fails to be sensitive to evidentialist accounts of epistemic justification and the
important distinction between epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality.
Now, I don’t wish to present this response to Engel as an argument against all forms of
reliabilism and the role reliability can play in epistemic justification. Instead, I’ve presented this
analysis to cast doubt on the view that there are two types of epistemic justification, i.e.—
doxastic and personal justification. I have sided with the evidentialists in response to Leite,
Axtell, and Engel.
II.4 – Against Evidentialism: Keith DeRose and ‘Epistemic Ought’
I now wish to consider an important argument that Keith DeRose makes against
evidentialism. In contrast to Axtell’s and Engel’s arguments, DeRose’s argument has nothing to
do (as far as I can tell) with making a distinction between personal justification and doxastic
justification. DeRose argues that whether a subject epistemically ought to believe something
largely depends on issues relevant to evidence gathering and processing of evidence.
DeRose rejects Richard Feldman’s evidentialist thesis:
O2. For any person S, time t, and proposition p, if S has any doxastic attitude at all toward
p at t, then S epistemically ought to have the attitude toward p supported by S’s
evidence at t.
Feldman provides a way to specify what attitudes we epistemically ought to have in different
cases:
If a person is going to adopt any attitude toward a proposition, then that person ought to
believe it if his current evidence supports it, disbelieve it if his current evidence is against
it, and suspend judgment about it if his evidence is neutral (or close to neutral) (DeRose
2011, p.137; Feldman, 2000, p.679; Feldman, 2004a, p.178).
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DeRose offers what he thinks is a counter-example to O2:
Suppose that Henry ﬁrmly believes that p—it doesn’t matter much what p is—and has
excellent evidence for p (evidence that’s strong enough to adequately support the ﬁrm
and conﬁdent attitude Henry has adopted toward p). Suppose further that Henry doesn’t
possess evidence against p, so the attitude toward p that ﬁts all the evidence Henry
possesses is the conﬁdent belief that p which Henry in fact holds. But suppose that Henry
doesn’t believe p on the basis of the excellent evidence for it that he possesses. Indeed,
Henry hasn’t even considered p in the light of this excellent evidence, and the fact that he
possesses good evidence for p is no part of the explanation for why Henry believes that p.
Rather, Henry believes that p on the basis of some other beliefs of his that he considers to
be good evidence for p, but which in fact constitute absolutely lousy evidence for p.
Henry has no business believing p at all on the basis of the evidence he is in fact using,
much less believing it as ﬁrmly as he does. If you want some details—maybe your
intuitions are helped out by ﬁlling in the story a bit— suppose that p is a proposition to
the effect that someone that Henry hates very much has done some horrible thing. It’s
Henry’s hatred and resulting desire to believe his opponent has done this horrible thing
that causes him to think of his lousy evidence as strong evidence and to thereby believe
that p. (DeRose, p.138)
Further:
Suppose then that there is some evidence Henry very easily could have, and should have,
gathered, but that he negligently never encountered. This would have been very strong
evidence against p. So strong that, despite the excellent evidence Henry possesses in
favor of p, this negative evidence that Henry should have gathered would have
completely outweighed the positive evidence he actually possesses, such that disbelief of
p would have been the attitude that would have best suited Henry’s evidence, had he
gathered this negative evidence. (We want it to remain the case that the evidence Henry
actually possesses still favors p, so don’t imagine this case such that Henry has good
reason to think that the evidence he neglected to gather would have counted against p.
This would raise the suspicion that, whatever these good reasons for thinking the
evidence will be unfavorable to p are, they probably already also constitute some
evidence against p itself.) (DeRose, p.139).
DeRose believes that the following proposition ‘P’ is true:
P Henry ought not to believe p at all.
DeRose thinks P is true for two reasons. The first reason is because Henry’s belief is based on
lousy evidence. The second reason (and the one I wish to focus on) is that even if Henry had
brought all the evidence he had to bear on the issue, he still would have ended up not believing in
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p if he had also been responsible in his gathering of evidence. There is relevant evidence that
Henry easily could have and should have had. The fact that there is evidence Henry easily could
have and should have gathered seems to ground a legitimate, and important sense, in which,
because he should have already gathered that evidence, Henry right now ought not to believe that
p. That is, P is true right now (DeRose, p.140-41).
In support of P, DeRose cites an important sense of ‘epistemic ought’ that Feldman
endorses:
[F]orming beliefs is something people do. That is, we form beliefs in response to our
experiences of the world. Anyone engaged in this activity ought to do it right. In my
view, what they ought to do is follow their evidence (rather than wishes or fears). I
suggest that epistemic oughts are of this sort—they describe the right way to play a
certain role....They are based on what’s good performance. (DeRose, p.142; Feldman,
2000, p.676; Feldman, 2004a, p.175)
This sense of epistemic ought is connected to a certain ‘role’ we play as believers. To believe
what you ought to believe and to the degree you ought to believe, is to perform well in filling the
role of a believer. But as DeRose points out, if Feldman is correct about the tie between
‘epistemic ought’ and the role of a believer, then the evidentialist thesis is surely false. DeRose
writes:
For Henry’s performance is poor, in almost every way I can think of. He’s doing it
(believing), but not doing it right. He’s doing a lousy job of gathering evidence, and a
lousy job of processing the evidence he does have. His belief seems irrational and
unjustiﬁed, and even if it happens to be true, it certainly isn’t a piece of knowledge. He’s
not doing a good job of ﬁlling the role of a believer. Yet, at least as I understand it, he
satisﬁes Feldman’s evidentialist thesis for believing what he ought (Ibid).
In order to do a good job as a believer or to fill the role of a believer well, one should both gather
and process evidence well. If Henry had both gathered and processed evidence well, he would
not believe p. So Henry did not perform well in filling his role as a believer, nor did he believe
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what he would have believed if he had performed well in that role, despite the fact that he
satisfies Feldman’s account of believing what one ought.
DeRose further claims that “It’s not the (more general) role of a believer that Feldman’s
account seems to answer to, but the more specialized role of an evidence-processor [my italics]”
(DeRose, p.143). The evidence that Henry used didn’t actually support his belief, and it was
only through bad processing of the evidence that he used that he ended up believing that p.
However, Henry did end up believing what he would have believed if he had taken all of the
evidence he had and processed it well. But this is a very specialized sense of ought and if this is
what is meant by ‘epistemic ought’, then O2 comes out true but in a very trivial way, i.e.—it’s no
surprise that O2 gets this very specialized notion correct (Ibid).
Conee and Feldman reject DeRose’s counterexample to O2. They believe that O2
correctly implies that P is false. Henry has excellent evidence, E1, for the proposition B (that
Jones did something terrible). Additionally, Henry has no reason to doubt B. He also has some
lousy evidence, E2, for B. Henry mistakenly and for no good reason thinks that E2 is good
evidence for B. He never considers B in light of E1. Henry only considers B in light of E2 and
believes B on that basis. In spite of DeRose’s claim that P is true, accepting B is precisely the
attitude Henry ought to take. It is made reasonable by having E1 and Henry not having any
reason to doubt B. Thus, he ought to believe B. Thus, P is false (Conee and Feldman, 2011,
p.287).
Conee and Feldman think that we must not be misled by the credibility of P. There are
other ‘nearby facts’ about things that Henry ought not do and these ‘ought not’s’ may lead some
to mistakenly believe P. Conee and Feldman have us consider P2.
P2 Henry ought not to ‘believe as he does’ concerning B.
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They concede that P2 is true because Henry bases his belief in B on E2 which is bad evidence.
Basing his belief on E2 is not well-founded. However, denying P is compatible with the claim
that Henry ought not to believe anything, including B, on an ill-founded basis (Ibid).
Additionally, Conee and Feldman have us consider P3-P5:
P3 Henry ought not to infer B as he does.
P4 Henry ought not to base his belief on E2.
P5 Henry ought not to come to believe B as he does.
Feldman and Conee believe that P3-P5 are all true.
They refer to things that Henry does, but he ought not do. The reasons he ought not do
these things are evidentialist and fully compatible with evidentialism’s verdict on P. He
ought not make bad inferences such as the one he actually makes in accepting B, he
ought not base his belief on bad evidence such as the evidence on which he actually bases
his belief in B, and he ought not come to believe in the way he did. Nevertheless, B is a
proposition that he ought to believe (Conee and Feldman, 2011, p.288).
All of this is compatible with the evidentialist thesis that Henry ought to believe B because the
evidence he has right now supports B.
Furthermore, Conee and Feldman reject DeRose’s suggestion that Henry neglecting or
failing to gather evidence about B that he could have easily gotten, and should have gotten,
somehow enhances the credibility of P. They argue that this additional stipulation does not make
P more credible when P is properly understood. P is a claim about what attitude Henry ought to
take toward B, given how things actually are. Henry’s failure to gather more evidence does not
support P. This produces the following distracting ‘ought not’:
P6 Henry ought not to have only the evidence he has about B.
Conee and Feldman point out that this is a practical evaluation of Henry’s evidence gathering,
but this is not what P is about. P is about a doxastic attitude that Henry has toward B and P is
mistaken because having that attitude is the correct one, given the evidence that Henry actually
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has. Feldman and Conee believe that we must consider the total actual evidence that Henry has.
If ‘ought to believe’ is closely connected to epistemic justification, one ought not ignore any
relevant evidence that one possesses and one is in no position to consider any evidence that one
does not even have. “This leaves all of the evidence one does have as a non-arbitrary
determinant of what one ought to believe” (Ibid). Hence, O2 is not arbitrary or trivial in any
way.
Conee and Feldman’s reply to DeRose is pretty much in line with the various defenses of
evidentialism I’ve already discussed. Conee and Feldman provide a very plausible defense of
evidentialism, insofar as evidentialism provides a plausible account of when a belief is
categorically justified (i.e.—justified ‘period’ or ‘full stop’). Crucial to Conee and Feldman’s
view is the following:
No matter what the answers are to questions about how I ought to conduct my inquiry,
where I ought to look for evidence, and so on, there always remain the questions, "What
should I believe in the meantime?" "What should I believe until I have a chance (or the
courage) to look at that new evidence?" It's that natural and central question to which
evidentialism provides a good answer (Feldman, 2000, p.188).
The answer to the questions in the above passage is that a person ought to believe what the
person’s evidence supports at that time. If your belief p is well-supported by the evidence you
possess and you don’t possess any other evidence against your belief p, then there’s no epistemic
reason that you ought to believe anything other than p. Even if you should have and/or could
have gathered different evidence, the fact is you didn’t. Consequently, it wouldn’t make sense to
believe anything other than what your current body of evidence supports, in this case, p. Hence,
when you believe p based on evidence that supports p over believing some other proposition not
supported by that evidence, then you are believing precisely what you ought to believe. This
evidentialist view holds that the doxastic attitude a person epistemically ought to adopt toward a
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proposition is the one that is supported by the evidence the person has at that time. Importantly,
Feldman says that the sort of ‘ought’ in play in this evidentialist view is a) purely epistemic and
b) it is an ‘ought’ about what doxastic attitude is epistemically permissible at any given time
(2000, p.179). What is epistemically permissible to believe at any given moment is a function of
what your total body of evidence supports. You ought to believe what your evidence permits.
Furthermore, Feldman says that how a person actually came to possess the evidence the
person has does not change what the person ought to believe at that time:
How the person came to have that evidence, whether by conscientious inquiry or by
avoiding potentially troublesome information, is irrelevant to this epistemic fact.
Similarly, how the person ought to proceed in the future is also irrelevant. Evaluations of
this behavior can be made, of course, but these evaluations are of a different nature than
those made on evidentialist grounds [prudential or moral evaluations] (Feldman, 2000,
p.190).
I think Feldman is right that how a person actually came to possess the evidence has no bearing
on what the person ought to believe at that moment, unless of course the person has evidence that
the evidence was gathered in some flawed way, e.g., in a biased manner. Having evidence e that
you gathered your evidence in a biased way changes your total body of evidence E1 to include e
which gives you a new total body of evidence E2, so that your prior belief p, which was based on
E1, no longer fits your new body of evidence E2. Given E2, you ought not believe p. However,
suppose that you gathered e in a biased way but you have no evidence that e was gathered in a
biased way. If this is the case, then it seems right to say that you ought to continue believing p
based on E1. This is correct. In this latter case, historical facts about how you gathered your
evidence have no bearing on whether p is justified for you. However, all of this is consistent
with the evidentialist view we’ve considered. That is, in any given circumstance at any time, a
person epistemically ought to believe what that person’s evidence supports. However, this (like I
discussed earlier in this chapter) is consistent with the view of epistemic justification that I have
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been advocating. More precisely, I have been advocating a view of epistemic justification in
which a belief is categorically justified for a person if that person’s current total body of
evidence supports that belief. That is, if my total evidence supports p, then I’m justified in
believing p, full stop. Kelly, Dougherty, and Conee and Feldman would all agree with this
claim. Where I depart from their evidentialist view is when I make the further claim that this
view is compatible with the view that reliability can still play a salient role in fixing the degree to
which a belief is justified. They would deny this claim. They think that justification is solely a
function of evidential fit.
So, in contrast to Kelly, Dougherty, and Conee and Feldman, I endorse the view that even
though historical facts having to do with how I gathered my evidence have no bearing on
whether my belief that p is well-founded (justified period), such historical facts can and often do
have a direct bearing on the degree to which my belief is justified. So, I don’t think that
DeRose’s arguments impugn evidentialism as a synchronic account of categorical justification.
DeRose’s conditional claim that <if a person would have and/or should have gathered
different/additional evidence, then that person would have and/or should have believed
differently> has no bearing on what evidence the person actually has nor does it have any
bearing on what the person ought to believe given the person’s current total body of evidence.
However, I do think whether the method of inquiry the person actually used to gather her current
body of evidence was virtuous or vicious does have a bearing on the degree to which that belief
is justified (other things being equal). In other words, whether the person could have or should
have gathered different/additional evidence is irrelevant to a belief’s justificatory status, but the
actual mode of inquiry used to gather the evidence is often relevant to the degree to which a
belief is justified (if the mode of inquiry was virtuous). Thus, DeRose’s argument doesn’t
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impugn evidentialism as a synchronic account of categorical justification, but this evidentialist
view doesn’t rule out that virtuous inquiry can play a role in determining the degree to which a
belief is justified. I think this is the right conclusion.
I wish to make one more crucial point about the sort of epistemic ‘ought’ discussed in
this section. This ‘ought’ has to do with what doxastic attitude you are epistemically permitted
to take toward a proposition given the total body of evidence you currently possess. This is a
similar point to the one made in Chapter One about epistemic justification. That is, when we are
talking about epistemic ‘ought’ here, we are not talking about epistemic blameworthiness or
blamelessness. That is, it’s not the case that you ought to believe some proposition simply
because you are somehow blameless for holding the belief. Again, this sort of doxastic
justification is subjective deontological justification. But this is not the sort of ‘ought’ that is
relevant to what I’m concerned with in this section. I’m concerned with a sort of ‘ought’ that is
more objective than subjective deontological justification. Consider once again the example of
someone who grows up in a religious society and is taught to listen to the deliverances of an
oracle. We can’t blame her for believing what she believes, but if her belief is not supported by
her evidence, then she epistemically ought not believe what she believes. The same goes for the
example of the paranoid man who believes he is being spied on but lacks any evidence
supporting his belief. In this case, he epistemically ought not believe he is being spied on. In
both of the above cases, the person is epistemically blameless for holding his/her belief, but it is
still not what each person epistemically ought to believe. In both of these examples, the person
doesn’t have evidence that sufficiently supports his/her belief. Thus, in both examples, each
person epistemically ought not believe what he/she believes because the evidence he has does
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not support that belief. The evidence each person possesses determines what is epistemically
permissible for him/her to believe.
III. Conclusion
In this Chapter I argued that epistemic justification is not just a species of instrumental
rationality. I also argued that methodological epistemic rationality is not merely a form of
instrumental rationality.
I also argued that evidentialist views such as Kelly’s and Conee and Feldman’s provide a
plausible account of when a belief is epistemically justified for a person. More precisely, I’ve
argued that evidentialism has the conceptual tools to explain when a belief is epistemically
justified period. My conclusion from this discussion was that a belief is epistemically justified
period if the total body of evidence a person possesses supports that belief at that time. Thus,
evidentialist accounts of epistemic justification provide a satisfactory synchronic account of
categorical justification.
I also argued against diachronic approaches to epistemic justification that rely on a
distinction between personal justification and doxastic justification. I argued that personal
justification is irrelevant to epistemic justification. Furthermore, I argued against diachronic
approaches of epistemic justification that claim that a belief is not justified if the person holding
the belief based on some body of evidence, could have and/or should have gathered
different/additional evidence but failed to do so. However, I argued that it is compatible with a
synchronic account of categorical justification that how a person actually gathered her evidence
often does have a bearing on the degree to which a belief is justified. Specifically, if a person
gathers her evidence virtuously (reliably), then (other things being equal) the degree to which

116

that belief is justified is increased and if a person gathers her evidence viciously (unreliably),
then (other things being equal) the degree to which that belief is justified is decreased.
In Chapter Four I will continue to motivate and defend the evidentialist view I’ve been
discussing in Chapter Three. I will provide a more detailed and fleshed out account of
evidentialism that appeals to ‘best explanations’ to account for evidential fit, i.e.—explanationist
evidentialism. This account provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for a belief’s
being categorically justified. In Chapter Five I will argue that the reliability or unreliability of
one’s inquiry can play a salient role in fixing the degree to which a belief is justified.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Explanationist Evidentialism
In Chapter Three I gave numerous examples and arguments that motivated and defended
a rough evidentialist view of necessary and sufficient conditions for categorical epistemic
justification. This chapter will continue to motivate, develop, and defend this view but in much
greater detail. I will do so by explicitly appealing to the work of Conee and Feldman and more
recently Kevin McCain (2014). I will discuss what I think is the best synchronic approach to
categorical doxastic justification: explanationist evidentialism. Explanationist evidentialism
offers a full account of well-founded belief.
I will begin by discussing the nature of evidential fit or the epistemic support relation.
Thus far I’ve mentioned the notion of ‘evidential fit’ numerous times, but I haven’t yet discussed
what it amounts to. Having a strong conception of evidential fit is important for understanding
how explanationist evidentialism accounts for doxastic justification. I will endorse an
explanationist account of evidential fit (a view argued for by Conee and Feldman and McCain)
that I think is amicable to my own two-component view of justification. Roughly, an
explanationist account of evidentialist fit holds that a belief p is justified for a person S if p is the
best explanation S has for why S has evidence E or p is an available entailment of the best
explanation of S’s evidence (McCain, p.6). Hence, explanationist fit offers a full account of
propositional justification which is crucial for understanding well-founded belief.
Before I discuss the notion of ‘evidential fit’ I will spend a little more time motivating the
type of evidentialism I have been considering thus far. The type of evidentialism I have been
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advocating is an internalist and mentalist form of evidentialism.40 Fundamentally, an internalist
view (at least most) holds that the justifying of a belief is done by things internal to the mental
life of the subject, i.e.—mental states. On this view, evidence consists entirely of mental states
and evidence is what justifies a belief, hence the mentalist component to internalism. Mentalism
is a supervenience thesis which means that justification supervenes on mental states. This is best
understood by the idea that the beliefs of any two individuals that are alike mentally are alike
justificationally (Conee and Feldman, 2004a, p.56). Importantly, this internalist and mentalist
conception of evidentialism is compatible with the fact that there are non-mental/external factors
that are necessary for justification. For example, internalism and mentalism accept that facts
about epistemic support (fit) are not internal to the subject—they are necessary truths about
which propositions certain mental states make it rational to believe. That is, the fact that
evidence E supports believing p is a necessary truth, and therefore external to S. However, the
view is still internalist because E must itself be internal and it is still mentalist because E consists
solely of mental states.
In order to motivate the discussion in this chapter, I will briefly present three cases that
support an evidentialist synchronic approach to categorical justification. Case 1 is the now
famous ‘New Evil Demon’ (NED) problem41:
Imagine a world where an evil demon creates non-veridical perceptions of physical objects
in everybody’s minds. All of these perceptions are qualitatively identical to ours, but are
false in the world in question. Hence, their perceptual belief-forming processes (as judged
by the facts in that world) are unreliable; and their beliefs so caused are unjustified. But
since their perceptual experiences—hence evidence—are qualitatively identical to ours,
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There are other types of externalist, non-mentalist, etc., evidentialist theories that are different from the version of
evidentialism I’m concerned with here. There are important differences between them and I will touch on some of
these distinctions later on, but a more thorough discussion of these distinctions goes beyond the scope of this
dissertation.
41
This is the problem presented by Cohen and Lehrer that I discussed in the previous chapter.

119

shouldn’t those beliefs in the demon world be justified? Evidently, then, reliabilism must
deliver the wrong verdict in this case.42
Here a person in the demon-world is justified period since her belief fits the relevant perceptual
evidence, regardless of the fact that in the demon-world all beliefs are formed by unreliable
belief-forming processes. What is noteworthy is that this case doesn’t rule out the possibility
that reliability can play a role in determining the degree to which a belief is justified. Evidence
justifies necessarily in both the demon-world and the actual world. In the actual world our
perceptual belief-forming processes are reliable. So why not think that such processes can be
relevant to the justificatory status of a belief in the actual world? This case simply tries to show
that reliability isn’t necessary for justification. It says nothing about reliability’s sufficiency for
increasing a belief’s level of justification.
Cases 2 and 3 come from Conee and Feldman (2004a). Here is Case 2:
Initially, Smith has excellent reasons to believe that Jones, who works in his office, owns
a Ford. Smith deduces that someone in the office owns a Ford. The latter belief is true, but
the former is false. Smith's reasons derive from Jones pretending to own a Ford. Someone
else in the office, unknown to Smith, does own a Ford. The fact that Jones is merely
simulating Ford ownership keeps Smith from knowing that someone in his office is a Ford
owner, but it does not prevent Smith from being justified or diminish his justification. At
a later time Smith gains ample reason to believe that Jones is pretending. At that point
Smith is not justified in believing either that Jones owns a Ford or that someone in his
office owns a Ford (Conee and Feldman, 2004a, p.60).
Case 2 is similar to cases we saw in Chapter Three in that Smith has excellent reasons to believe
what he believes and his belief is therefore justified. Those reasons are in the form of evidence
for his beliefs. Furthermore, Smith’s belief that Jones owns a Ford is justified even though that
belief is false (just like in NED). Finally, when Smith’s evidence changes, so does the
justification for his initial belief. In this case he is no longer justified in believing that Jones
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Taken from Goldman, Alvin and Beddor, Bob, "Reliabilist Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/reliabilism/>.
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owns a Ford (or that anyone in his office owns a Ford for that matter). Whether reliability plays
a role in determining the justificatory status of Smith’s belief is irrelevant. The point is that
whether Smith’s belief is categorically justified is a function of his total body of evidence. But
again, this case doesn’t rule out the possibility that reliability or unreliability can play a role in
determining the degree to which a belief is justified.
Case 3 is similar to Case 1:
Hilary is a brain in a vat who has been abducted recently from a fully embodied life in an
ordinary environment. He is being stimulated so that it seems to him as though his normal
life has continued. Hilary believes that he ate oatmeal for breakfast yesterday. His
memorial basis for his breakfast belief is artificial. It has been induced by his "envatters"
(Conee and Feldman, 2004a, p.60-61).
Conee and Feldman provide two versions of the relevant details. Hilary A's “. . . recollection is
very faint and lacking in detail. The meal seems incongruous to him in that it strikes him as a
distasteful breakfast and he has no idea why he would have eaten it” (Conee and Feldman,
2004a, p.61). Hilary B's “. . . recollection seems to him to be an ordinary vivid memory of a
typical breakfast for him” (Ibid). Conee and Feldman say that even though both Hilary A's and
Hilary B’s breakfast beliefs are false and their bases are abnormal, Hilary A’s belief is not well
justified and Hilary B’s belief is well justified. Hilary A’s belief differs internally from Hilary
B’s belief because Hilary B’s mental states include better evidence for his belief (Ibid). It’s
debatable whether Hilary A has sufficient evidence to justify his belief (the evidence might not
sufficiently support his belief). However, intuitively it seems correct to say that Hilary B’s belief
is categorically justified given his memorial evidence and this is the case even though his belief
is false and is not formed by any reliable belief-forming process (his memorial evidence is fed to
him by an unreliable process that feeds him false information). But again, this example doesn’t
rule out the possibility that in a non-envatted world a person’s belief can receive a justificatory
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boost from the fact that the evidence that supports his belief was gathered using a reliable-belief
forming process (such as virtuous inquiry). This example also doesn’t rule out there being a
justificatory difference between two person’s beliefs who have precisely the same evidence, but
one is envatted and one is in a verific world. They can both have precisely the same evidence
and therefore their beliefs are well-founded, but the person in the envatted world will have
evidence that results from unreliable processes while the person in the verific world will have
evidence that results from reliable processes. If so, the person in the verific world will have
well-founded beliefs that are justified to a higher degree than the envatted person’s.
The diagnoses for each of these cases is compatible with my two-component view of
justification in which 1) your belief is categorically justified if it fits your total body of evidence
and 2) the degree to which your belief is justified is often largely a function of whether your
evidence was gathered using virtuous (reliable) inquiry or vicious (unreliable) inquiry. These
cases don’t establish or even suggest that reliability or unreliability make a justificatory
difference in some instances, but these cases don’t rule out the possibility either. I will defend
this possibility later on. For now it’s important to note that in each case above, a change in
evidence makes an epistemic difference. Furthermore, regardless of issues of demon-deception,
brain stimulations, or false or misleading information, evidential relations between a belief and
the evidence that supports it are necessary relations. As long as this necessary relation holds, a
person’s belief is categorically justified.
I. Evidential Fit
I now turn to a more fully fleshed out discussion of the components of an explanationist
account of evidentialism. I begin by discussing the nature of evidential fit. Here is a theory
neutral definition of evidential fit or what is known as the ‘epistemic support relation’:
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Evidential Fit: The relation that holds between some evidence e and a proposition p, such
that when person S has evidence e, S is justified in believing that proposition.
Furthermore, the justified doxastic attitude toward a proposition at a particular time is the one
that fits the evidence that person has at that time. However, this generic definition doesn’t help
us understand what this epistemic support relation amounts to. I will defend an explanationist
account of evidential fit which essentially holds that for belief p to fit S’s evidence at a given time
is for p to be the best explanation of that evidence or for p to be an available entailment of the
best explanation of S’s evidence. But before fleshing out the details of this explanationist
account, I will explain some other accounts of evidential fit and the problems inherent to them.
This will help to motivate the preferred explanationist account.
The first view of evidential fit is called evidential proportionalism (EP) which says that
each and every body of evidence bears some logical or objective probabilistic relation to each
proposition. There are two versions of EP. First, S’s evidence supports belief p only when S’s
evidence entails that the proposition is true.
Logical Entailment (LE): p fits S’s evidence at t iff S’s evidence at t entails p.
Conee and Feldman reject this view because it ties epistemic relations too closely to logical
relations (2008, p.94). They argue that LE requires a type of logical omniscience that justified
believers needn’t possess. That is, there are propositions a person may know, which logically
entail other propositions the person cannot even grasp, and surely couldn’t know, that follow
from what she currently believes. Hence, just because a belief is logically entailed by one’s
evidence doesn’t mean the person is justified in holding that belief. Kevin McCain (2014)
argues that LE rules out extremely plausible instances of inductive support for propositions
(p.57). It seems that S can have epistemic support for propositions not entailed by S’s evidence.
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That is, a proposition can fit one’s evidence when it is the conclusion of an inductive inference
from that evidence.
The second way to understand EP is that the evidence makes the proposition probable to
some degree. This account is superior to LE because it allows for inductive support. This gives
us the following account of evidential support (b = background information and e = S’s
evidence):
Probability (PB): p fits S’s evidence at t iff Pr (p|e&b) > Pr (p|b) at t.
Conee and Feldman (2008, p.95) and McCain (p.57) argue that the same problem applies to PB
that applies to LE. That is, there will cases where this probabilistic relation is beyond the grasp
of S. Furthermore, McCain argues that PB allows that propositions that S does not grasp fit S’s
evidence as long as S’s evidence increases the probability of these propositions. But this is
counterintuitive.
There is a second possible account of evidential fit called subjectivism.
Subjectivism: evidence e supports p for person S iff S believes that e entails or makes
sufficiently probable p.
The idea here is that the support relation depends upon S believing that a satisfactory relation
holds between e and p. Conee and Feldman provide two reasons why this account fails. First, it
requires a ‘meta-level requirement’ that justified belief always requires believing that some
satisfactory objective relation holds between one’s evidence and the content of one’s beliefs.
But this is the wrong picture of epistemic justification because children and unsophisticated
believers don’t possess these explicit beliefs about the relationship between their evidence and
their conclusions. Additionally, if simply believing that the relation obtains were sufficient, then
very ‘wild and unjustified beliefs’ to the effect that some evidence supports a conclusion would
render these conclusions justified. But that’s implausible. Finally, if there will be cases in which
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the justification of a conclusion depends upon a belief that the evidence is properly related to the
conclusion, then this belief about the connection must itself be justified. However, this will
result in an intolerable infinite regress and therefore an actual belief in such a connection cannot
be required in all cases. Therefore, Subjectivism fails as an adequate account of evidential fit
(Conee and Feldman, 2008, p.95).43
A third possible view of evidential fit involves non-doxastic seemings. There are times
when someone just reflects on his evidence and it “just seems” to the person that it supports
some conclusion.
Non-Doxastic Seemings (NDS): evidence e supports C for person S provided it seems to
S that e has a proper logical or probabilistic relation to C.44
Thus, its ‘seeming’ to S that e supports p is a non-doxastic state, not a belief that e supports p.
This avoids Conee and Feldman’s objection to Subjectivism above (and yet NDS is still a brand
of subjectivism). A seeming (unlike a belief) is not something that needs justification, so if a
seeming can justify a belief then it stops the infinite regress problem stated above. Conee and
Feldman reject this view. First, they argue that ‘seemings’ are not required for justification. If S
has a good reason to believe something, then the conclusion is justified regardless of whether one
has the additional non-doxastic seeming. Second, Conee and Feldman argue that the existence of
these non-doxastic seeming states is unlikely. It might be easy to pick out spontaneous beliefs
about connections between propositions and to identify feelings of confidence about these
beliefs. However, it is very difficult to recognize any state other than a belief or a level of

One particular brand of subjectivism is advanced by Richard Foley (1987). Foley’s subjectivism says that a
doxastic attitude fits some evidence that a subject S has iff S would, on reflection, endorse the epistemic principle
linking that doxastic attitude to that evidence.
44
Michael Huemer (2007) advances a similar view called phenomenal conservatism which says: If it seems to S that
p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p (p.30).
43
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confidence that can be properly characterized as it seeming to one that e supports p (Conee and
Feldman, 2008, p.95-96).
Michael Bergmann provides a nice explanation of how to characterize the sort of
objection to NDS that Conee and Feldman support (Bergmann, 2013, p.169-70). ‘Objectivity’
rejects the view that a doxastic response to an experience (such as a seeming) is fitting as long as
it feels right to the person.
Objectivity: it is possible for S’s belief response to her experience to seem to her to be
entirely ﬁtting and epistemically appropriate when in fact it is objectively unﬁtting
(epistemically) (Bergmann, 2013, p.169).
And likewise
It is possible for S’s belief response to her experience (e.g., a sensory experience) to be
objectively unﬁtting epistemically even when—in virtue of the fact that that experience
causes the content of that belief to seem true to S—that belief response feels right to S
(Bergmann, 2013, p.170).
Bergmann gives the following example of a belief response to an experience that is epistemically
unfitting for us: <believing, in response to the sensory experience that one is having as one sits in
his quiet ofﬁce looking at a bookcase lined with books, that he’s standing on a mountaintop
enjoying a view of the clear night sky while listening to a choir singing Handel’s Messiah>.
Objectivity holds that this unfittingness does not dissolve (a) simply because of its coming to
seem to the person that that belief response to that experience is epistemically ﬁtting or (b)
simply because that belief response to that experience feels right because that experience causes
that belief content to seem true (Ibid). I think this is correct and from this point on I adopt the
objectivity view.
A fourth possible view of the evidential support relation involves principles of evidence
that do not involve principles of deductive and inductive logic. This view was advanced by
Roderick Chisolm (1979, p.238). The idea is that we discover these principles by first starting
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with the assumption that what a person knows at any time is justified by reference to what is in
one’s evidence base at that given time and that we know things from various sources. There are
a variety of sources of our knowledge: perception, memory, introspection, reason, etc. “Moral
consciousness”, “intuitive understanding”, and “religious consciousness” may also be sources of
knowledge (Chisolm, 1982, p.114-15). With these assumptions, we engage in a Socratic project
of formulating evidential principles that account for our knowledge derived from these various
sources. Together, these principles are supposed to describe all of the cases in which particular
propositions fit one’s evidence. The problem, as Conee and Feldman argue, is that all of these
principles are such that they “…do not derive from any more fundamental or more general ones”
(Conee and Feldman, 2008, p.97). The problem isn’t that these principles don’t correctly
describe when our evidence supports believing a particular proposition, rather the issue is that
“…there is a troubling arbitrariness and specificity about his [Chisholm’s] choice of principles”
(Ibid). That is, if there is something about perception, memory, reason, etc., that justifies, then
there is something about them that makes this the case. Chisolm’s view fails to offer more
fundamental principles to explain why these experiences are justifying.45
In part II below, I will argue against one more important account of the epistemic support
relation that incorporates reliability—a.k.a., ‘reliabilist fit’. It is important to discuss this view
because it tries to account for the role that reliability plays in epistemic justification. That is,
‘reliabilist fit’ conflicts with my own two-component view of justification, so it’s important to
see why reliabilist fit doesn’t properly account for the role that reliability plays in justifying a
belief. This helps to clear the way for my own account which I will develop later on.

For a more through discussion of Chisolm’s view as well as phenomenal conservatism, see Kevin McCain (2014)
p.58-62.
45
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II. Juan Comesana and ‘Evidentialist Reliabilism’
In this section, I will argue against one other account of the epistemic support relation.
Juan Comesana defends a theory of epistemic justification that combines evidentialism and
reliabilism. In doing so, he utilizes an account of the epistemic support relation that he calls
‘reliabilist fit’. Evidentialist reliabilism replaces talk of evidence fitting certain propositions with
talk of evidence being reliably connected to the truth of certain propositions. I will argue that
Comesana’s evidentialist reliabilism (ER), although a promising account of epistemic
justification, fails because it relies on a reliabilist notion of epistemic support as a necessary
component. Remember that on my view, although reliability isn’t necessary for epistemic
justification, it can add to the degree to which a belief is justified.
II.1 - Against Evidentialism
Comesana begins by arguing that evidentialism is an incomplete theory of doxastic
justification. Remember that Conee and Feldman define epistemic justification in the following
way:
EJ: Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only
if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t.
Conee and Feldman characterize evidentialism as an internalist theory which is the view that a
person’s beliefs are justified only by things that are internal to that person’s mental life.
However, notice that EJ as defined above is a theory of propositional justification and not a
theory of doxastic justification. Thus, EJ cannot provide a full account of epistemic justification.
EJ only tells us when a doxastic attitude is justified for S (whether S adopts that doxastic attitude
or not). It does not tell us what it is for a person’s existing doxastic attitude to be justified. For a
full account of justification we need to know what it is for S’s existing doxastic attitude to be
justified. Furthermore, doxastic justification must include the fact that S’s doxastic attitude is
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based on the evidence in S’s possession. To account for doxastic justification, Conee and
Feldman offer an account of ‘well-foundedness’ which says:
WF: S’s doxastic attitude D at t toward proposition p is well-founded if and only if:
(i)
having D toward p is justified for S at t; and
(ii)
S has D toward p on the basis of some body of evidence e, such that
a) S has e as evidence at t;
b) having D toward p fits e; and
c) there is no more inclusive body of evidence e’ had by S at t such that
having D toward p does not fit e’46
Thus, in order for a belief p at t to be well-founded, S must have evidence that on balance
supports believing that p, this evidence in support of p must not be defeated by other evidence S
has, and S has to believe p on the basis of S’s supporting evidence (Comesana, p.573-74).
Even with WF, Comesana argues that evidentialism is an incomplete theory of epistemic
justification for one important reason: a satisfactory account of evidential fit cannot be
formulated if we adopt a mentalist account of evidentialism.
Evidential mentalism: If any two individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are
exactly alike evidentially.47
If two individuals are exactly alike evidentially they not only have the same evidence but their
evidence also justifies the same attitude towards the same propositions. How someone is
mentally fixes what evidence that person possesses, but also what that evidence is for.
Comesana argues that evidential mentalism cannot answer the following question:
Q: What necessary and jointly sufficient conditions must evidence e and proposition p
satisfy for it to be the case that adopting doxastic attitude D towards p fits e?
He says any answer to Q can be thought of as a completion of the following schema:
Doxastic attitudes: Necessarily, adopting D towards p fits e if and only if…

46

Kevin McCain points out that clause (i) in WF is actually redundant with the conjunction of a), b), and c) if EJ is
assumed (McCain, p.3).
47
Note that this should refer to beliefs being alike justificationally, not individuals.
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This schema is a conjunction of these other three schemas:
Belief: Necessarily, believing that p fits e if and only if…
Disbelief: Necessarily, disbelieving that p fits e if and only if…
Suspension of judgment: Necessarily, suspending judgment about p fits e if and only if…
Q, then, is a precise version of the question ‘what is it for a doxastic attitude towards a
proposition to fit some evidence?’ (Comesana, 2010, p.574).
According to Comesana, we can categorize the possible answers to Q in two ways. First,
it is compatible with evidentialism (including mentalist versions) that we cannot have a full or
even a partial answer to Q because it is compatible with evidentialism that epistemic facts are
brute facts (Comesana, 2010, p.276).
Brutal fit: Q doesn’t have a full, correct and informative answer, because epistemic facts
of the form “adopting D towards p fits E” are brute facts (Comesana, 2010, p.580).
Second, there is a class of answers that satisfy the following restriction:
Mental fit: Q can be given a correct, full and informative answer in exclusively mental
terms (Ibid).
Comesana points out that evidentialism doesn’t entail mental fit. He says that this is clearly the
case because evidentialism is compatible with brutal fit, which is itself incompatible with mental
fit. Thus it follows that evidentialism is compatible with the negation of mental fit. Comesana
believes that any answer to Q that tries to satisfy mental fit will encounter a fundamental
problem:
…the fundamental problem is that for a doxastic attitude towards a proposition to fit certain
evidence, that evidence must be a good reason to take that attitude towards that
proposition—and, whereas it is plausible to suppose that evidence itself is constituted by
mental states, it is not plausible to suppose that what makes evidence good is itself
constituted by mental states (Comesana, 2010, p.581).

130

Later I will examine the argument he provides that supports this claim, but for now it will suffice
to motivate examining a different answer to Q.
Now, before I explain what Comesana thinks is a satisfactory answer to Q, I will briefly
discuss the three problems he thinks reliabilism faces. Then I will explain why he thinks ER can
provide a satisfactory answer to Q. I will then discuss why Comesana thinks that this proposed
“hybrid” view also avoids the problems that reliabilists face.
II.2 - Reliabilism
Comesana also acknowledges three problems for reliabilism. Comesana offers the
following general account of reliabilism:
Reliabilism: S’s belief that p is justified if and only if:
1. S’s belief that p was produced by a belief-independent process that is reliable; or
2. S’s belief that p was produced by a belief-dependent process, the beliefs on which the
process depends are justified, and the process is conditionally reliable.
This definition of reliabilism respects the distinction between belief-dependent processes
(processes whose inputs include beliefs) and belief-independent processes (processes whose
inputs do not include beliefs). It is not necessary that belief-dependent processes be
unconditionally reliable in order to justify a belief. That is, they only need to tend to produce
mostly true beliefs if the beliefs that are part of their inputs are true. A belief produced by a
belief-dependent process is justified just in case the process is thus conditionally reliable and the
input beliefs are themselves justified (Comesana, 2010, p.577).
Comesana identifies three main problems with reliabilism. First, that reliabilism isn’t
necessary for justification. Second, that reliability is not sufficient for justification. Third, that
reliability is unintelligible.

131

The first problem, that reliabilism isn’t necessary for justification, is expressed by the
New Evil Demon Problem (NED) that I discussed earlier.
NED: The objection starts by having us consider victims of a Cartesian evil demon.
Everyone agrees that these victims don’t have knowledge (if only because most of their
beliefs are false, but not only because of that), but, Cohen argues, we should admit that
they can be just as justified as we are. To be sure, some of these victims engage in wishful
thinking, hasty generalization, and other epistemic vices—their beliefs are not justified.
But some other victims are careful reasoners and reasonable “perceivers”: they take their
experience at face value when there is no conflicting information, they commit as few
fallacies as we do, etc. We better say that the beliefs of these victims are justified—for
what is the relevant difference between them and us? But reliabilism seems to have the
consequence that the beliefs of the victims of an Evil demon can never be justified, because
what the demon does is to make the belief-forming processes of his victims nearly
completely unreliable (Comesana 2010, p.577-78).
NED is supposed to show that reliabilism seems to have the consequence that the beliefs of a
victim of an evil demon cannot be justified because they are not reliably produced. But
intuitively the victim’s beliefs can be justified if the victim in question is a careful epistemic
agent.
Comesana offers what he calls ‘indexical reliabilism’ as a means to deal with NED’s
challenge to reliabilism’s necessity for epistemic justification (2010, p.579).
Indexical Reliabilism (IR): S’s belief that p is justified if and only if:
1. S’s belief that p was produced by a belief-independent process that is actually reliable;
or
2. S’s belief that p was produced by a belief-dependent process, the beliefs on which the
process depends are justified, and the process is conditionally actually reliable.
Here, ‘actually’ is to be understood as having a two-dimensional semantics. That is, actual
reliability expresses two different propositions associated with any attribution of justification: the
“diagonal proposition” which holds that the belief was produced by a method that is reliable in
S’s world (the world where it is believed), and the “horizontal proposition” which holds that the
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belief was produced by a process that is reliable in the world where the proposition is being
considered (the world in which justification is being ascribed to S's pertinent belief via an
utterance of the sentence 'S's belief that p is justified'). To have knowledge, a belief must be
diagonally justified. But even subject S, who is the victim of an evil demon, can be justified in
the horizontal sense. Victims of an evil demon can have justified beliefs if those beliefs are
produced by processes that are reliable in our world.
The second problem, that reliability is not sufficient for justification is expressed in the
Norman the Clairvoyant case. Norman’s belief is not justified since he has no evidence or
reasons of any kind for or against the possibility of such a cognitive ability, or evidence of the
President’s whereabouts (Comesana, p.578).
The third problem, that reliability is unintelligible, is best expressed by the generality
problem. The generality problem is the problem that any token process that produces a belief
will be an instance of indefinitely many types of processes. Each type will have its own level of
reliability, normally distinct from the levels of reliability of other types. The problem is
determining which repeatable type should be selected for purposes of assigning a determinate
reliability ratio to the process token (Ibid).
In order to understand Comesana’s solutions to the second and third problems, we have
to first understand his account of ER. To understand ER Comesana argues for a proper account
of ‘fit’.
II.3 - ‘Fit’
Comesana proposes the following answer to what ‘fit’ consists in:
Anti-mental fit: Q can be given a correct, full and informative answer, but not in mental
terms exclusively.
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Comesana proposes ER as a way to answer Q that satisfies anti-mental fit. In developing this
answer Comesana appeals to the following ‘full and informative’ answer to Q (Ibid):
Reliabilist fit (RF):
Belief: Necessarily, believing that p fits e for subject S if and only if:
1. e doesn’t include any beliefs of S and the connection between S’s having e and p is
actually reliable; or
2. e includes beliefs of S, all of these beliefs are justified, and the connection between
S’s having e and p is conditionally actually reliable.
Disbelief: Necessarily, disbelieving that p fits e for subject S if and only if:
1. e doesn’t include any beliefs of S and the connection between S’s having e and notp is actually reliable; or
2. e includes beliefs of S, all of these beliefs are justified, and the connection between
S’s having e and not-p is conditionally actually reliable.
Suspension of judgment: Necessarily, suspending judgment with respect to p fits e for
subject S if and only if neither believing nor disbelieving that p fits e for subject S.
RF replaces talk of evidence fitting certain propositions with talk of evidence being reliably
connected to the truth of certain propositions. Comesana says that given the fact that we want to
avoid postulating primitive (brute) epistemic facts, and given the shortcomings of mental fit, he
believes that reliabilist fit is a promising complement to evidentialism.
II.4 - Proto-Evidentialist Reliabilism
Adding RF to IR helps deal with the challenge to the sufficiency of reliability for
justification. Remember that IR consists of a two-dimensional semantics for ‘actual’. Comesana
argues that the sentence “clairvoyance is actually reliable” (uttered in a context where Norman is
being discussed) expresses two propositions: a true diagonal proposition (because clairvoyance is
reliable in Norman’s world), and a false horizontal proposition (because clairvoyance is not
reliable in our world). But again, Norman has no evidence for or against his clairvoyant ability
or regarding the whereabouts of the President. The belief just pops into his head. This gives us
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the intuition that Norman is not justified in believing that the President is in New York City,
since his belief isn’t based on any evidence (Comesana, 2010, p.582).
Now, in order to account for the dependency of justification on evidence, IR can be
revised in the following way:
Proto-evidentialist reliabilism (Proto-ER): S’s belief that p is justified if and only if that
belief was produced by a process P which includes some evidence e and:
1. e doesn’t include any beliefs of S and P is actually reliable; or
2. e includes beliefs of S, all of these beliefs are justified, and P is conditionally
actually reliable.
Proto-ER properly diagnoses the Norman case because now his belief is unjustified because it
was produced by a process that doesn’t provide any evidence (evidence of the possibility of
Norman’s clairvoyant ability or evidence regarding the President’s whereabouts). Thus, ProtoER has advantages over both reliabilism and evidentialism. Unlike reliabilism, Proto-ER is
successful at dealing with counterexamples like Norman the Clairvoyant, and unlike
evidentialism, it includes a non-pessimistic answer to Q. However, in order to deal with the third
problem, the unintelligibility of reliabilism, a further integration of evidentialism and reliabilism
is required (Comesana, 2010, p.583).
II.5 - Evidentialist Reliabilism
Proto-ER provides a partial solution to the generality problem because it rules out process
types that don’t include evidence. However, there are still too many process types that include
evidence under which any given token process of belief-production falls, and it is not guaranteed
that they will all have the same reliability ratio. For example, the token process that produces
<S’s belief that there is a computer in front of him> falls under all the following processes:
<perceptual process>, <visual process>, <visual process while sober>, <visual process while
sober and not wearing socks under bad lighting conditions>, etc. Comesana says that intuitively,
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the answer to the generality problem includes pointing out that some of the process types are
descriptions of the psychological processes that actually produced the belief, while other types
include irrelevant information, or leave out relevant information. For example, whether S is
wearing socks has nothing to do with the formation of S’s belief and any type that doesn’t
include information about features of S’s experience that S takes notice of in forming his belief is
likely to leave out relevant information (Ibid).
Importantly, Comesana points out that any complete epistemological theory will include
a theory of doxastic justification. Evidentialism is not incomplete because it has a theory of
well-foundedness, which appeals to the notion of basing a belief on some evidence. In order for
a person’s belief to be justified, he must base his belief on his evidence that justifies it, i.e.—his
belief is well-founded. Comesana further points out that any theory that accounts for doxastic
justification must include a basing relation (Comesana, 2010, p.584).
Comesana believes that the evidentialist theory of well-foundedness provides an
important insight into how to solve the generality problem:
Now, the evidentialist theory of well-foundedness has it that every justified belief will be
based on some evidence. If so, then the token process that produced that belief will always
be an instance of a type of process of the form producing a belief that p based on evidence
e—for instance, producing a belief that there is something gray in front of me based on the
fact that it looks as if there is something gray in front of me, etc. That type, I propose, is
the one whose reliability is relevant for the justification of a belief (Comesana 2010, p.584).
Comesana thus provides what he thinks is an adequate solution to the generality problem by
providing an account of how to specify which token process is always involved in producing the
relevant belief. In each token process there is some evidence that produces S’s belief. If we can
identify the evidence that the belief is based on then we can identify the token process that
produced the belief. The token process always being identifiable as the specific evidence e (it
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looks as if there is something gray in front of me) that produces the specific belief p (there is
something gray in front of me).
More clearly expressed, the solution to the generality problem (based on the evidentialist
definition of well-foundedness) is ER. ER is a form of evidentialism where the epistemic notion
of fit is replaced by the notion of reliability.
ER: A belief that p by S is justified if and only if...
1. S has evidence e;
2. the belief that p by S is based on e; and either
a. e doesn’t include any beliefs and the type producing a belief that p based
on evidence e is actually reliable; or
b. e includes other beliefs of S, all of those beliefs are justified and the type
producing a belief that p based on evidence e is conditionally actually
reliable (Comesana 2010, p.584).
ER is no longer Proto-ER because ER fully incorporates the evidentialist insight that the
evidence possessed by S plays a crucial role in determining whether a particular belief is justified
for S. That is, Proto-ER only requires that there is some evidence in the belief-forming process,
while ER requires that the justification of the belief depends on whether the subject used that
evidence in forming the pertinent belief. For ER the justification of the belief depends upon
whether the subject used the evidence to form the belief (Ibid).
II.6 - Objection to Evidentialist Reliabilism
Although Comesana’s account of ER seems to be a promising account of doxastic
justification, ultimately it doesn’t work. The following objections are aimed at both RF and
ER.48 The first objection is aimed directly at ER.
Consider the following case as a counterexample to ER. Vic is the unfortunate and
unwitting victim of a Cartesian Evil Demon. Both Vic and the Evil Demon are the only things

48

These objections are attributed to Michael Pace (Chapman University) in a communication I had with E.J.
Coffman.
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contained in the world they both inhabit, world ‘W’. The Evil Demon manipulates Vic’s sensory
experience such that all of the beliefs Vic forms on the basis of these experiences are false
beliefs. For example, the Evil Demon gives Vic a misleading visual experience as of hands
(even though Vic has no hands). On the basis of this misleading visual experience, Vic forms a
non-inferential belief that he has hands. Upon reflecting on his “hands” belief, he attributes
justification to it by uttering (thinking it in his own mind) the following sentence: ‘My noninferential belief that I have hands is justified.’
Now, since ER incorporates IR, we are to understand ‘actually’ as having a twodimensional semantics. There are two different propositions associated with any attribution of
justification: the diagonal proposition, which says that the belief was produced by a method that
is reliable in the world where it is believed, and the horizontal proposition, which says that the
belief was produced by a process that is reliable in whichever world the proposition is
considered. Therefore, Vic’s utterance ‘My non-inferential belief that I have hands is justified’
is true only if 1) forming a belief on the basis of visual experience is reliable in the world where
it is believed (Vic’s world W) or 2) forming a belief on the basis of visual experience is reliable
in the world in which the proposition is considered, i.e.—in the world where the justificationattribution is uttered (also W since Vic is the person attributing justification to his belief that he
has hands). Therefore, ER holds that Vic’s utterance ‘My non-inferential belief that I have hands
is justified’, is true only if visual experience is reliable in world W (the world Vic inhabits).
However, visual experience is not reliable in W. Hence, ER holds that Vic’s utterance ‘My noninferential belief that I have hands is justified’ is false, i.e.—neither the diagonal nor the
horizontal proposition is true. But this result is implausible because it seems that Vic’s utterance
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‘My non-inferential belief that I have hands is justified’ is true. Therefore, this seeming truth of
Vic’s utterance weighs significantly against ER.
The idea behind this objection is that even though visual experience isn't reliable in W,
the evidence Vic has (seeming to have hands) justifies his non-inferential belief ‘I have hands'
because his visual experience (absent any defeating evidence) gives him a very good reason to
believe that he has hands. If true, this is compatible with the view that you can have a justified
false belief because you have strong evidence that supports that belief.
This same objection can also be used against the left-to-right conditional of RF. In
particular, the objection indicates that the left-to-right conditional of RF is false. Simply put, we
need to modify Vic’s case so that Vic ascribes to his hand belief the property of fitting the
evidence it’s based on – viz., visual experience as of hands. So suppose that Vic utters (in the
same manner as before) ‘My hand belief fits my visual experience as of hands’. Intuitively, there
seems to be something correct about Vic’s utterance. That is, it seems to be expressing a true
statement. But, RF implies that Vic’s utterance expresses a truth only if “hand-ish experience”
reliably indicates “hand presence” in W (the world Vic inhabits). However, by hypothesis
“hand-ish experience” is not a reliable indicator of “hand presence”. Therefore, RF yields the
counterintuitive result that Vic’s utterance is false, which strongly weighs against RF. This
strongly supports that reliability is not a necessary condition for a belief to be justified. It also
supports the evidentialist view that a belief is justified if it properly fits one’s evidence that it is
based on. If so, then evidentialist fit is a sufficient condition for a belief to be justified period (at
the very least).
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III. Externalist Evidentialism
One important point needs to be made before I move on to discussing accounts of
explanationist evidentialism. Explanationist Evidentialism (EE) is a mentalist and an internalist
theory of epistemic justification. It is a mentalist theory of justification because it holds the
following two principles:
1. The justificatory status of a person’s doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes on the
person’s occurrent and dispositional mental states, events, and conditions.
2. If any two possible individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are alike
justificationally, e.g., the same beliefs are justified for them to the same extent (Conee
and Feldman, 2004a, p.56).
Number 1 says that justification supervenes on mental states and 2 is an implication of 1. EE is
an internalist and mentalist account of justification. However, not all accounts of evidentialism
are internalist. Timothy Williamson offers an externalist evidentialist view. He identifies one’s
evidence with one’s knowledge. That is, one's evidence consists of the totality of propositions
that one knows. Famously, he holds that E=K (evidence = knowledge). Williamson’s account
of evidentialism is externalist because knowledge consists of true propositions and truth is
external to the thinker. So if E=K, then evidence consists of only true propositions. Thus, a
belief’s justification depends upon truth, which is external to the thinker. Williamson’s view is
known as propositionalism which says that all evidence is made up of propositions. Very briefly
I would like to discuss some strong reasons to doubt that propositionalism is true.
There are a number of good reasons to doubt propositionalism. For the sake of brevity, I
will provide what I think are the two biggest reasons to doubt propositionalism.49 McCain
argues that propositionalism is too restrictive as an account of evidence since it is highly

For a more thorough discussion of the issues with propositionalism and Williamson’s E=K thesis, see McCain
(2014) Chapter 2 and Feldman and Conee (2008).
49
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plausible that your experiences count as evidence. “Your experience of being in pain is evidence
for you that you are in pain. Your experience of being hungry is evidence for you that you are
hungry. Your experience of a book looking blue is evidence for you that the book is blue. And
so on” (McCain, p.19). Conee and Feldman write, “Experience is our point of interaction with
the world—conscious awareness is how we gain whatever evidence we have” (Conee and
Feldman, 2008, p.87). McCain points out that none of this means that only experience counts as
evidence. It is very plausible that things like beliefs count as evidence as well. However, if a
belief is to count as evidence for anything other than the fact that the person holds that belief,
then it must be a justified belief, i.e.—it must be a belief for which the person has good evidence.
This good evidence could be other justified beliefs or experiences, but eventually it is very likely
that the evidence will ‘bottom out’ in experiences (perceptual, introspective, memorial, intuitive,
etc.). Thus, beliefs can be evidence, but it’s likely that they are not ‘ultimate evidence’. McCain
thinks it is very plausible (and likely) that all ultimate evidence is experiential and that “…all
other evidence is evidence in virtue of bearing appropriate relations to ultimate evidence”
(McCain, p.19-20).
One other reason to doubt propositionalism and therefore E=K is that evidence need not
be factive. If evidence consists solely of mental states, then the type of mental states in question
are non-factive mental states (McCain, p.10). Non-factive mental states are mental states
someone can be in even if they misrepresent the world. Factive mental states, on the other hand,
are mental states that actually represent the world. For example, seeing that there is a tree is a
factive mental state since S can only be in the mental state of seeing that there is a tree if there
actually is a tree. However, seeming to see that there is a tree is a non-factive mental state
because S can seem to see that there is a tree even when there isn’t one (e.g., the seeming is a
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hallucination). We can see that evidence is non-factive because it doesn’t always point to the
truth. Good evidence can support a false proposition. In other words, even good evidence is
fallible.
IV. Explanationist Accounts
Given the misgivings of the above accounts of the epistemic support relation, I want to
now discuss what I think is a far more promising account: explanationist fit. However, in order
to have a full account of categorical doxastic justification, we need to know not only what it is
for a doxastic attitude towards some proposition to fit some evidence that the subject possesses,
but what it is for a subject to base his doxastic attitude toward some proposition on that evidence
(well-foundedness). So, explanationist fit is only one important component of a fully fleshed out
evidentialist theory of categorical doxastic justification, i.e.—well-foundedness.
To begin my discussion of explanationist fit, I propose the following working definition,
which will need a great deal of unpacking:
Evidential Fit: For belief p to fit S’s evidence at a given time is for p to be the best
explanation of that evidence.
Having a strong conception of evidential fit is important for understanding how evidentialism
accounts for epistemic support. Conee and Feldman say the following about epistemic support:
We believe that the fundamental epistemic principles are principles of best explanation.
Perceptual experiences can contribute toward the justification of propositions about the
world when the propositions are part of the best explanation of those experiences that is
available to the person. Similarly, the truth of the contents of a memory experience may
be part of the best explanation of the experience itself. Thus, the general idea is that a
person has a set of experiences, including perceptual experiences, memorial experiences,
and so on. What is justified for the person includes propositions that are part of the best
explanation of those experiences available to the person. Likewise, one’s inferences justify
by identifying to one further propositions that either require inclusion in one’s best
explanation for it to retain its quality or enhance the explanation to some extent by their
inclusion (Conee and Feldman, 2008, p.97-98).
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Thus, according to Feldman and Conee, the fundamental support principle of evidentialism is a
principle of best explanation. We can formulate this basic principle like so:
Best Explanationism: Belief p is justified for S if and only if p is the best explanation of
the evidence S has at a given time.
This principle is a principle of propositional justification only, so later I will discuss an account
of the basing relation in order to turn explanationism into a theory of categorical doxastic
justification (in this case, well-foundedness).
Now, there are a number of things that need to be addressed in order to understand Conee
and Feldman’s view. As they point out, we need a better understanding of what it means to have
a best “available” explanation. Is this “availability” qualifier referring to the best explanation
available simpliciter or the best explanation available to the subject? If the former, then there
will be worries about the right-to-left direction of ‘Best Explanationism’. For example, the best
scientific explanation of S’s current experience will include detailed scientific theories or logical
consequences that S is unable to grasp or understand. So, there will be certain explanations that
will constitute the best explanation for why S has that evidence, but aren’t available to S as an
explanation. Even if Conee and Feldman add that the type of availability in question includes
the best explanation available to the subject, then this qualifier itself will need to be explained
(Conee and Feldman, 2008, p.98).
Conee and Feldman make the following claim about the “availability” qualifier:
The best available explanation of one’s evidence is a body of propositions about the world
and one’s place in it that make best sense of the existence of one’s evidence. This notion
of making sense of one’s evidence can be equally well described as fitting the presence of
the evidence into a coherent view of one’s situation. So it may be helpful to think of our
view as a non-traditional version of coherentism. The coherence that justifies holds among
propositions that assert the existence of the non-doxastic states that constitute one’s
ultimate evidence and propositions that offer an optimal available explanation of the
existence of that evidence (Ibid).
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However, there are still important questions that remain. If it is this ‘coherence’ that justifies,
then is it an objective coherence that holds among one’s body of propositions that does the
justifying or is it the fact that it seems to the subject that such coherence obtains? It suffices to
say that more needs to be said about this “availability” qualifier. Conee and Feldman admit that
much more work needs to be done to develop their view, but they believe they have cast doubt
on competing views of epistemic support and offered a more plausible account. In what follows,
I will discuss how Conee and Feldman’s position has been developed in a recent work by Kevin
McCain (2014).
IV.1 - Kevin McCain’s Account of Evidential Fit
Conee and Feldman suggest that what is justified for a person are propositions that are
part of the best explanation of the person’s experience available and the conclusions of
inferences that would enhance that explanation. They admit that “…there are important details
of this account that are yet to be developed” (Conee and Feldman, 2008, p.98). Kevin McCain
attempts to develop this explanationist account.50
The first step McCain takes to develop this theory is to define the following important
terms:
Explanation:
p fits S’s evidence, e, at t iff p explanatorily coheres with e at t.
Explanatory Coherence:
p explanatorily coheres with e at t iff p is part of the best explanation available to S at t
for why S has e.
By combining these two we get

McCain’s account of evidentialism is quite lengthy, so I’m offering what I think are the essential elements of his
theory that are directly relevant to my project.
50
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Best Explanation (BE):
p fits S’s evidence, e, at t iff p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S
has e.
According to BE, the basic epistemic principle is a principle of best explanation (McCain, p.63).
But McCain points out the inadequacy of BE.
McCain points to two counterexamples by Keith Lehrer (1974) and Alvin Goldman
(2011) that he thinks convincingly show that BE is an unsatisfactory account of evidential fit.
Lehrer’s example involves using the Pythagorean Theorem to figure out that a particular mouse
is five feet from a particular owl:
Pythagorean Theorem:
Imagine that I am standing with my toe next to a mouse that is three feet from a four-foothigh flagpole with an owl sitting on top. From this information concerning boundary
conditions and the Pythagorean Theorem, which we here construe as an empirical law, we
can deduce that the mouse is five feet from the owl (McCain, p.64; Lehrer, p.166).
Lehrer claims that this counterexample works against explanationist accounts of justification
because he is “…completely justified in his belief that the mouse is five feet from the owl”, but
he “…has no explanation of why the mouse is five feet from the owl” (Lehrer, p.178). His
justification for this belief doesn’t rely on any explanatory relations whatsoever. Instead, “…it is
enough that the man knows the Pythagorean Theorem, the distance to the pole, and the height of
the pole, and deduces the conclusion” (Ibid). The assumption is that logical relations are not
explanatory relations.
Alvin Goldman makes a similar point:
Animals:
I think there are two squirrels on my deck, and I think there are two birds. So I infer that
there are (at least) four animals. Presumably, this arithmetic inference is justified. Is it a
case of explanatory inference? Surely not. How does there being four animals explain
there being two squirrels and two birds? It doesn’t. Still, here is a justified belief that some
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epistemic principle must cover. But that principle, in turn, cannot be grounded in terms of
best explanation (McCain, p.64; Goldman, 2011, p.277-78).
In this case there is justification for thinking that there are four animals on the deck, but
explanationist accounts of epistemic support (such as BE) cannot account for this justification.
The proposition <there are (at least) four animals> is a logical consequence of Goldman’s
evidence that there are two squirrels and two birds on his deck, but there being four animals on
his deck does not explain there being two squirrels and two birds on his deck. Thus, this is a
case in which a proposition is justified for someone because it fits the person’s evidence, but the
proposition is not itself part of the best explanation of the person’s evidence. Therefore, BE fails
as an adequate account of evidential fit (McCain, p.64-5).
In response to the inadequacy of BE, McCain offers a new account of evidential fit that
respects the fact that not all fundamental epistemic principles are principles of best explanation.
An adequate account of evidential fit cannot simply appeal to explanation. Any account of
evidential fit must appeal to logical consequences of best explanations. McCain thus
reformulates epistemic support as
Explanationist Fit (EF):
p fits S’s evidence, e, at t iff either p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for
why S has e or p is available to S as a logical consequence of the best explanation available
to S at t for why S has e (McCain, p.65).
Before moving on, McCain makes some important points about EF. First, when we discuss
whether S is justified in believing that p because it fits S’s evidence, “S’s evidence” is S’s total
evidence (McCain, p.65). One’s total evidence is a subset of one’s total possible evidence. A
person’s total possible evidence is all and only the information a subject has stored in his mind at
a given time (conscious, unconscious, retrievable, irretrievable, etc.). One’s total evidence is the
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subset of S’s total possible evidence that is relevant for justification. One’s total evidence
includes any defeating evidence one might have.
Second, in order for p to be part of the best explanation available to S at t, there must not
be any contrary explanation with respect to p available to S at t that is as good of an explanation
as, or better than, the best explanation of which p is a part. But this doesn’t mean that there must
be one unique best explanation. That is, S can have two explanations available to her that are
both equally good explanations of why S has the evidence she does. What is key is that there are
no explanations available to S that do not contain p and are just as good as the best explanation
she has available. Finally, what determines whether one explanation is better than another is a
matter of which one is more explanatorily virtuous, i.e.—explanatory power, simplicity, scope,
etc. (McCain, p.65-66).
Third, there can be cases in which the best explanation available is a very poor
explanation. Belief p may fit S’s total evidence but it may not fit her evidence all that well. In
which case, the amount of justification p has for S is minimal. It might be just above the
justification she has for believing ~p. This simply means that one can be more or less justified
(to different degrees) in believing some proposition. The better the explanation that p is a part
of, the better p fits S’s evidence and therefore the higher degree of justification p has for S
(McCain, p.66). However, I don’t think McCain is right when he says that a very poor
explanation can provide some minimal amount of justification for a belief. Before moving on I’d
like to explain why I think McCain is wrong about this.
Like McCain, Ted Poston (2014) adopts an explanationist view of epistemic justification
in which explanationism is a mentalist evidentialist account of epistemic justification. Poston
holds the position that “…one’s normative standing in the space of reasons is constituted by
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one’s explanatory position” (p.69) and that the justificatory status of one’s belief is a function of
the explanatory virtues or merits of one’s system of beliefs (p.80).
Poston argues that the virtues relevant to explanationism and justification are
conservativism, simplicity, and explanatory power.51 Briefly, ‘conservatism’ is the view that
belief confers some positive merit on the proposition that is believed.52 ‘Simplicity’ roughly
holds that given two theories which both explain some phenomena, the simpler theory is the
better of the two. ‘Explanatory power’ involves a theory’s ability to explain a wide range of
phenomena. These virtues are central in understanding Poston’s explanatory view of epistemic
justification which says:
EX-J: S has justification for believing p if and only if p is a member of a sufficiently
virtuous explanatory system, E, and E is more virtuous than any p-relevant competing
system E’ (Poston, p.90).53
Poston makes an important point about EX-J that is relevant to the present discussion and I think
it bolsters McCain’s view. Poston says that for p to be justified for S it must be part of a
sufficiently virtuous explanatory system. This condition deals with the objection that sometimes
the best explanation isn’t a very good explanation. In other words, in some cases an explanation
may be the best among a set of really lousy explanations in which case it doesn’t seem like the
pertinent belief is justified. Poston says that such explanations aren’t sufficiently virtuous and
therefore such explanations aren’t sufficient for justification. That is, in cases where the best
explanation is a lousy explanation, EX-J doesn’t entail that p is justified (Poston, p.88). I think
this is the correct analysis. This is an important condition that I think any explanationist view
I will not discuss whether there this is an acceptable list of virtues. I’m simply providing an example of how one
explanationist view makes sense of explanatory virtues. I don’t claim that this view is definitive.
52
Conservatism is a very controversial view in epistemology and a discussion of the relevant controversy goes
beyond the scope of this dissertation. I simply offer Poston’s explanationist view as a way for the reader to see what
a plausible view of best explanations might look like. For a more thorough discussion of the issues surrounding
conservativism see Poston (2014) Chapter 2.
53
Again, this should say ‘p is justified for S’ and not ‘S has justification for believing p’.
51
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should have. It is also in line with Feldman’s point that mere evidential support isn’t enough for
propositional justification. Recall the example Feldman gives to make this point clear: if you
learn from a reliable weather report that there’s a 51% chance of rain tomorrow, then while your
total evidence now barely supports the proposition that “It’ll rain tomorrow”, you’re not yet
justified in believing it’ll rain tomorrow. Evidential support must be sufficiently strong for
propositional justification.54 That’s not to say that the strength of evidential support must be
extremely high in all cases in order for a belief to be justified; it just means that a belief needs
stronger evidential support than what McCain allows. I think this same condition applies to best
explanations. That is, for a best explanation to justify a belief, that explanation must be
sufficiently virtuous. Thus, not all best explanations are justifying explanations. McCain’s view
on this matter is too permissive.
Finally, McCain provides an account of what it means for an explanation of why S has e
to be available to S at t and what it means for a proposition to be available to S as a logical
consequence of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e. First, McCain says that
at t S has p available as part of the best explanation for why S has e at t if and only if
At t S has the concepts required to understand p and S is disposed to have a seeming that p
is part of the best answer to the question "why does S have e?" on the basis of reflection
alone (p.67).
By “seeming” McCain adopts an account defended by Chris Tucker (McCain, p.67; Tucker,
2013) called the “Experience View”, which says that seemings are mental states with
propositional content and a particular phenomenology—they “have the feel of truth, the feel of a
state whose content reveals how things really are” (Tollhurst, 1998, p.298-299). On the
‘Experience View’, seemings are not beliefs or inclinations to believe but are either sui generis
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See footnote 31 in Chapter Three.
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propositional attitudes or experiences. The idea is that if seemings are a sui generis propositional
attitude, then they are the sort of thing that is like a belief, desire, etc., that takes a proposition as
its object, but they don't fall under any of the other categories of propositional attitudes.
Importantly, the “availability” qualifier does not require that S actually have the seeming
in question. Instead, S must have the disposition to have such a seeming. McCain cites Peter
Markie’s (McCain, p.67; Markie 2013) “Knowledge How Proposal” to explain how this
disposition should be understood. The idea is that S has the pertinent disposition by virtue of
having certain information as background evidence. Markie says that this background
information helps determine the character of the seeming and helps sustain it (McCain, p.67;
Markie, 2013, p.263). What this means is that this disposition to have the necessary seeming is a
type of evidence that connects or links p to e. Hence, this disposition to have a seeming is part of
S’s total evidence. In other words, the disposition to have this sort of seeming is intermediate
evidence that connects p to e. The ultimate evidence connecting p to e is made up of the
background evidence S has that sustains this disposition to have the pertinent seeming (McCain,
p.81).
To be clear, McCain is not adopting a subjectivist view along the lines of phenomenal
conservatism. As we saw earlier, McCain rejects such a view. McCain is not claiming that if it
seems to S that p is part of the best answer to the question “Why does S have e?”, then it is part
of the best answer. McCain says that "…it is an open question whether p is in fact part of the
best answer to this question" (Ibid). He says "It is plausible that S could have a mental state in
which it seems to her that p is part of the best answer to "why does S have e"? but in fact it is
not" (Ibid). The idea with availability here is that S doesn't have to consciously at t
recognize/think of/believe/have a seeming/etc., that p is part of the best explanation of her

150

evidence in order for p to be justified for her. Such a requirement would over-intellectualize
justification. Instead, S has to have a disposition upon reflection to have a seeming that p is part
of the best explanation of her evidence in order to have p available in the right way. It has to be
possible that S have the seeming that p is part of the best explanation for why she has e. This
weaker requirement is one that can be met by even unreflective agents (such as children). So,
when S has p available as a best explanation in this sense, then she has (at least some)
justification for believing that p even if p isn't part of the actual best explanation of e. Roughly,
the idea is that one doesn't need to be infallible when it comes to recognizing best explanations in
order to have justification. An example might help here. Suppose that S has three potential
explanations of e that she can understand, E1, E2, and E3. Further, suppose that p is part of E1.
It is possible for S to be justified in believing p because it is available to her as part of the best
explanation of e—even if in fact according to the correct (objective) standards of evaluating
explanations, E2 is a better explanation. Thus, for S to have p available as part of the best
explanation for why S has e at t, then (in addition to having the relevant concepts) it must simply
be possible for S to have the experience (seeming) that p is part of the best explanation for why S
has e at t.55
Now, in terms of logical entailment, McCain says: “…p is available to S as a logical
consequence of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e if and only if
S has the concepts required to understand p and S is disposed on the basis of reflection
alone to have a seeming that p is entailed by the best explanation available to S at t for why
S has e” (p.68).
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I thank Kevin McCain (in communication) for clarifying this availability qualifier.
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S has the seeming that q (for example) follows from the best available explanation of her
evidence in the sense that someone who does not have the concept of modus ponens can have the
seeming that if p and if p, then q are true, then q must be true (Ibid).
McCain provides a couple of examples to show that EF is an acceptable account of
evidential fit. In the first example he says that in normal conditions (and S has no defeaters) S’s
visual experience as of a red block provides her with epistemic support for the proposition <there
is a red block>. He argues that EF delivers precisely this result. That is, the proposition <there
is a red block> is part of the best explanation of why S has an experience as of a red block that is
available to S. S has the concepts required to understand <there is a red block> and is disposed
to have a seeming that <there is a red block> is part of the best answer to the explanatory
question, “Why am I having this visual experience?” or “Why am I having this?” on the basis of
reflection alone. McCain says that in a normal case there will not be an equally good or better
explanation that does not include <there is a red block> available to S. So, <there is a red block>
will fit S’s (assuming S is an ordinary person) evidence. Therefore, S will have justification for
believing that <there is a red block> when S has the visual experience as of a red block. The
same goes for other cases of perception (McCain, p.70).
In order to understand how EF works in accounting for logical entailment (in addition to
seeing how EF works more generally), McCain applies it to Lehrer’s ‘Pythagorean Theorem’ and
Goldman’s ‘Animal’ examples. Let’s look at each of these.
In Lehrer’s example, he has evidence that justifies him in believing that the mouse is
three feet from the flagpole, the owl is on top of the four-foot tall flagpole, and the Pythagorean
Theorem is true. Additionally, he is presumably justified in believing other relevant information
(what three squared equals, what four squared equals, etc.). Given EF, the following
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propositions are all available to Lehrer: <the mouse is three feet from the four foot tall flagpole>,
<the owl is on top of the four foot tall flagpole>, <the Pythagorean Theorem is true>, <the
Pythagorean Theorem says that the hypotenuse of a triangle that has a three foot long side and a
four foot long side is five feet long>, etc. These propositions are part of the best explanation
available to Lehrer. Thus, <the mouse is five feet from the owl> is a logical consequence of this
explanation. McCain says that it is very plausible that <the mouse is five feet from the owl> is
available to Lehrer as a logical consequence of the best explanation available to him at t for why
he possesses the evidence he has. After all, McCain says, Lehrer claims that he deduces this
conclusion. “So, EF yields the result that <the mouse is five feet from the owl> fits Lehrer’s
evidence, so he is justified in believing that the mouse is five feet from the owl” (McCain, p.74).
McCain doesn’t think ‘Animals’ is a problem for EF either. Part of the best explanation
available to Goldman for his current visual experience and his background evidence in this case
is that <there are two squirrels on the deck>, <there are two birds on the deck>, and <squirrels
and birds are both animals>. Goldman has the concepts required to understand <there are four
animals on that deck> and he is disposed based on reflection alone to have a seeming that <there
are four animals on the deck> is entailed by the best explanation available to him at t for why he
has the evidence that he possesses. Thus, Goldman has justification for believing that <there are
four animals on the deck> because this proposition fits his evidence (McCain, p.74-5).
EF provides a piece of McCain’s full account of epistemic justification. It provides
necessary and sufficient conditions for S to have justification for adopting a particular doxastic
attitude (propositional justification):
EF-EJ:
I) Believing p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if at t S has considered p and:
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1) p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has her occurrent nonfactive mental states and the non-factive mental states that she is disposed to bring to
mind when reflecting on the question of p’s truth
OR
2) p is available to S as a logical consequence of the best explanation available to S at t
for why S has her occurrent non-factive mental states and the non-factive mental states
that she is disposed to bring to mind when reflecting on the question of p’s truth
II) Withholding judgment concerning p is epistemically justified for S at t if and only if at t S
has considered p and neither believing p nor believing ~p is epistemically justified for S
(McCain, p.79).56
However, in order to have a full account of doxastic justification (well-foundedness), McCain
offers an account of what it takes for S to have a particular doxastic attitude based on her
evidence. I turn toward that discussion now.
IV.2 - McCain’s Account of the Basing Relation
McCain adopts a version of the causal account of the basing relation. Causal accounts
usually entail that in order for S’s belief to be based on S’s evidence, that evidence must
contribute causally to S’s having that belief. In contrast, McCain rejects doxastic accounts of the
basing relation because he thinks that such accounts engage in over-intellectualization and/or fall
prey to a vicious regress.57 The idea behind doxastic accounts is that the basing relation requires
a meta-belief about the support that the evidence provides for the belief. That is, such accounts
require S to have the meta-belief that her evidence supports believing that p in order for her
belief that p to be based on that evidence. McCain says that such accounts are guilty of over-
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Behind EF-EJ is McCain’s principle (MVP*) that says:
S has p available as evidence relevant to q at t iff at t S is currently aware of p or S is disposed to bring p to
mind when reflecting on the question of q’s truth (McCain, p.51).

For a discussion of doxastic accounts see Keith Allen Korcz. 1997. “Recent Work on the Basing Relation.”
American Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 171-91; and Joseph Tolliver. 1982. “Basing Beliefs on Reasons.” Grazer
Philosophische Studien, 15:149-161.
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intellectualization. For example, if S were to see a tree in perfect viewing conditions, her belief
that <there is a tree> is not based on her evidence unless she also believes that her visual
evidence is good evidence for thinking that her belief <there is a tree> is true. McCain thinks it’s
obvious that we have many beliefs that are based on the justifying evidence that don’t require
such meta-beliefs. This is the case for children and unreflective adults who lack the ability to
form such meta-beliefs. Another problem with doxastic accounts is that they fall prey to a
vicious infinite regress because the meta-belief itself will have to be justified by another metabelief and so on ad infinitum. On the other hand, if the first meta-belief doesn’t need to be
justified then it’s unclear how such a belief could be useful for basing (McCain, p.85).
In contrast to doxastic accounts of the basing relation, McCain opts for an interventionist
account of causation that he thinks provides a satisfactory way of dealing with the basing
relation.
McCain’s interventionist account of the basing relation is a type of manipulability
theory.58 Generally, manipulability theories hold that when A is a cause of B our manipulating A
in certain ways changes B. More precisely:
A causes B if and only if B would change if an appropriate manipulation on A were to be
carried out (McCain, 2014, p.86; Woodward, 2008a).
Interventions are manipulations on one or more variables in a system. More precisely, “…an
intervention I on X with respect to Y will be such that I causes a change in X, I does not cause a
change in Y via some route that does not go through X, and I is exogenous in the sense of not
itself having a cause that affects Y via a route that does not go through X” (McCain, p.87;
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McCain appeals to James Woodward (2003, 2008a, 2008b) and Brad Weslake (2011) to explain his
interventionist account.
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Woodward, 2008b, p.213). Now, it is also important to understand what it is for X to be causally
relevant to Y.
(M) X causes Y if and only if were some intervention…that changes the value of X to
occur, Y or the probability distribution of Y would change in some regular, stable way [at]
least in some range of background circumstances B (Ibid).
M holds that a cause is a difference maker. M says that a cause must make a difference to its
effect because in order for X to be a cause of Y, changes in the value of X must be correlated with
changes in Y in a stable way (McCain, p.87).
One important feature of the interventionist view is an extension of M that accounts for a
specific kind of type-causal relation, the relation of a direct cause.
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a direct cause of Y with respect to some
variable set V is that there be a possible intervention on X that will change Y (or the
probability distribution of Y) when all other variables in V besides X and Y are held fixed
at some value by interventions (McCain, p.87; Woodward, 2003, p.55).
To help understand what a direct cause is, McCain offers the following example: “…if we have a
variable set that includes X, Y, and Z; X is a direct cause of Y if and only if there is a possible
intervention on the value of X that will change the value of Y when we hold fixed the value of Z”
(McCain, p.87). McCain also explains how we should determine which variable set to use when
evaluating whether X is a direct cause of Y. We are concerned with when S’s belief is based on
her evidence, so the relevant variable set will consist of variables that can propositionally justify
or defeat S’s justification for believing a proposition. Hence, the pertinent variable set will be a
set of non-factive mental states (McCain, p.88).
A direct cause is also different in an important respect from an actual cause. In order to
understand what an actual cause is we need to first understand two other important notions.
First, there is the notion of a directed path. A directed path from one variable X to another
variable Y is a chain of direct causal connections from X to Y (McCain, p.88; Woodward, 2003,
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p.59). That is, there is a directed path from X to Y if and only if each variable starting with X and
ending with Y is a direct cause of the variable that immediately succeeds it. So, if there is a
causal chain from X to R to S to Y, this chain is a directed path from X to Y if and only if X is a
direct cause of R, R is a direct cause of S, and S is a direct cause of Y. The second important
notion for understanding what an actual cause is, is the notion of a redundancy range.
For a path P from X to Y in a causal model, define V1…Vn as all variables that are not on
P. Values v1…vn are on the redundancy range for Vi with respect to P if no intervention
on v1…vn while holding X fixed would result in a change to the actual value of Y (McCain,
p.88; Weslake, 2011, p.8).
Together, the notions of a directed path and redundancy range help us understand an actual
cause. When X is an actual cause of Y, X’s having its actual value is a cause of Y’s having its
actual value. Thus, ‘actual cause’ refers to a relation of token causation. Basically, when X is an
actual cause of Y it is possible to change the actual value of Y by changing the actual value of X
while still keeping all other direct causes of Y that are not part of a chain of direct causes
(directed path) leading from X to Y fixed at a value within their redundancy range (McCain, p.89;
Woodward, 2003, p.84).59
Given the above features of the interventionist account of causation, McCain believes
that he has the means to formulate the basing relation which “…bridges the gap between
propositional justification and well-founded belief (doxastic justification)” (p.91). That is, for
S’s belief to be well-founded, S’s belief must be propositionally justified by her evidence and she
must base her belief on that justifying evidence. Here is McCain’s interventionist account of the
general basing relation:
IB: S’s belief that p at t is based on X, if and only if at t:
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For a nice (lengthy) example to help understand the various features of the interventionist account see McCain,
p.89-90.
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1) X is a direct cause of S’s believing that p
AND
2) X is an actual cause of S’s believing that p (McCain, p.93).
Now, we need to know whether S’s evidence bears a causal relation of sufficient strength to her
belief in order for that belief to be based on the evidence. Thus, McCain offers a refined version
of the general relation:
IB-R: S’s belief that p at t is based on her evidence, E, if and only if at t:
1) Each ei ∈ E is a direct cause of S’s believing that p
AND
2) Each ei ∈ E is an actual cause of S’s believing that p
AND
3) It is not the case that intervening to set the values of all direct causes of S’s believing
that p, other than the members of E, to 0 will result in S’s not believing that p when
every ei ∈ E is held fixed at its actual value (Ibid).
In IB-R, E is a subset of S’s non-factive mental states, which propositionally justifies p.
S’s belief that p has the connection to her propositional justification needed for well-founded
belief only if there is some E such that S’s belief that p is based on E in the manner described in
IB-R and S’s believing that p satisfies the conditions laid out in EF-EJ for p to be justified for S.
Also, sets of variables are used when evaluating the causal relations between S’s evidence and
her beliefs. These variable sets include variables for S’s belief, S’s evidence (E), and any factor
that might be a causal influence on S’s believing as she does (e.g., wishful thinking, being struck
by a ray from Alpha Centauri, etc.). Further, assigning values for the variables mentioned
involves imposing a binary system in which each variable has a value of either 1 or 0. So, for
any variable, the influence of that variable is either active or it is not. However, we are not
limited to a binary schema. We might adopt a schema in which these variables get assigned
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values based on the strength of the mental state, mechanism, or influence in question. Finally,
IB-R describes a relation between a belief and its causal base at a given time t. Thus, IB-R offers
an account of basing for both belief formation and sustention. This is crucial since the causal
basis of a belief might fluctuate over time so that at t, x causes S to form the belief that p, but at
t2 S’s belief that p is causally sustained by y. Thus, depending on the nature of x and y it is
possible that S’s belief that p is based on her evidence at one time, but not another. This is in
line with the intuition that someone may form a belief that is not based on sufficiently strong
evidence, but later on obtain evidence that sufficiently supports the belief and continue to hold
the belief because of that evidence, so the later belief is based on sufficient evidence (McCain,
p.91-93).
McCain provides a number of examples to show how IB-R works in application (see
pp.93-99) and how IB-R handles standard objections to causal accounts of the basing relation
(see pp.99-112). I would like to look at a couple of these examples, both of which arise from a
particular objection to IB-R that is relevant to my overall project. This particular objection to
IB-R involves a challenge by John Turri (2010) in which he challenges the ‘orthodox view’
which holds that well-founded belief should be understood in terms of propositional justification
and not the other way around. Turri provides counter-examples which he thinks reveal that the
orthodox view “…misses something deep and important about the relationship between
propositional and doxastic justification” (McCain, p.109; Turri, p.317-18). More precisely, “The
way in which the subject performs, the manner in which she makes use of her reasons,
fundamentally determines whether her belief is doxastically justiﬁed. Poor utilization of even
the best reasons for believing p will prevent you from justiﬁedly believing or knowing that p”
(McCain, p.110; Turri, p.318). As an analogy, Turri offers the following example:
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In evaluating beliefs we are evaluating a kind of performance, the performance of a
cognitive agent in representing the world as being a certain way, and when performing with
materials (which, in cognitive aﬀairs, will include reasons or evidence), the success, or lack
thereof, of one’s performance will depend crucially on the way in which one makes use of
those materials. This is true for carpentry as well as cognition. Consider a carpenter,
equipped with the ﬁnest tools and lumber. You want a deck built, and he is in a position to
build a wonderful one for you. Despite the quality of his tools and lumber, unless he puts
them together in the right way, you are not going to be happy with the end result. You want
a well built deck, not just one built with tools and materials ﬁt for making a well built deck.
Merely having the right equipment for the job, and using it to perform the job, does not
guarantee a job well done (Turri, p.315).
IB-R is part of the orthodoxy, so if Turri is right then there is something very wrong with it.
However, McCain believes that IB-R is not threatened by Turri’s objection.
Here is Turri’s first counter-example. There are two jurors, Miss Proper and Miss
Improper, who sit in judgment of Mr. Mansour. Both know a set of propositions (P1-P4) which
propositionally justifies believing that <Mansour is guilty>. Here is how the case is described:

PROPER & IMPROPER
As it happens, each comes to believe <Mansour is guilty> as the result of an episode of
explicit, conscious reasoning that features (P1–P4) essentially. Miss Proper reasons like
so: (Proper Reasoning) (P1–P4) make it overwhelmingly likely that Mansour is guilty.
(P1–P4) are true. Therefore, Mansour is guilty. Miss Improper, by contrast, reasons like
this: (Improper Reasoning) The tea leaves say that (P1–P4) make it overwhelmingly likely
that Mansour is guilty. (P1–P4) are true. Therefore, Mansour is guilty (McCain, p.109;
Turri, p.316).
Turri says that this is a counter-example to orthodox views since (P1-P4) propositionally justify
<Mansour is guilty> for both jurors and Miss Improper bases her belief on (P1-P4) as evidence
for <Mansour is guilty>. It is part of the content of her reasoning that (P1-P4) make <Mansour is
guilty> extremely probable. However, Miss Proper’s belief is well-founded and Miss Improper’s
belief isn’t (McCain, p.110; Turri, p.317).
Turri’s second case is as follows:
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PONENS & LACY
Mr. Ponens and Mr. F.A. Lacy each knows the following things:
(P5) The Spurs will win if they play the Pistons.
(P6) The Spurs will play the Pistons.
This is a paradigm case of propositional justiﬁcation. <The Spurs will win> is
propositionally justiﬁed for each man because he knows (P5) and (P6). From these two
premises, and only these premises, each man draws the conclusion:
(P7) Therefore, the Spurs will win.
Ponens applies modus ponens to reach the conclusion. Lacy, however, applies a diﬀerent
inference rule, which we may call modus profusus: for any p, q, and r: ( p ∧ q) → r. Lacy’s
belief that the Spurs will win is deﬁnitely not doxastically justiﬁed; following that rule
could never lead to a justiﬁed belief (McCain, p.110; Turri, p.317).
Turri thinks this is a problem case for orthodox views since Ponens applies a proper inference
rule to reach the conclusion while Lacy used an invalid inference rule. Ponens belief is nondeviantly caused by his belief in P5 and P6, and the same is true for Lacy. Further, both Ponens
and Lacy believe that the conjunction of P5 and P6 is a good reason to believe P7. However,
Ponen’s belief P7 is well-founded, but Lacy’s belief isn’t (Ibid).
McCain agrees with Turri that the manner in which one uses her evidence makes a
crucial difference to whether her beliefs are based on her evidence in the sense required for a
belief to be well-founded. However, McCain thinks that Turri is mistaken in thinking that all
orthodox views of the basing relation fail to account for this truth. McCain claims that IB-R
accounts for this truth.
Here is McCain’s explanation of how IB-R yields the intuitive result that Miss Proper’s
belief that <Mansour is guilty> is based on her evidence while Miss Improper’s isn’t. Beginning
with Miss Proper, the relevant variable set for her contains: p (Miss Proper’s belief that <(P1-P4)
make it overwhelmingly likely that Mansour is guilty>), q (Miss Proper’s belief that <(P1-P4)
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are true>, d (Miss Proper’s disposition to have the seeming that <Mansour is guilty> is a logical
consequence of the best explanation of her evidence), and B (Miss Proper’s belief that <Mansour
is guilty>). The key is determining whether B is based on E. The first step is to determine if
each of the members of E (p, q, and d) are a direct cause of B. This seems to be the case since
there are interventions that one could perform on each of them that would result in a change in B.
For example, if we hold fixed q and d but lower the value of p to 0 via an intervention, Miss
Proper wouldn’t have a reason to infer B (B’s value would change) since she is making an
inference from <(P1-P4) make it overwhelmingly likely that Mansour is guilty> and <(P1-P4)
are true> to <Mansour is guilty>. The same applies mutatis mutandis for q and d. Furthermore,
each member of E is an actual cause of B. There are interventions on the actual values of the
members of E that would each result in the actual value of B changing. For example, holding the
values of the other variables fixed at a value within their redundancy ranges, but lowering the
actual value of p to 0. With p set at 0, B will change to 0. Intuitively, if Miss Proper doesn’t
believe that <(P1-P4) make it overwhelmingly likely that Mansour is guilty> she will no longer
infer that < Mansour is guilty>. The same applies mutatis mutandis for q and d. Therefore, IB-R
yields the correct result that Miss Proper’s belief B is based on her evidence (McCain, p.111).
McCain also argues that IB-R successfully rules out Miss Improper’s belief that
<Mansour is guilty> from counting as based on her propositionally justified evidence.
According to Turri, the evidence that propositionally justifies Miss Improper in believing
<Mansour is guilty> consists of her justified belief that <(P1-P4) are true>. Hence, E consists of
q (<(P1-P4) are true>) and d (Miss Improper’s disposition to have the seeming that <Mansour is
guilty> is a logical consequence of the best explanation of her evidence). The other relevant
variables are t (Miss Improper’s belief that <the tea leaves say that (P1-P4) make it
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overwhelmingly likely that Mansour is guilty>) and B (Miss Improper’s belief that <Mansour is
guilty>). McCain points out that in Miss Improper’s case, the third condition of IB-R isn’t met.
Interventions that set the values of all direct causes of Miss Improper’s believing that <Mansour
is guilty>, other than the members of E, to 0 results in her not believing that <Mansour is guilty>
when each member of E is held fixed, but sets t to 0 will result in B being 0. Now, because part
of what leads Miss Improper to believe that <Mansour is guilty> is her belief that <the tea leaves
say that (P1-P4) make it overwhelmingly likely that Mansour is guilty>, it seems plausible that
removing this belief would lead to her not believing that <Mansour is guilty>. This would be the
case even if she continued to believe that <(P1-P4) are true> and kept her disposition to have the
seeming that <Mansour is guilty> is a consequence of the best explanation of her evidence. IB-R
yields the result that Miss Improper’s belief is not based on her justifying evidence. Therefore,
IB-R yields the intuitively correct result that Miss Proper’s belief is based on her justifying
evidence while Miss Improper’s is not. Hence, PROPER & IMPROPER fails as a counterexample to IB-R (McCain, p.111-12).
McCain also argues that PONENS & LACY poses no problem for IB-R either. Very
briefly, Ponen’s belief in the conclusion of his inference is based on his justifying evidence.
However, Lacy does not base his belief on his justifying evidence (McCain, p.112).
Therefore, McCain argues, IB-R yields the intuitive result in both of Turri’s counterexamples because IB-R emphasizes that the manner or way in which S makes use of her reasons,
fundamentally determines whether her belief is well-founded. McCain concludes “If Turri is
correct that all the other orthodox views of the basing relation fail to capture this important truth,
then instead of an argument against the orthodoxy, Turri has helped provide a strong argument in
support of IB-R as the correct account of the basing relation” (Ibid).
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McCain believes that EF-EJ is a satisfactory account of propositional justification and
that IB-R is a successful account of the basing relation. Thus, putting EF-EJ and IB-R together
gives us a complete evidentialist theory of epistemic justification that McCain calls
Explanationist Evidentialism. Explanationist evidentialism is a full and fleshed out account of
Conee and Feldman’s schema for an evidentialist account of well-founded belief.
EX-WF
At t, S’s belief that p is well-founded if and only if:
At t,
1) Each ei ∈ E is a direct cause of S’s believing that p
AND
2) Each ei ∈ E is an actual cause of S’s believing that p
AND
3) It is not the case that intervening to set the values of all direct causes of S’s
believing that p, other than the members of E, to 0 will result in S’s not
believing that p when every ei ∈ E is held fixed at its actual value.
(II) E is a subset of S’s occurrent non-factive mental states and the non-factive
mental states that she is disposed to bring to mind when reflecting on the question
of p’s truth.
(III) 1) p is part of the best explanation available to S for why S has E
OR
2) p is available to S as a logical consequence of the best explanation available
to S for why S has E.
(IV) There is no set of S’s occurrent non-factive mental states and the non-factive
mental states that she is disposed to bring to mind when reflecting on the question
of p’s truth, E*, such that:
A) E is a subset of E*
AND
B) p is not part of the best explanation available to S for why S has E*
AND
C) p is not available to S as a logical consequence of the best explanation
available to S for why S has E* (McCain, p.118).
(I)

McCain explains the various conditions of EX-WF. Condition (I) holds that S’s belief must be
based on her justifying evidence in the manner required by IB-R in order to be well-founded.
Condition (II) holds that the evidence that S’s belief is based on at t must be evidence that she
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possesses at t.60 Condition (III) says that S has to satisfy the requirements for propositional
justification (EF-EJ). Condition (IV) is a crucial ‘no defeater’ condition, which says that in order
for S’s belief that is based on E to be well-founded, it cannot be fully defeated by other evidence
that S possesses. Together, these conditions yield a full account of well-founded belief and
therefore a complete evidentialist theory of epistemic justification (McCain, p.119).
IV.3 - Objection to EX-WF
In this section I wish to begin a preliminary sketch of an argument that concludes that
EX-WF is not a full account of epistemic justification because there is an important sense in
which it fails to account for the prominent role that reliability often plays in epistemic
justification. In order to see this it will be instructive to see how reliability cannot figure into
EX-WF.
One objection that deserves consideration is that in the Turri cases that McCain discusses,
the fact that Miss Improper and Mr. Lacy aren't justified is because they don't properly base their
belief on the evidence. In order to properly base one's belief on the evidence one must use it the
right way, e.g., by applying modus ponens correctly, etc. But by saying this, isn't McCain giving
away the game to the reliabilist because 'using' one's evidence properly involves using
conditionally reliable belief-forming processes such as good reasoning? That is, it would seem
that McCain is ignoring an important reliability component in his account that plays a crucial
role in the justificatory status of the relevant beliefs. The belief had to be properly formed by a
reliable belief-forming process, i.e.—the process of utilizing one’s evidence properly. If so, then
there's an unacknowledged reliability-related element in McCain's account of well-founded
belief.

60

For an account of what it means to possess evidence, see McCain (2014) Chapter 3.
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However, I think McCain has an effective response to this objection. Although McCain
agrees with Turri that the manner in which S makes use of her reasons does matter for basing,
there's no need to concede to the reliabilist with IB-R. The problem with Miss Improper and
Lacey is that a non-justifying reason (the bad inference rule) is playing too strong of a causal role
in their beliefs. Put another way, the problem is that the evidence which propositionally justifies
Miss Improper and Lacey is not playing a sufficiently strong causal role in their forming the
beliefs in question.61 Reliability of a process doesn't play a role here.62
Although EX-WF needn’t concede anything to the reliabilist with respect to IB-R, I still
think there is an important sense in which EX-WF cannot account for the role that reliable
evidence gathering plays in a belief’s justificatory status.
McCain responds to objections that concern cases of bad evidence gathering. In such
cases, S has good evidence for believing that p, but she has been negligent in her evidence
gathering. If S had not been negligent then she would have gathered evidence that does not on
balance support believing p. S’s negligence is supposed to make it so that she lacks justification.
EX-WF yields the result that S has justification for believing that p because all that matters is the
evidence that S has at the time. This is exemplified in the GEORGE case. Remember that Baehr
stipulates that George’s belief about second-hand smoke is well-supported by the evidence, but
that he only has this evidence as the result of his intellectual ‘tunnel vision’. Baehr thinks that
George is clearly unjustified because of this. Thus, Baehr thinks that views such as EX-WF need
a constraint that one must be virtuous in her evidence gathering practices in order to have

A similar point can be made about Engel’s example of ‘Sally the misinformed logic student’ from Chapter Three.
In this case Sally doesn’t base here belief on the evidence. She is propositionally justified, but her belief isn’t wellfounded because her evidence is not playing a sufficiently strong causal role in forming her belief. Instead, her
mistaken belief about modus ponens is playing too strong a role in causing her belief.
62
I would like to thank Kevin McCain for providing helpful clarification on this point (in communication).
61
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justification. However, McCain diagnoses this case differently. McCain thinks that despite
George’s obvious intellectual viciousness, George does not lack epistemic justification for his
belief because his belief is supported by the evidence he has. Just as Conee and Feldman argue,
McCain thinks that even if we acknowledge that George should gather more evidence, it does not
follow that he should not believe what he does right now, given the evidence he currently
possesses (McCain, p.150-51). “After all, if someone else were to have exactly the same
evidence as George, we would be inclined to think that she should believe that secondhand
smoke does not pose a significant health risk just as George does” (McCain, p.151).
Even worse than GEORGE, there are cases in which a person intentionally and actively
tries to avoid the truth. Consider the following case as an example:
FOOTBALL JON
Jon hates to find out the results of a football game before he has had a chance to watch the
game in its entirety. He missed yesterday’s game, so Jon tries very hard to avoid learning
the score. He refuses to consult any of the typical sources for this information. He will
not read newspapers, watch the news, or even listen to the radio. In fact, he goes so far as
to avoid talking to people he knows are likely to have watched the game. While running
out of a room with his ears plugged to avoid hearing the latest sports report Jon runs into a
newspaper rack and sees on the front page of a newspaper he knows to be extremely reliable
that the Bears won the game yesterday (McCain, p.151).
McCain says that Jon has very good evidence for believing that the Bears won the game and that
he obviously has justification for believing the results of the game. At the same time, it is clear
that Jon is a poor epistemic agent with respect to this proposition. Jon is clearly worse than
George in this respect. Regardless, Jon has justification for believing that the Bears won. Jon’s
evidence gathering methods do not change this fact. McCain writes, “While we might aptly
criticize agents for not employing good evidence gathering methods, the fact that their evidence
gathering methods are bad does not change what their evidence supports or what they have
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justification to believe” (Ibid). McCain concludes that cases of bad evidence gathering pose no
problem for EX-WF.
One possible difficulty with McCain’s argument in this section of the book is that he
holds seemingly inconsistent views. As we just saw, he writes (1) “While we might aptly
criticize agents for not employing good evidence gathering methods, the fact that their evidence
gathering methods are bad does not change what their evidence supports or what they have
justification to believe”. However, at the end of the previous paragraph in that section of his
book, he writes (2) “Further, S’s justification does not depend upon how she gathers that
evidence so long as she has no reason to think that her evidence gathering is flawed in some
relevant way [My italics]” (Ibid). If, as McCain claims, (1) is true, then having a reason to
believe your evidence-gathering is flawed needn’t have any impact at all on what belief your
evidence justifies (~2). But this is a contradiction (at least it seems to be given that McCain
doesn’t elaborate on (2)). Hence, both (1) and (2) can’t both be true.
If what was said in the last paragraph is correct, then it would seem that when
evidentialists like McCain concede that awareness of bad evidence-gathering (unreliability)
makes a justificatory difference, they unwittingly commit themselves to the view that reliability
itself can make a justificatory difference. So, if it really is an epistemological truth that bad
(unreliable) evidence gathering doesn't make a justificatory difference, then a self-consciously
bad (unreliable) evidence gatherer should be able to apply that epistemological truth to his own
situation and remain just as justified in the beliefs he bases on the badly (unreliably) gathered
evidence as he was before he realized he was gathering evidence badly (unreliably). However, I
think that McCain has the resources to explain this and this is one of the main issues I will
discuss in detail in the next chapter. But, as I will argue in the next chapter, there is another
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important reason to think that reliability still figures prominently in a belief’s justificatory status,
i.e.—other things being equal, if your evidence was gathered using a reliable belief-forming
process (e.g., virtuous inquiry), then the probability that your evidence is not misleading
increases and hence the degree to which your belief (which is based on that evidence) is justified
is increased. The issue is that McCain’s view doesn’t account for the fact that a belief can be
well-founded and still be justified to a higher or lesser degree depending on whether the person’s
evidence was gathered using reliable or unreliable evidence-gathering methods (virtuous or
vicious inquiry).
Now, I emphasize that I’m speaking here of evidentialists like McCain. Other prominent
evidentialists like Conee and Feldman do not think that awareness of bad evidence-gathering has
any bearing on one’s evidential support and makes no justificatory difference. For example,
Feldman writes: "It would be a mistake to hold that the mere fact that I know that there is
additional evidence…neutralizes the evidence I already have" (Feldman, 2004b, p.235).63 Even
though Conee and Feldman don’t make the same claim that McCain makes about the
justificatory difference that the awareness of bad evidence-gathering makes (and therefore don’t
contradict themselves), I will argue that they are still mistaken in claiming that such awareness
makes no justificatory difference. I take this up in the next chapter as well.
V. Conclusion.,
In Chapter Four I motivated, presented, and provided a defense of what I think is the
most promising and complete version of evidentialism—explanationist evidentialism. I

Feldman is referring to the “Precarious Peak” example in which a hiker has evidence of the difficulty of a
particular hike. In addition to this evidence the hiker has a book with facts about the relative difficulty of hikes
(including the one the hiker is considering). However, the hiker fails to consult the hiking book. Feldman says that
the evidence in the book is not psychologically available in the relevant sense. It is only available in the sense that
the hiker could have obtained it.
63
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discussed alternative accounts of the epistemic support relation and provided reasons for why
each of these alternative accounts are unsuccessful. I also discussed how explanationist
evidentialism handles cases in which it seems that flawed evidence-gathering or irresponsible
inquiry are responsible for a belief. I then hinted at the fact that the explanationist response does
not completely rule out the idea that reliability or unreliability can still play an important role in
determining the degree to which a belief is justified.
In Chapter Five I will defend the explanationist view that flawed evidence gathering,
vicious inquiry, etc., is problematic for a belief’s justification if the person has evidence that she
engaged in such unreliable belief-forming methods. That is, having evidence that one engaged in
unreliable evidence-gathering methods can decrease the degree to which a belief is justified for a
person and in some cases give a person reason to disbelieve some proposition. Then I will
finally provide a more thorough presentation and defense of my two-component view of
justification. I will argue that the reliability or unreliability of one’s evidence gathering methods
can increase or decrease the degree to which one’s well-founded belief is justified (other things
being equal) even if one has no evidence of this reliability or unreliability.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Towards a Two-Component Theory of Epistemic Justification
In this chapter, I will finally put together my two-component theory of epistemic
justification. I will argue that EX-WF gives us a complete synchronic theory of categorical
epistemic justification, but that including reliability as an additional justificatory factor provides
a more satisfactory account of justification. That is, S’s belief that p is categorically justified
(justified ‘period’ or ‘full stop’) when p meets the conditions of EX-WF, but that in addition, the
reliability of one’s evidence-gathering methods can also play a salient role in increasing the
degree to which p is justified (other things being equal). Thus, I will argue that a belief can be
justified along two-dimensions: the fittingness-dimension and the reliability-dimension, but that
being justified along the fittingness-dimension is all that is necessary for a belief to be justified
full-stop (this also allows for the strength of one’s evidence to partly—sometimes wholly—
determine the degree to which a belief is justified). Being justified along the reliabilitydimension can only increase the degree to which the belief is justified.
First I will provide an account of how the evidentialist can make sense of the role that
evidence-gathering plays in fixing a belief’s justificatory status without appealing to notions of
reliability. Then I will argue that there is an additional important externalist justificatory factor
that is positively relevant to a belief’s justificatory status, namely the reliability of one’s method
of inquiry (virtuous evidence-gathering methods). Specifically, I will argue that if the method of
inquiry used to gather evidence is highly reliable, then the probability that that evidence is not
misleading increases. If so, then that reliability has a positive epistemic relevancy to the
justificatory status of the pertinent belief. The flipside is also true. That is, if the method of
inquiry used to gather evidence is highly unreliable, then the probability that that evidence is
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misleading increases. If so, then that reliability has a negative epistemic relevancy to the
justificatory status of the pertinent belief.
I. Evidence of Flawed Evidence Gathering (EFEG) as an ‘Undercutting Defeater’
I will now discuss how the explanationist evidentialist can make sense of how flawed
evidence gathering methods can undermine the justification of a belief. In order for this to
happen, a person must have evidence that her evidence gathering method was flawed
(unreliable).
Epistemic justification is defeasible. That is, justified beliefs can be refuted or
undermined by other beliefs, evidence, etc. Michael Bergmann (2005) distinguishes between
what he calls propositional defeaters (which are propositions) and mental defeaters (which are
either propositional attitudes or experiences or combinations thereof) (p.422). I will not discuss
propositional defeaters. Instead, my focus will be on mental state defeaters. Bergmann defines
mental state defeaters as follows:
D1. d is a defeater at t for S’s belief b iff (i) d is an experience or propositional attitude or
combination thereof; (ii) S comes to have d at t; (iii) as a result of S’s coming to have
d at t, b ceases to be justiﬁed.
Epistemologists typically distinguish between two ways that a belief can be defeated.
First, there are defeaters that are reasons for believing that one’s belief that p is false. Such
defeaters give us reason to believe ~p (the negation of p). Second, there are defeaters that are
reasons to lower the probability that one’s belief that p is true. Such defeaters are reasons for no
longer believing p or at least believing p to a lesser degree of confidence. The first type of
defeaters are called rebutting defeaters and the second type are called undermining or
undercutting defeaters.
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John Pollock (1986) provides one widely used taxonomy of defeaters. A rebutting
defeater for some belief p is a reason for holding the negation of p or holding some proposition q
that is incompatible with p (Pollock, p.38). For example, from a distance Mary sees what seems
to be a sheep in a field, but the owner of the farm tells her that there is no sheep in the field. This
provides Mary with a reason to believe that there is no sheep in the field. Alternatively, Mary
might walk up to the sheep in the field to discover it is a fake sheep made out of papier- mâché.
In which case she has acquired a reason to believe q (the sheep is made out of papier-mâché),
which is incompatible with p (there is a real sheep in the field). Bergmann provides a nice
formal definition of a rebutting defeater that is suitable for our purposes:
D2. d is a rebutting defeater for b iff d is a defeater for b which is (or is an epistemically
appropriate basis for) the belief that b is false (Bergmann, p.424).
In contrast to a rebutting defeater, an undercutting defeater is a reason for no longer
believing p. It is a reason to think that one’s ground for believing p is not sufficiently indicative
of the truth of p (Pollock, p.39). For example, suppose a person enters a widget factory where
there is an assembly line on which there are widgets that appear red. It thus appears to the
person that he sees red widgets. However, the factory manager explains to the person that the
widgets are actually being illuminated by powerful red lights. In this case the person loses his
reason for believing that the widgets are red instead of acquiring a reason for believing that they
are not red.64 Again, Bergmann provides a suitable definition of an undercutting defeater:
D3..d is an undercutting defeater for b iff d is a defeater for b which is (or is an
epistemically appropriate basis for) the belief that one’s actual ground or reason for b
is not indicative of b’s truth (Ibid).65
64

Importantly, there are two further distinctions to be made. There are also partial and full defeaters. Full defeaters
completely neutralize one’s justification for believing p, while partial defeaters simply reduce one’s justification for
believing p to some degree (Bergmann, p.422).
65
In a revised definition of D3, Bergmann adds the following clause: “(ii) is (or is an epistemically appropriate basis
for) an attitude of signiﬁcant uncertainty about the proposition that one’s actual ground or reason for b is indicative
of b’s truth, signiﬁcant enough to withhold that proposition” (p.427). This added clause is not important to my
present discussion. For Bergmann’s argument supporting this clause see Bergmann (2006) pp.424-27.
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So what kind of defeater is EFEG (evidence of flawed evidence-gathering)? EFEG is a
reason to question the quality of one’s evidence in support of p such that one is no longer
justified in believing p or at least less justified to some degree. EFEG does not give one a reason
to believe the negation of p or to believe some proposition q, which is incompatible with p. For
example, suppose a private investigator collected evidence for a client that he thinks strongly
supports the belief that his client’s wife is having an affair. Based on the evidence the
investigator gathered, the client believes that his wife is having an affair. However, after
discussing the evidence with the investigator, the client learns that the investigator was sloppy in
gathering the evidence. Although the client still has evidence that his wife is having an affair, he
now has a reason to be less confident in believing the evidence is veridical. Hence, he has some
justification for believing that his wife is having an affair, but the degree to which he is justified
has been diminished considerably (possibly enough to suspend judgment on the matter). The
client does not have reason to believe that his wife isn’t having an affair (the negation of what he
currently believes), nor does he have a reason to believe something incompatible with his belief,
e.g., that his wife is simply having business-related encounters with another man. Thus, EFEG is
an undercutting defeater rather than a rebutting defeater.
I.1 - ‘Higher-Order’ Evidence and Defeaters
Next, we need to understand what type of evidence EFEG is. One way to get at this is to
distinguish between first-order and second-order evidence. First-order evidence is evidence for
a "non-evidential" proposition, i.e.—a proposition that isn't itself about evidence. Second-order
evidence, or what has been called higher-order evidence (HOE) (Christensen, 2010; Feldman,
2005; Kelly, 2005; 2010; Lasonen-Aarnio, 2014), is evidence for an "evidential" proposition,
i.e.—a proposition that is itself about evidence. EFEG is higher-order evidence or HOE. HOE
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often includes the following type of evidence: that one is the victim of some sort of cognitive
malfunction, that one has made a crucial mistake in one’s calculations or in properly cataloguing
one’s evidence, that one has failed to give some evidence its due, that some epistemic principle
has been incorrectly used, that one has engaged in poor evidence gathering methods, etc. HOE
are often defeaters that lead one to doubt one’s epistemic rationality.66 67 For example,68 suppose
that a meteorologist analyzes available evidence that bears directly on tomorrow’s weather and
as a result concludes that it will rain tomorrow. The meteorological data is first-order evidence
that bears directly on the meteorologist’s conclusion that it will rain tomorrow. The fact that the
meteorologist arrived at his conclusion on the basis of the available evidence is HOE because it
is evidence about the content and import of the meteorological data (as evidence). However, the
meteorologist might have some HOE that the cognitive process that produced the belief was
malfunctioning, e.g., perhaps the meteorologist realizes that he was very drunk when he analyzed
the data or perhaps he has strong evidence that he performed some miscalculations (maybe he
remembers that he applied an incorrect formula). Such evidence is evidence that his conclusion
about the weather might be seriously flawed to the extent that he is no longer justified or at least
far less justified in holding that conclusion.
HOE is ‘backward-looking’ in the sense that it is evidence that concerns whether
someone’s belief was ever epistemically rational to begin with. It’s not that the meteorologist
fails to be justified once he had this HOE. Instead, such evidence indicates that the
meteorologist was never justified in holding the relevant belief because at the time he formed the
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This is the majority view but there are some that disagree, e.g., Field (2000).
Importantly, not all HOE are defeaters. For example, often times we get new evidence which indicates that some
previously acquired evidence was properly gathered. However, I’m currently focusing my discussion on ‘flawed’
evidence-gathering.
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Kelly discusses a similar example. See Kelly (2014).
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belief he was extremely drunk or performed some significant miscalculation. When we get
HOE, it serves as evidence that the evidence we gathered is very likely misleading.
The above discussion doesn’t completely exhaust the types of HOE. There are two more
I will briefly mention. First, there is HOE which involves someone else’s belief that some
proposition is true. For example, suppose that Rick and Jeff have the same first-order evidence
that bears on some proposition p. Suppose that Rick forms his belief p before Jeff forms the
same belief, and Rick tells Jeff what his conclusion is. One question is whether Jeff should take
Rick’s conclusion to be additional evidence in support of p? Similarly, in cases of peer
disagreement in which two experts in the same field with exactly the same evidence arrive at
different conclusions, should the fact that another expert in your field disagrees with your
evaluation of the evidence serve as evidence against your own conclusion? These are all
important issues but they go beyond the scope of the present discussion. The takeaway from this
section should be that HOE differs from first-order evidence in that the former either prevents us
from giving some part of our first-order evidence its due or in some cases it might serve to
increase our credence in some conclusion we’ve reached given the available evidence.69 Further,
HOE differs from first-order undercutting defeaters in that HOE does not disturb the connection
between the evidence and the conclusion. Instead, the person is in a position where he can’t trust
his own appreciation of the first-order evidence. “Thus…rational accommodation of HOE can
require a certain kind of bracketing of some of one’s reasons, in a way that does not seem to
occur in accommodating ordinary evidence, even when that evidence is an ordinary undercutting
defeater” (Christensen, p.198).
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I will discuss this issue later on.
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I.2 - Michael Bergmann—‘Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements’
In this section I will argue that EFEG is a higher-level belief that serves as an
undercutting defeater for first-level (object-level) beliefs. That is, if one is aware that one’s
evidence gathering methodology was unreliable, then one has a defeater for the belief that the
pertinent evidence bears directly on. However, in order for person S to have a justified belief, it
is not a requirement that S satisfy the higher-level requirement of holding a belief about the
reliability of one’s evidence gathering methodology.
Michael Bergmann (2005) argues that a higher-level requirement is not required for
justification. A higher-level requirement on justification is a requirement according to which a
belief is justified only if the subject has a higher-level belief, i.e.—a belief about the epistemic
credentials of a belief (I say more about this below). Bergmann argues that higher-level
requirements have the following important asymmetry: analytically, a belief is not justiﬁed if we
have a defeater for it, but contingently, it is often the case that to avoid having defeaters, our
beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement (Bergmann, 2005, p.419). In other words, it is
necessarily the case that if a belief has a defeater, then it fails to be justified (or I would add: at
least justified to a lesser degree), but it is not necessary to meet a higher-level requirement for
epistemic justification. A higher-level requirement would require that for a belief p that anyone
holding p must have a certain perspective on it, i.e.—must conceive of p as having something
going for it. For example, someone might think that in order for someone to justifiedly believe p
he also believe that p was formed in a reliable way. A higher-level requirement for justification
requires a higher-level belief about one’s epistemic rationality. Bergmann rejects this higherlevel requirement, but affirms the ‘no defeater’ requirement. I turn to this asymmetry argument
now.
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Bergmann argues that higher-level requirements are appealing because internalists often
think that we ought to reflect critically on our beliefs, and therefore that
(*) S takes up some doxastic attitude towards p*s (the proposition that S’s belief that p is
formed in a reliable way70)
is a necessary condition for the justification of S’s belief that p. Similarly, internalists often
think that if S disbelieves or suspends judgment on p*s, then S has a defeater for the belief that p.
So, they conclude that S must believe p*s for belief p to be justified for S. Bergmann’s point is
that internalists who are drawn to higher-level requirements assume that if S’s belief does not
satisfy a higher-level requirement, S must either 1) question the reliability of his belief source or
2) be irresponsible by not thinking whatsoever about the reliability of that source (Bergmann,
2005, p.430).
Bergmann denies that * is a necessary condition for the justification of S’s belief that p
because there is no sense in which * contributes to the justification of p. How might * contribute
to the justification of p? The line of thinking seems to be that by considering and taking some
doxastic attitude towards p*s, S is thereby doing something that contributes to the justificatory
status for his belief that p. On the other hand, if S disbelieves or suspends judgment on p*s, then
doing so will not contribute to the justification of p. So, it is only the belief towards p*s that
could possibly contribute to the justification of S’s belief that p. Bergmann then asks whether
just any belief, justified or not, does so (Bergmann, 2005, p.430-31). “Would an irrational,
irresponsible or insane belief that p*s contribute to the justiﬁcation of S’s belief that p, any more
than having no doxastic attitude at all towards p*S does?” (Bergmann, 2005, p.431). If we
suppose that S’s belief that p satisfies some externalist conditions and that S has no defeater for it

Bergmann uses the example of a belief’s reliability but any other relevant example of a higher-level belief would
suffice to make his point.
70
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and no doxastic attitude towards p*s, then would the justification of S’s belief that p be increased
if S had an irrational, irresponsible, insane, or unjustified belief that p*s? Bergmann thinks that
the answer is certainly no. Thus, the only way in which * could possibly be required for the
justification of S’s belief that p is if we stipulate that it must be made true by S’s having a
justified belief that p*s (Ibid).
However, Bergmann argues that to require that * must be satisfied by S’s having a
justified belief that p*s brings up the following dilemma: 1) either this requirement applies to all
beliefs, which leads to a vicious regress, or 2) it applies only to beliefs at the first/object level
(and possibly some higher levels, but not all higher levels), then such a restriction is made ad hoc
for no other reason than to avoid the regress. Bergmann concludes:
I conclude, therefore, that although it is contingently the case that some beliefs are justiﬁed
only if the person holding them has some higher-level belief, because it is contingently the
case that some beliefs can avoid having a defeater only by this means, there is no general
or principled higher-level requirement on justiﬁcation (Ibid).
Thus, higher-level requirements on justification are sometimes required, but certainly not in all
(if not most) cases. Given this conclusion we can put together Bergmann’s asymmetry claim.
First, recall that D1 says:
D1. d is a defeater at t for S’s belief b iff (i) d is an experience or propositional attitude or
combination thereof; (ii) S comes to have d at t; (iii) as a result of S’s coming to have
d at t, b ceases to be justiﬁed.
On this account of a defeater it is analytic (i.e.—necessary and therefore uncontroversial) that a
belief is justified only if there is no defeater for it (Bergmann, 2005, p.422). Secondly, as we just
saw, higher-level requirements are not a requirement for all beliefs to avoid having defeaters. It
is simply a contingent fact that some beliefs must satisfy a higher-level requirement to avoid
defeaters.
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Let me state precisely how this discussion relates to EFEG. EFEG is a higher-level belief
that serves as an undercutting defeater for first-level (object-level) beliefs. That is, if one is
aware that one’s evidence gathering methodology was unreliable, then one has a defeater for the
belief that the pertinent evidence bears directly on. On the other hand, in order for person S to
have a justified belief, it is not a requirement that S satisfy the higher-level requirement of
holding a belief about the reliability of one’s evidence gathering methodology.71
Next, I turn to the issue of understanding in what sense being aware of the unreliability of
one’s evidence-gathering methods serves as an undercutting defeater.
I.3 - ‘Defeat’ In Explanatory Terms
On McCain’s evidentialist model, we must think of ‘defeat’ in explanatory terms. Given
some proposition p and some total body of evidence E that strongly supports p, the best
explanation for why I have E is that p is true. For example, the proposition “It is snowing
outside” is well-supported by the following evidence: <There are white flakes falling from the
sky>; <It is very cold outside>; <It is cloudy>; <The local meteorologist says it is snowing in
parts of the city>, etc. This evidence strongly supports the proposition “It is snowing outside”.
In this case, the best explanation of this evidence is that it happens to be snowing outside.
However, suppose that I later find out that my roommate, who happens to work in the movie
industry, played a trick on me and used a fake-snow making machine to create the appearance
that it was snowing. My friend also played a fake weather forecast on my television. In this
case, my total body of evidence has changed to include the fact that <My roommate played a
trick on me and used a fake-snow making machine> and the fact that <My friend tricked me with
a fake forecast video>. I now have evidence E* and my new evidence of my roommate’s

However, I do think that contingently, awareness that one’s evidence gathering methods were highly reliable does
contribute to the justification of one’s relevant belief (even if not necessary).
71
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trickery serves as a defeater for my belief that the proposition “It is snowing outside” is true.
Once I have this information about my roommate, p is no longer the best explanation of my total
body of evidence. The best explanation of E* is p1: “My roommate tricked me into thinking it is
snowing outside”.
The above example is an instance of an undercutting defeater. Remember that a
rebutting defeater gives one reason to believe ~p. For example, suppose I found that my
roommate had tricked me and then I got on the internet to look up the local weather and found
that all local news stations are reporting that it is not snowing. In this case, your roommate’s
admission of trickery gives you a strong reason to question whether p is true (an undercutting
defeater), but not that ~p is true (“It is not snowing”). However, the information you got from
the internet does give you good reason to believe that a rival ~p explanation is true (a rebutting
defeater), i.e.—you get evidence of ~p. Now, higher-order evidence such as EFEG serves as an
undercutting defeater, not a rebutting defeater. To see why, suppose I gather some body of
evidence in order to find out who murdered the butler. I now have some body of evidence E that
supports p (that the maid murdered the butler). In this case, let’s suppose that the best
explanation of E is that p is true. However, suppose further that I later learn that my evidence
gathering methodology was biased in some significant way. Without this information, part of the
best explanation for why I have E is that p is true. However, once I have this information
concerning the biased nature of my evidence gathering methods, the truth of p is no longer
clearly the best explanation. That is, I now have a rival explanation—I cherry-picked evidence
so that I got the sort of evidence that I wanted. In this sort of case, I don't get evidence for
thinking that a rival ~p explanation is true (say, that the maid was not the murderer or that the
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gardener was the murderer instead), but I do get evidence that undercuts E's support for p by
making the truth of p a weaker explanation of E.
The fact that EFEG is an undercutting defeater and that explanationist accounts of
justification view defeaters in explanatory terms, means an explanationist evidentialist like
McCain has the resources to respond to the criticism I made in the last chapter. Namely, the
criticism that when evidentialists like McCain concede that awareness of bad evidence-gathering
(unreliability) makes a justificatory difference, they unwittingly commit themselves to the view
that reliability itself can make a justificatory difference. First, total evidence is always what
matters. Once you have a reason to believe that your evidence gathering is flawed, you have
different total evidence than what you had before. Suppose that you have evidence E which
supports p <the maid murdered the butler>. However, unbeknownst to you, you gathered E in a
flawed manner—perhaps you only consulted biased sources. In this case you hold that E
supports p. And, assuming that you don't have any defeaters in your total evidence, you are
justified in believing p. Now, add to the case that you come to have good reason to think that
you gathered E in this flawed way. E still supports p (evidential support relations are necessary).
However, your total evidence doesn't support believing p. The reason for this is that your total
evidence now includes E as well as new information about your flawed inquiry (this information
constitutes a reason to doubt that p's truth is the best explanation of your having E, and thus
prevents E from justifying p for you).
Second, the evidentialist could say that the reliability of one’s evidence gathering
methods itself (or its lack) doesn't make a justificatory difference. However, awareness of
reliability or better yet ‘evidence gathering methods that are apt to produce biased samples’ does
make a difference. How is this so? It's because evidence is what matters for justification. The
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mere fact that something is unreliable doesn't matter—when it comes to defeaters, the mere fact
that there is information in the world that would give me a defeater doesn't matter if I'm not
aware of that information. Otherwise, any and all unpossessed evidence or facts about the world
would serve as defeaters regardless of the fact that we are unaware of them. However, being
aware that some process is unreliable does give me a defeater because it gives me evidence that
undercuts the support that my evidence gives for various propositions. For instance, if S is
unwittingly in the demon-world then she has just as much justification for the sorts of perceptual
beliefs that we typically form. But, if S were to have sufficient evidence that she is in fact in the
demon-world, then her justification would be defeated by this evidence. In both cases her
perceptual faculties are equally unreliable, but only in the latter case does she fail to have (allthings-considered) justification.72
It is important to understand what this reply amounts to. EFEG doesn’t do anything to
change the support relation between E and p. As I said above, epistemic support relations are
necessary. That is, p is justified for S at t iff S’s evidence at t on balance support p. Evidence
justifies necessarily, i.e.—the justificatory status of a proposition for S strongly supervenes on
the body of evidence S has. Thus, as Conee and Feldman hold:
Necessarily if S1’s belief p is justified, and E is evidence that S1 has, then necessarily, (1)
on balance E supports p, and (2) if E is the evidence that S2 has, then p is also justified for
S2.73

72

I would like to thank Kevin McCain (in communication) for helpful comments about the material in the above
part of this section.
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I changed the original wording of this principle to entail that belief p is justified for S1 and S2, rather than Conee
and Feldman’s original phrasing that entailed that S1 and S2 are justified in believing p. As I’ve argued, it is
important to remember that it is beliefs and not persons that are epistemically justified. Here is the original passage:
Necessarily if S1 is justified in believing p, and E is the evidence that S1 has, then necessarily, (1) on
balance E supports p, and (2) if E is the evidence that S2 has, then S2 is justified in believing p (2008,
p.83).
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EFEG does not undermine the epistemic support relation between evidence E and p. In other
words, EFEG doesn’t change the fact that E necessarily support p. What is peculiar about
higher-order evidence like EFEG is that even though it does nothing to undermine the support
relation between E and p, it does call into question whether the truth of p is the best explanation
for why one has E. For example, you might have evidence E that on balance supports p <the
maid murdered the butler> (because this support relation is necessary), but your total evidence
E*, which now includes EFEG, undercuts your belief that the truth of p <the maid murdered the
butler> is the best explanation of E, even though E still supports p. In other words, you are
given good reason to lower your confidence that the truth of p is what best explains E. But it is
the evidence that does the justifying. Without the awareness of flawed evidence-gathering,
flawed-evidence gathering has no bearing on the justificatory status of your belief that p is true.
Hence, on the explanationist evidentialist account of justification, reliability or unreliability of
one’s evidence gathering methods plays no role in the categorical justification of your belief that
p is true.
I.4 - The New Evil Demon Problem
Evidentialists reject the notion that reliability is necessary for justification. I think this is
correct. One way to see this is by looking at the ‘New Evil Demon’ problem (NED). I discussed
NED in earlier chapters, but it would be beneficial to lay out the problem once again because
later on I will use it to highlight important applications of my two-component view of
justification.
Here NED is presented somewhat differently but with the same basic elements. Suppose
there are two individuals, person A and person B. Imagine that A and B believe precisely the
same thing, undergo precisely the same experiences, have the same memories, have the same
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intuitions, and reason in the same manner. Further, imagine that A and B have both had the
same non-factive mental states their whole lives. Now, suppose that A lives in the actual world
(the real world we live in), but B lives in a ‘demon-world’ (unbeknownst to him) where he is
unwittingly being deceived and manipulated by an evil demon. Thus, A’s beliefs are reliably
produced by processes that reliably lead to the truth, but B’s beliefs are formed by unreliable
processes (demon-deceptions). For a reliabilist, you cannot have a justified belief unless that
belief was formed by some reliable belief-forming process. If the reliabilist is correct, then none
of B's beliefs are justified.74 However, it is a commonly held intuition that the beliefs of A and B
are both equally well justified. The evidentialist will say that because A and B have all of the
same experiences, memories, reason in the same manner, etc., they are alike evidentially and
because they are alike evidentially their beliefs are alike justificationally. That is, if both A and
B base their beliefs on the same sufficiently strong evidence, then both of their pertinent beliefs
are equally justified, regardless of the fact that A’s beliefs are reliably formed and B’s beliefs are
unreliably formed.
Importantly, however, I don’t quite agree with this ‘commonly held intuition’ that ‘both
A’s and B’s beliefs are equally well justified’. There is a crucial distinction to make here. What
I do think is true is that both A’s and B’s beliefs are justified period. The fact that they both
have the same supporting evidence guarantees that their beliefs (that are based on that evidence)
meet the bare minimum (at the very least) required for a belief to be justified. That is, A’s and
B’s beliefs that p are categorically justified, justified full-stop, justified period, etc. This is an
important distinction because if NED is interpreted in this way, it leaves room for the possibility

Of course, this isn’t necessarily true since there may be some beliefs that are justified regardless of whether you
are in the demon-world. For example, your introspective belief that you are currently thinking seems immune to
demon-world deceptions. However, even if this is so, it doesn’t change the implications of the case at hand since
almost all of the processes that form beliefs are susceptible to the demon’s manipulations.
74
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that even though A’s and B’s beliefs that p are both categorically justified, one of their beliefs
might possess a higher degree of justification depending on whether the evidence gathered to
support that belief was gathered virtuously (reliably). This picture of categorical justification
still preserves the intuition of NED that both A’s and B’s beliefs that p are justified. However,
my view also allows for there to be a difference in the degree to which (possibly) A’s belief that
p is justified to a higher degree than B’s.
Notice how my view of NED is consistent with the evidentialist analysis of EFEG I
discussed earlier. Consider person A and B again, but this time they are both in the actual world.
Suppose that A virtuously (reliably) gathers evidence X which strongly supports his belief p. On
the other hand, suppose B viciously (unreliably) gathers the same evidence X which strongly
supports his belief p. Now, both A and B have precisely the same evidence, namely X, so their
beliefs that p are both categorically justified regardless of how they gathered their evidence.
Further, suppose that A becomes aware of new evidence that his evidence gathering methods
were highly reliable and B becomes aware of new evidence that his evidence-gathering methods
were highly unreliable. As discussed in the last section, this new evidence about the reliability of
one’s method of inquiry changes the total evidence one has. So, A and B both have new
evidence that changes the justificatory status of their beliefs. Person A now has higher-order
evidence that p's truth is the best explanation of A's having evidence X. Thus, there is an
increase in the justificatory status of A’s belief that p. More precisely, the fact <A inquired
reliably> is new evidence that A has for believing that p's truth is what best explains his having
evidence X. Moreover, the new total body of evidence X* (evidence X + <A inquired reliably>)
supports p even more strongly than does evidence X alone, so that A’s belief is now (on the basis
of evidence X*) even more justified than it was before he acquired the information about his
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reliable inquiry. Person B’s new higher-order evidence <B inquired unreliably> is new evidence
B has for thinking that p's truth is not what best explains his having evidence X. Moreover, the
new total body of evidence X’ (evidence X + <B inquired unreliably>) does not support p as
strongly as does evidence X alone, so that B’s belief is now (on the basis of X’) less justified
than it was before he acquired the information about his unreliable inquiry. Consequently, given
A’s and B’s new evidence about the nature of their respective evidence-gathering methods, A’s
belief that p is far more justified than B’s belief that p.
This evidentialist analysis is consistent with other problems related to reliable evidence
gathering. Consider again the cases of GEORGE and FOOTBALL JON. The challenge from
bad evidence-gathering is a challenge to one having propositional justification. In other words,
the challenge from such cases is not that, Jon say, has sufficient justification for p, but he simply
doesn’t base his belief on his evidence in the right way. Instead, these cases are attempts to say
that, for example, Jon lacks justification for p because of how he gathered the evidence. In a
sense, the claim is that the evidence that the person has doesn’t support p—even though, if
someone else had that same evidence they would have justification for p. This is in line with the
evidentialist analysis of what is going on with A and B in NED. What justifies the person’s
belief here isn’t reliability, but instead that the person is basing his belief on sufficiently strong
evidence. The evidence in cases like GEORGE and FOOTBALL JON is just as strong as it
would be had George and Jon been good epistemic agents in gathering their evidence. That is,
the epistemic support relation between George’s and Jon’s total evidence and their respective
beliefs are unaffected by the unreliability of bad evidence gathering, whether they are aware of
this unreliability or not. But there is more to say on behalf of the reliabilist about this issue.75
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I want to thank Kevin McCain (in communication) for helpful comments regarding GEORGE and FOOTBALL
JON.
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II. The Fittingness-Dimension
In this section I will very briefly argue that EX-WF provides a satisfactory account of one
dimension of epistemic justification, i.e.—the fittingness-dimension (FD). What I say here is a
culmination of arguments I’ve already discussed elsewhere. I will adopt McCain’s EF
(Explanationist Fit) as the main focus of this discussion.
Explanationist Fit (EF):
p fits S’s evidence, e, at t iff either p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for
why S has e or p is available to S as a logical consequence of the best explanation available
to S at t for why S has e.
EF provides a proper account of what it means for a proposition to be justified for a subject and
is of course a key component in EX-WF (well-founded belief). I think the crucial thing behind
EF is that it explains when a subject epistemically ought to believe a proposition. For example,
in the GEORGE case, the evidentialist says that given George’s total evidence, he is believing
precisely how he ought to believe. That is, his total body of evidence supports his belief about
second-hand smoke. There is nothing else George ought to believe given his evidence regarding
the health effects of second-hand smoke. Absent any defeaters (first- or second-order) George’s
belief is justified period. Two people with the exact same evidence (who are alike mentally),
will have the same belief justified for them if that belief is the best explanation available to them
of that evidence. In this case their respective beliefs are both categorically justified. Let’s look
at an example.
Consider the following:
Biologists (BIO)
Biologist A and Biologist B have gathered evidence X. But, Biologist A engaged in
virtuous inquiry while gathering his evidence and Biologist B engaged in vicious inquiry
while gathering his evidence. Suppose that Biologist A and B both form the same belief
p based on evidence X and p strongly fits evidence X (i.e.—belief p is the best
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explanation of evidence X, etc.). Neither Biologist A nor B is aware of the virtuous or
vicious nature of their respective inquiries.
Absent any first- or second-order defeaters, Biologist A and B believe precisely what they should
believe given the evidence they have at that given time. Even though Biologist B believes p
based on evidence that was viciously gathered and given he has no evidence that his methods of
inquiry were vicious, what else should he believe (not in the blameless sense)? Belief p strongly
fits evidence X, so there is a very good reason for Biologist B to believe p. Now, compare this
example to one in which we plug in these same biologists to NED:
Biologists-NED (BIO-NED)
Biologist A who is in the actual world and his demon-world counterpart Biologist B have
exactly the same experiences, apparent memories, intuitions, etc., (they have the same
evidence) and in both worlds go through exactly the same processes of reasoning and
evidence gathering, and form exactly the same belief p. Furthermore, Biologist A and
Biologist B form the same belief p based on the same evidence and p strongly fits that
evidence (i.e.—belief p is the best explanation of their evidence, etc.). Yet belief p is true
in the actual world and false in the demon-world.
EF holds that Biologist A and B have the same total evidence. The important question to ask in
both BIO and BIO-NED is what each biologist should believe. I have already assessed BIO, so I
will now focus on BIO-NED.
In BIO-NED, Biologist B has all the same evidence as Biologist A and therefore has very
good reasons to believe the same things that Biologist A does. In fact, Biologist B has exactly
the same reasons to believe the same things (if ‘reasons’ is construed as ‘evidence’). Therefore,
Biologist A’s and B’s beliefs are alike justificationally along FD. What is crucial in accounting
for justification in BIO and BIO-NED is that the beliefs in question are non-factive. This means
that the beliefs they have may misrepresent the world. This is because even evidence can
support false beliefs (fallibilism). A false belief can still be the best explanation available to a
person given the evidence the person possesses at a given time. In both BIO and BIO-NED, the
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best explanation Biologist A and Biologist B have of their evidence is belief p. However, in BIO
it is possible that belief p is false, and in BIO-NED Biologist B’s belief p is false because he is in
the demon-world (e.g., Biologist A is looking at actual birds and believes he is looking at actual
birds, while Biologist B is looking at a demon-created illusion of birds and believes he is looking
at actual birds). Nevertheless, both Biologist A and Biologist B in BIO and BIO-NED, believe
exactly what they should believe. If neither of the biologists have evidence of the reliability of
their evidence-gathering methods, it would be quite irrational for either of them to believe
anything else than what their evidence supports at that time.
Importantly, the sort of justification I’m talking about in BIO and BIO-NED is an
objective sort of justification. Remember back to Chapter One when I discussed the distinction
between objective and subjective deontological justification. For example, in BIO NED
Biologist B is not justified because he is blameless for holding his belief. He is justified because
his belief is the best explanation he has available to him for why he has that evidence (even
though he is in the demon-world). Being justified along FD is not a case of subjective
deontological justification. EF offers an objective sense of justification because it is the type of
justification such that Biologist A’s belief that p could have it and Biologist B’s belief that p
could lack it even if both Biologist A and B are equally epistemically blameless in believing p.
So, for example, Biologist A might be blameless for believing p but the reason that p is justified
for Biologist A is because p is the best explanation available to him for why he has some body of
evidence, not because he is blameless for holding p. Furthermore, Biologist B might be
blameless for believing p but be unjustified in believing p because his evidence doesn’t support p
(e.g., a schizophrenic who believes his delusions or someone in a religious community taught to
believe what the oracle says).
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Hence, if p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e or p is
available to S as a logical consequence of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e,
then S’s belief is epistemically justified period. If a belief meets this standard, then the person is
believing precisely what he/she epistemically ought to believe. Of course, EF is only one
important component in EX-WF, but it is the crucial component that a belief is required to meet
to be justified for a person along FD. Being justified along FD is all that is required for a belief
to meet the bare minimum required to be epistemically justified. However, this sort of
categorical justification is also compatible with a belief having varying degrees of justification
depending on the strength of evidence the person possesses. Thus, the best explanation available
to a person may be a very good explanation and hence the belief is strongly justified, but a best
explanation that is very weak may not provide much support for a belief, in which case the belief
is weakly justified, but justified nevertheless.76 Furthermore, being justified along FD means a
belief is justified full-stop, regardless of any historical facts that led to the formation of the belief
(e.g., vicious inquiry).
III. The Reliability-Dimension
In this section, I will argue that beyond the justification conferred by one’s evidence
along FD, reliability, when relevant, can make a positive difference on the justificatory status of
one’s beliefs. Thus, I will argue that a person’s belief p can be justified along FD and along the
reliability-dimension (RD). Again, the picture I have in mind is that a person’s belief is
epistemically justified to varying degrees depending on how strongly that person’s belief fits the
evidence that person has at a given time, but that in addition, there is an externalist justification
factor (namely reliability) that is often directly relevant to the positive justificatory status of that
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Of course, if the best explanation is lousy then the belief isn’t justified.
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belief. Specifically, I will argue that if a person’s evidence was gathered in a reliable way, then
(other things being equal) the belief that evidence bears on will have an even higher degree of
epistemic justification than it would if it were only justified along FD. Importantly, however, for
a belief to be justified it is not necessary that it is justified along RD. On the other hand, for a
belief to be justified it must necessarily be justified along FD. A belief being justified along RD
only contributes to increasing the degree to which that belief is justified. That is, being justified
along RD is not necessary for justification, but it is sufficient to increase the degree to which a
belief is justified (other things being equal).
Although the evidentialist has strong resources to explain the role that EFEG plays in
epistemic justification without appealing to reliability, I will advance an argument that I think
supports the view that the reliability of one’s evidence-gathering methods does often have a
positive bearing on the justificatory status of many of our beliefs. This argument centers on what
Comesana (2005) refers to as ‘support facts’ and what Goldman (2009; 2011) refers to as
externalist ‘justification factors’ (‘J-factors’). I will begin by discussing Comesana’s view of
‘support facts’ and then turn toward discussing Goldman’s view.
III.1 – Support Facts and J-Factors
According to Comesana, anytime a person is justified in holding some belief, there will
be some facts in virtue of which that person is so justified. He says that these facts are the truthmakers for the claim that the subject is justified in holding the pertinent belief. More generally,
we can distinguish between two types of facts: 1) ‘evidence facts’ of the form <the subject is
justified in having some other belief(s)>, or <the subject has a certain experience>; 2) ‘support
facts’ which are of the form <the subject’s belief(s) is (are) a good reason for thinking that r> or
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<the subject’s undergoing a certain experience e is a good reason for thinking that r>
(Comesana, 2005, p.60-1).
To help us understand ‘support facts’, Comesana has us consider two examples of
justified belief (2005, p.60):
1. Sally believes that the streets are wet (call this proposition q) because she
justifiably believes that it is raining and that if it is raining then the streets are wet
(call the conjunction of these propositions p).
2. Steve believes that the streets are wet because he is looking at them.
What are the factors that contribute to the justification of the belief that q for Sally and Steve?
For Sally, one factor that justifies her belief that q must include her being justified in believing
that p. Sally’s being justified in believing that p constitutes her evidence for believing that q.
For Steve, one of the factors that justifies his belief that q is his having a certain visual
experience e as of the street’s being wet. This experience constitutes his evidence for believing
that q.
Comesana acknowledges that part of what justifies Sally and Steve’s belief that q is their
evidence. Thus, Comesana grants that mentalism is true with respect to evidence, i.e.—that the
evidence Sally and Steve have is composed entirely of factors that consist of their mental states.
But Comesana argues that Sally’s and Steve’s evidence doesn’t exhaust all of the factors that
contribute to their justification for believing that q. In addition to Sally’s evidence, there is the
fact that <p supports q>, i.e.—the fact that p is a good reason for thinking that q. In addition to
Steve’s evidence, there is the fact that <e supports q>, i.e.—the fact that if someone has an
experience with the same content as e, then this gives the person a good reason to think that q
(Ibid). Support facts so conceived must exist because if p were not a good reason to believe that
q, then the fact that Sally is justified in believing that p would not justify her belief that q.
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Support facts are of the form: <p supports q just in case p is a good reason to believe that q>.
There is no mental state that corresponds to the fact that <Sally’s being justified in believing that
p is a good reason for her to believe that q>. The support fact in question is a relation between
those two mental states and this relation is not reducible to either of the two relata (Comesana,
2005, p.61).
Now, because of support facts, Comesana thinks that mentalist accounts of epistemic
justification will run into a dilemma. Any mentalist theory holds that there are mental factors MS
of a subject S, such that the justificatory status of S’s doxastic attitudes is determined by the
constituents of MS. A mentalist who claims that support facts are mental will hold that they are
constituents of MS. If so, Comesana says we can ask the following question: “…is it the case
that the obtaining of the facts mentioned in MS is a good reason for holding the doxastic attitude
in question?” (Ibid). For example, is it the case that the obtaining of Sally’s mental facts is a
good reason for her believing that q? Here is the dilemma: If the answer is no, then it appears
that Sally is not justified in believing that q, and thus the theory has a counterexample. If the
answer is yes, then the theory has failed to pick out an epistemically relevant factor, “…because
the fact that the obtaining of all the epistemically relevant mental factors is a good reason for
believing that q cannot itself be a mental factor” (Ibid). Therefore, any mentalist epistemic
account of support factors is either going to have counterexamples or fail to pick out relevant
epistemic factors.
Given Comesana’s account of support facts, I think it’s easy to see how he would
construct an argument against EF (Explanationist Fit) since it’s a mentalist account of evidential
fit. Remember that EF says
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p fits S’s evidence, e, at t iff either p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for
why S has e or p is available to S as a logical consequence of the best explanation available
to S at t for why S has e.
The fact <p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e> is itself a support
fact. ‘Best explanation’ in EF is a relation between p and e, i.e.—p is part of the best explanation
for why S has e. Furthermore, the fact <p is available to S as a logical consequence of the best
explanation available to S at t for why S has e> is also a support fact. That is, ‘is a logical
consequence of’ is also a relation between two relata: ‘p’ and ‘the best explanation available to S
at t for why S has e’. Neither of these two relations is a mental state. Thus, EF, being made up
of these two relations, is itself a relation. That is, S’s belief p fits evidence e and thus the fact <a
belief fits one’s evidence> is a support fact of the form <p supports q just in case p is a good
reason to believe that q>. In the case of EF, p’s fitting S’s evidence e is a good reason to believe
that p. Therefore, there are facts that contribute to S’s justification for believing that p that are
not mental states, i.e.—the fact <S’s believing p fits the evidence e that S has at t>, and therefore
evidence e is a good reason to believe that p. If this picture is correct, then EF does not fully
exhaust everything that contributes to epistemic justification (at least if EF is conceived as a
mentalist account of epistemic support).
If we apply Comesana’s dilemma to EF then we get the following: Is it the case that S’s
belief that p fitting S’s evidence e (e being made up solely of mental facts) is a good reason (best
explanation) for S’s believing that p? Here is the dilemma: If the answer is no, then it appears
that S is not justified in believing that p, and thus the theory has a counterexample. If the answer
is yes, then the theory has failed to pick out an epistemically relevant factor, “…because the fact
that the obtaining of all the epistemically relevant mental factors is a good reason for believing
that p cannot itself be a mental factor”. Therefore, EF, as an epistemic account of support factors
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is either going to have counterexamples or fail to pick out relevant epistemic factors. Either way
it is an inadequate theory of epistemic justification.
Although Comesana makes some interesting points, I’m not entirely convinced his
argument works. First, explanationist evidentialism is compatible with there being externalist
support facts. Remember the point made at the beginning of Chapter Four. Fundamentally, an
internalist view (at least most) holds that the justifying of a belief is done by things internal to the
mental life of the subject, i.e.—mental states. On this view, evidence consists entirely of mental
states and evidence is what justifies a belief, hence the mentalist component to internalism.
Mentalism is a supervenience thesis which means that justification supervenes on mental states.
This is best understood by the idea that the beliefs of any two individuals that are alike mentally
are alike justificationally. Importantly, this internalist and mentalist conception of evidentialism
is compatible with the fact that there are non-mental/external ‘support facts’ that are necessary
for justification. For example, internalism and mentalism accept that support facts about
epistemic support (fit) are not internal to the subject nor are these facts mental states—they are
necessary truths about which propositions certain mental states make it rational to believe. That
is, facts like <evidence e supports believing p>, the fact that <p is available to S as a logical
consequence of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e>, and the fact that <p is
part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has e> are therefore external to S.
However, EF is still internalist because e must itself be internal and it is still mentalist because e
consists solely of mental states.
The above non-mental/externalist factors are compatible with EX-WF, but Comesana is
on the right track. Non-mental/externalist facts are important for understanding why EX-WF is
not a full account of justification (even though it is a full account of categorical justification). To
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show why EX-WF is not a complete account of justification we need to see how reliability (a
non-mental/externalist fact) can play a positive role in justification, which is not something EXWF countenances. If this is the case, then EX-WF does not work as a full account of doxastic
justification by itself (even though it is a complete theory of categorical justification), because it
doesn’t exhaust all of the relevant justificatory factors that contribute to a belief’s epistemic
justification.
Alvin Goldman (2009) says that whether a theory of justification is classified as
internalist or externalist depends on how that theory answers the question: "What kinds of states
of affairs determine, or make a difference to, the justificational status of a belief (or other
doxastic attitude)?" (p.309). Goldman calls factors that contribute to some extent in fixing a
belief’s justificatory status justifiers or J-factors (2009, p.310).
(J) A justifier of any belief or other doxastic attitude is any property, condition, or state of
affairs (and so on) that is positively or negatively relevant to the justificational status of
that attitude (Goldman, 2009, p.311).77
Again, evidentialist theories such as Conee and Feldman’s well-foundedness and McCain’s EXWF are internalist and mentalist versions of evidentialism. Such theories are compatible with
there being externalist J-factors. Thus, if it can be shown that there are J-factors (namely
reliability) that contribute to the justificatory status of a belief to some degree and are not mental
states, then two individuals who are alike mentally do not necessarily have the same belief
justified to the same degree. Why? Because there are other non-mental J-factors (reliability)
that contribute to some extent in fixing a belief’s justificatory status.

The term ‘relevant’ is not to be understood as purely causal. Goldman believes that some, but not all, J-factors
will be causally relevant. Instead, ‘relevant’ should be understood in explanatory terms. Explanatory relevance is
defined in the following way: “X is a J-factor of a given belief's justificational status if and only if X helps explain
why the beliefs justificational status is what it is.”
77
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Goldman offers what he calls ‘the right-rule architecture of epistemic justification’ (2009,
p.313). This ‘architecture’ is influenced by the idea that justification is a normative term. When
dealing with normative domains we often think in terms of ‘rules’ or ‘principles’ that govern that
domain. Goldman considers the plausible view that the justificatory status of beliefs (and other
doxastic attitudes) is (at least partly) constituted by certain conditions, states of affairs,
circumstances, or causes, plus the governing of epistemic rules. There are objective rules that
confer (objective) ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ on epistemic conduct. These rules are right or
correct rules of epistemic conduct. Epistemic ‘acts’ are objectively right or wrong (at least
partly) in virtue of the fact that they fall under or violate some correct or legitimate rule.
Goldman formulates the following ‘linkage’ principle to articulate what he has called
‘right-rule architecture’:
(L) S is justified in holding doxastic attitude D toward proposition p at time t if and only if
there are some conditions C such that
(i) S is in conditions C at (or before) t, and
(ii) one or more right J-rules jointly permit a subject who is (or was) in C to form
or retain attitude D toward p at t. (2009, p.314).
(L) says that “…the justificational status of a subject's doxastic attitude toward a proposition is a
matter of whether the attitude conforms to what right J-rules authorize in light of the subject's
epistemic situation or activity” (Ibid). Importantly, conforming to rules here does not mean rulefollowing, where doing so consists in conforming to rules as a result of mentally representing
them and verifying that the epistemic act conforms to that rule.
Goldman distinguishes between inferential and non-inferential J-rules. Inferential rules
sanction new beliefs (and other doxastic attitudes) based on logical, inductive, abductive, or
probabilistic relations to pre-existing beliefs (and so on). Non-inferential rules sanction new
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beliefs in virtue of the occurrence of non-doxastic states or events such as perceptual experiences
and apparent memories (Goldman, 2009, p.315). He offers the following as schemas for J-rules:
(INF) If subject S, at time t, holds doxastic attitudes D1, D2,…, Dm toward propositions q,
r,…,s, respectively, and if proposition p bears relation R to the conjunction of q, r,
s, then S is permitted to adopt attitude Dn toward proposition p at t (Goldman, 2009,
p.316).
(NONINF) If subject S, at time t, is in nondoxastic mental conditions X, Y and Z, then S is
permitted to adopt doxastic attitude D toward proposition p at t (Ibid).
These schemas are only approximations (and not necessarily exhaustive) of what specific J-rules
would need to look like. However, Goldman thinks they suffice as a good starting point.
Beginning with inferential J-rules. INF has a conjunctive antecedent. The first conjunct
concerns S’s occurrent doxastic states, and the second conjunct concerns some relation R of
entailment, inductive support, etc., which holds between the propositional contents of those
doxastic states and the target proposition p. Beginning with the second conjunct, Goldman says,
“The fact that a certain logical, inductive, or probabilistic relation holds between specified
propositions is a fact independent of any individual's mind” (2009, p.317). For example, the
relation of entailment between the conjunction ‘All men are mortal’ and ‘Socrates is a man’, on
the one hand and ‘Socrates is a mortal’, on the other, is not a mental fact or condition. That is,
this relation holds independently of any minds whatsoever. Such conditions, states of affairs,
factors, etc., satisfy an antecedent of an inference rule, and therefore will include conditions,
states of affairs, factors, etc., that are not mental states belonging to S (Ibid).
There is also another category of external facts that will play a justificatory role.
Goldman calls these instantiation facts (2009, p.320). To understand what these instantiation
facts amount to, Goldman has us consider the following example:
Melanie believes that Albert has just testified to P, that he has no motives for being
disingenuous about P, and so forth. Does Melanie's cognitive situation permit her to infer
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P? Suppose there is a right inferential rule that authorizes one to believe a proposition if it
is the best explanation of other things one already believes. And suppose that the truth of
P is, as a matter of fact, the best explanation of Albert's testifying to P and other things
Melanie believes about Albert. Then Melanie is indeed justified in believing P (Ibid).
What factors are relevant to Melanie’s being justified? The answer is similar to the point I made
about support facts such as best explanations and logical entailments. First, they include the
antecedent beliefs from which Melanie infers P. Second is the fact that Melanie’s antecedent
beliefs and prospective conclusion belief (P) jointly instantiate the right inferential rule posited.
This instantiation fact is highly relevant to the justificatory status of Melanie’s belief P. “So the
instantiation fact helps justify her (that is, helps make her justified) in believing P. This
instantiation fact, however, is an external fact, not a mental fact. So its status as a justifier cannot
be accommodated by mentalism” (Ibid). Importantly, Goldman reminds us what (L) says. A
belief (or other doxastic attitude) is justified if and only if it actually conforms to the right rule.
(L) doesn’t require epistemic agents to be aware that their inferential behavior conforms to the
right J-rule (Ibid). An awareness requirement would be too strong of a requirement on epistemic
justification since most inferential relations are not available to most epistemic agents. 78
Goldman also discusses non-inferential J-rules. However, I’m not going to discuss these
in any detail.79 Instead, I will focus on Goldman’s argument for the historicity thesis. This
thesis is a diachronic thesis about the nature of inferential J-factors. It holds that the justificatory
status of a belief held at time t partly depends on what transpired in the subject's cognitive
history prior to t. Therefore, some of the J-factors relevant to a given belief held at t will be
conditions, states of affairs, etc., obtaining prior to t (Goldman, 2009, p.323). Goldman’s
argument for the historicity thesis hinges on the role of preservative memory in helping to
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For a more detailed defense of this point see Goldman (2009) Section III.
For a detailed discussion of non-inferential J-rules see Goldman (2009) section VI.
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determine a belief’s justificatory status. However, I think that the evidentialist has a good way to
respond to Goldman’s account of preservative memory and therefore I don’t think his argument
for the historicity thesis works. On the other hand, I think there is a way to support Goldman’s
historicity thesis that doesn’t involve an appeal to preservative memory, but rather one that
appeals to the role of virtuous inquiry as a reliable evidence-gathering method.
Goldman’s account of preservative memory is supposed to be a problem for
explanationist accounts of epistemic support such as those offered by Conee and Feldman and
McCain. Goldman says
If S was justified in believing p earlier, and S retains her belief in p now via preservative
memory, then S is prima facie justified in believing p now. Like introspection, however,
preservative memory lacks any type of mental experience or episode that invites
explanation. In particular, there is no (conscious) act of ‘recollection’ that invites
explanation. An epistemic principle that covers preservative memory, then, cannot be
rationalized by the best-explanation approach (Goldman, 2011, p.277).
However, this case fails to impugn explanationist accounts of the support relation. In a direct
reply to Goldman, Conee and Feldman (2011b) argue that in cases of preservative memory, by
stipulation, S has not forgotten the preservatively remembered proposition q. Hence, S “…has
the potential to bring q to mind with the phenomenology of activating a memory, specifically,
the memory that q” (Conee and Feldman, 2011b, p.304). S’s ability to bring q to mind in this
way is not “…merely because he has the stored belief that q. Many of our stored beliefs are
recalled as things we merely believe, not as things we know” (Ibid). This ‘potential’ to bring a
proposition to mind in this way in cases of preservative memory are “dispositions to recollect”,
which “…is a disposition to bring to mind the proposition as known” (Ibid).
Conee and Feldman hold that “…there is something among his mental states at the time
that provides justification for this stored belief. The justifying is not done by any active
conscious occurrence at the time, evidentialists need not appeal only to conscious occurrences as
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justification” (Ibid). Thus, there is plausibility to the view that S has dispositional evidence.
There is further plausibility to the view that the evidence that S has in this example supports his
belief in the remembered proposition. Since in a case of preservative memory S has a
disposition to recall the proposition remembered “with the phenomenology of activating a
memory”, it is plausible that S also has a disposition to have a seeming that the truth of the
proposition is part of the best explanation S has of why he recalls the proposition with that
particular phenomenology (Ibid). In his own response to Goldman, McCain argues that
…according to EF [Evidential Fit], these dispositions (or at least the stored evidence that
serves as the grounds for such dispositions) are sufficient for S to have justification for
believing the proposition that is retained in preservative memory because they are part of
S’s evidence, which the proposition fits, so EF yields the intuitively correct result in cases
of preservative memory (2014, p.76).
Conee and Feldman further argue that having one of these dispositions to recollect is not the
same thing as being in a factive state. These dispositions to recollect can justify false beliefs that
we only seemed to have learned when the dispositions were formed. This is not a case of
preservative memory. Goldman says that ‘Preservative memory does not create or generate
justifiedness from “scratch”, but instead transmits a belief ’s justifiedness (or unjustifiedness)
from one time to a later time’ (Goldman, 2009, p.259-60; Conee and Feldman, 2011b, p.304-5).
On the other hand, “…a disposition to recollect is a potentially momentary state” (Conee and
Feldman, 2011b, p.305). Normally, “…it exists by its having been formed in the past when a
proposition was learned, or at least the proposition seemed to have been learned, and then
retained by a process of long-term memory consolidation” (Ibid). However, “…a recollective
disposition toward a proposition might come about from brain malfunction or tampering” (Ibid).
Furthermore, Conee and Feldman argue that
Whatever causes a disposition to recollect does create evidence for the content proposition
from scratch. Having the disposition constitutes having some defeasible evidence for its
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content, whatever its historical origins [my italics]. When a recollective disposition
resulting from malfunction or tampering leads to a justified true belief, it may nevertheless
be a Gettier case rather than a case of knowledge (Ibid).
Thus, contrary to what Goldman thinks, preservative memory does not support the historicity
thesis.
I want to offer up another potential way to support the historicity thesis that appeals to a
non-mental/externalist J-factor, i.e.—reliability. Suppose the body of evidence e that S bases his
belief p on was gathered in a virtuous (reliable) manner. The next day, S surveys evidence e and
forms a belief p based on this evidence. In this case, the belief p that S forms based on evidence
e, fits the evidence, i.e.—p is the best explanation S has for why S has e. EX-WF holds that S’s
belief p is justified period because it is the best explanation S has for why S has e. What EX-WF
says is that the only relevant J-factor is that p is the best explanation one has of e. But my
proposal is that since S had gathered his evidence e in a virtuous manner (using reliable
evidence-gathering methods), then this reliability positively contributes to increasing the degree
to which his belief p is justified. I turn to that discussion now.
IV. A Two-Component View of Epistemic Justification
What I now wish to argue is that there is (at least) one important externalist crosstemporal (diachronic) J-factor that bears on the justificatory status of a person’s belief that p.
More precisely, there is a sense in which the reliability of one’s evidence-gathering is
justificationally relevant to the justificatory status of one’s attitude toward p. Importantly, I’m
not arguing that the reliability of one’s evidence-gathering methods fully determines the
justificatory status of p. Rather, as Goldman says, “…being a J-factor only requires being
positively or negatively relevant to justificational status, not being decisively determinative of it”
(2009, p.324). The upshot of my argument is that at least one diachronic factor is relevant to
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justification after all. More precisely, in some cases a doxastic attitude’s justificatory status at t
is partly determined by the reliability or unreliability of one’s evidence-gathering methods.
Hence, historicity is relevant to epistemic justification.
In making my argument I will adopt a view of epistemic justification loosely similar to
Goldman’s (2011) two-component theory of epistemic justification. As I’ve already discussed,
my two-component theory has a fittingness-dimension (FD) and a reliability-dimension (RD).
On FD, a belief is justified if it fits the evidence one has at time t.
p fits S’s evidence, e, at t iff either p is part of the best explanation available to S at t for
why S has e or p is available to S as a logical consequence of the best explanation available
to S at t for why S has e.
But RD is also justificationally relevant. In this case, how the evidence was gathered can be
positively or negatively relevant to the justificatory status of a belief. If S’s evidence supporting
S’s belief p was gathered virtuously (i.e.—reliably), then the evidence-gathering method used
will be (other things being equal) positively relevant to the justificatory status of p. On the flipside, if S’s evidence supporting S’s belief p was gathered viciously (i.e.—unreliably), then the
evidence-gathering method used will be (other things being equal) negatively relevant to the
justificatory status of p.
The view I will offer is consistent with cases in which a doxastic attitude’s justificational
status is wholly determined by events occurring at t (synchronic). That is, one might have
evidence that justifies some belief p at t where the person didn’t engage in inquiry (e.g., the
example of your friend blurting out the end of a movie or being overcome with the belief that it’s
dark when the lights go out). But, in many cases a doxastic attitude’s justificatory status will be
partly determined by the reliability or unreliability of one’s evidence-gathering methods. I’ve
spent a lot of time discussing how evidence can support a belief and thereby render that belief
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justified period (FD), so I will turn my focus to arguing for RD as it relates to virtuous and
vicious inquiry.80
IV.1 – Truth-Conduciveness and Justification
Two important things need to be put into place. First, I adopt a view advanced by
Goldman (2011, p.278) about why inference-to-the-best-explanation is a good pattern for nondeductive inference. It is a good pattern of inference because it is conducive to true belief. This
does not mean that no explanation genuinely explains anything unless it is true. This last point is
consistent with explanationist accounts of justification such as Conee and Feldman’s and
McCain’s. I agree with what Goldman says about explanatoriness. He says that explanatoriness
is a good rationalizing property of a type of inference only because it is an excellent indicator of
truth. Even if we accept explanatoriness as a mark of justification, the fact that it is such a mark
derives from its correlation with truth-conduciveness. Truth-conduciveness is the fundamental
principle of epistemic justification, which is completely in step with reliabilism in general.
Goldman says “…we do not choose epistemic rules in which the support relation is weak
probabilistic support, or inference-to-the-worst-explanation! Why not? Because these rules
would yield a much lower rate of true-belief formation than the preferred principles” (2009,

I think my view entails that ‘non-inquiry’ related reliability can play a salient role in fixing the degree to which a
well-founded belief is justified. For example, in the case of being overcome by the belief ‘It is dark’ when the lights
are turned out, the visual experience of darkness is evidence that it is dark. My belief that it is dark is the best
explanation of my visual experience. Thus, along FD my belief is well-founded (assuming I base my belief on my
visual experience). Additionally, however, the fact that my vision is reliable contributes to the degree to which my
well-founded belief is justified even though no inquiry is involved. This is consistent with my two-component view.
It is also consistent with my view to say that even if my vision is not a reliable belief-forming mechanism (because
I’m in the demon-world), my belief still fits my evidence and therefore it is justified. I have not focused on
reliability more broadly because my main interest has been to try to understand the role that inquiry plays in
epistemic justification. However, I have not completely ignored this either. For example, I have mentioned the role
that reliable vision plays in justification. Careful observation using my vision is a reliable belief-forming process
that usually contributes to the degree to which my visual beliefs are justified (not always though because sometimes
I’m not very attentive!). Of course, someone might think that engaging in careful observation is engaging in
inquiry. I’m fine with this too. My point is simply that there are likely other ways my view is compatible with
reliabilism. I count this as a virtue of my view.
80
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p.336). He goes on to say that the standard for J-rule rightness is the tendency of such rules to
produce a fairly high ratio of true beliefs. If this is true then the J-factor at the level of the
rightness criterion is externalist. Importantly, Conee himself argues that evidence is indicative of
the truth: “…all evidence for a proposition, however weak, is some indication that the
proposition is true. Thus, the sort of justification that is constituted by evidence always bears on
the truth of what is justified” (Conee, 2004, p.253).
IV.2 – Virtuous Inquiry as a J-Factor
So, what is the particular externalist J-factor pertinent to virtuous inquiry? Answer:
reliability. Virtuous inquiry is a reliable evidence-gathering process. A subject who engages in
virtuous evidence-gathering methods is far more likely to gather a body of evidence that is not
misleading than a subject who engages in vicious inquiry. By ‘misleading evidence’ I mean:
Misleading Evidence: E is misleading evidence for p just in case (i) E is evidence for p
and (ii) p is false.
This should seem relatively uncontroversial. For example, a team of homicide detectives that
meticulously surveys a murder scene, properly catalogues relevant evidence, utilizes state-of-theart forensics techniques and laboratories, etc., is far more likely to gather non-misleading or
veridical evidence than a homicide team that engages in sloppy, hasty, and less than thorough
evidence-gathering. By ‘veridical evidence’ I mean:
Veridical Evidence: E is veridical evidence for p just in case (i) E is evidence for p and
(ii) p is true.
Thus, there is a crucially important metaphysical fact related to virtuous inquiry:
Metaphysical Fact1: other things being equal, virtuous evidence-gathering
significantly increases the probability that the evidence gathered is veridical.
There is also a crucially important epistemic fact that falls out directly from this metaphysical
fact:
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Epistemic Fact1: other things being equal, the metaphysical fact that virtuous evidencegathering significantly increases the probability that the evidence gathered is veridical,
means that the degree to which a well-founded belief p is justified for S increases when
the evidence supporting p was virtuously (reliably) gathered.
If S bases his belief p on evidence E and E sufficiently supports p, then p is categorically
justified for S. But in addition, if S gathered E virtuously (reliably), then the degree to which p
is justified increases because the likelihood of E being veridical increases.
Importantly, reliability is not a necessary condition for epistemic justification. FD says
that subject S’s belief p can satisfy the minimal requirement for epistemic justification if
evidence E is the best explanation S has available for why S has p. This is the bare minimum
required for S’s belief p to be epistemically justified. Thus, if a belief meets this minimum
requirement for justification, then that belief is justified period. However, the fact that E was
reliably gathered is, other things being equal, sufficient to increase the degree to which p is
justified for S. However, this is not the only way that a belief’s justification can be increased.
The strength of one’s evidence also determines the degree to which a belief is justified. A belief
can be justified to a higher degree if the evidence supporting that belief is strong. On the other
hand, a belief that is supported by weaker evidence is less justified than a belief that is supported
by stronger evidence. Thus, strength of evidence and reliable inquiry can both increase the
justification level of a well-founded belief.
On the flip-side, vicious inquiry is an unreliable evidence-gathering process. A subject
who engages in vicious evidence-gathering methods is far more likely to gather a body of
evidence that is misleading than a subject who engages in virtuous inquiry. Again, a team of
homicide detectives who engages in sloppy, hasty, and less than thorough evidence-gathering,
etc., is far more likely to gather misleading or non-veridical evidence than a homicide team that
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engages in virtuous inquiry. Thus, there is a crucially important metaphysical fact related to
vicious inquiry:
Metaphysical Fact2: other things being equal, vicious evidence-gathering significantly
increases the probability that the evidence gathered is misleading.
There is also a crucially important epistemic fact that falls out directly from this metaphysical
fact:
Epistemic Fact2: other things being equal, the metaphysical fact that vicious evidencegathering significantly increases the probability that the evidence gathered is misleading,
means that the degree to which a well-founded belief p is justified for S decreases when
the evidence supporting p was viciously (unreliably) gathered.
If S bases his belief p on evidence E and E sufficiently supports p, then p is categorically
justified for S. But, if S gathered E viciously (unreliably) then the degree to which p is justified
decreases because the likelihood of E being veridical decreases.
Importantly, vicious inquiry cannot render a well-founded belief unjustified. This is
because reliability is not a necessary condition for a belief’s justification. Satisfying FD is a
necessary condition for justification. In other words, having evidence that on balance supports
one’s belief is a requirement for justification and is also sufficient for a belief to be justified,
i.e.—if a belief meets this requirement it is justified period. There is no further requirement that
a belief be reliably formed for it to be justified. So, if a belief is justified along FD it cannot be
rendered unjustified by vicious inquiry.
IV.3 – An ‘Awareness’ Requirement for Justification?
At this point, it is important to look at a potential problem for my view. McCain argued
that virtuous or vicious inquiry only matter to epistemic justification if the subject is aware that
he/she engaged in one or the other types of inquiry. In other words, if a person has evidence that
his evidence-gathering method was unreliable (careless, biased, etc.), then this evidence will
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weigh against his belief’s justificatory status. This is correct. But without such evidence, how
one gathered evidence has no bearing on a belief’s justificatory status. We are now in a position
to see why this latter claim is wrong.
It is true that in order for evidence to support, undermine, or rebut some belief p for
person S, S must be aware (occurrent or dispositional evidence) of that evidence. Thus, in order
for the evidence that S engaged in virtuous/vicious inquiry to have an effect on the justificatory
status of S’s belief that p, S must be aware of that evidence. But this only applies when we
consider FD. That is, when considering FD we are concerned solely with how evidence provides
justification for a belief. In order for S’s evidence that he engaged in virtuous/vicious inquiry to
have any bearing on whether S’s belief that p is justified, p must fit the evidence S possesses and
S must also properly base his belief p on the relevant evidence, i.e.—S’s belief must be wellfounded. Additionally, remember that evidence need not be occurrent, since there is also
dispositional evidence. Thus, S need not have occurrent evidence in order for p to fit S’s
evidence since p can fit S’s dispositional evidence as well. Regardless of this fact, an awareness
requirement cannot apply to all J-factors even if it does apply to evidence. Of course, EX-WF is
consistent with this claim since it is compatible with there being non-mental/externalist J-factors
that a person is unaware of. For example, a belief p is justified for S if p is the best explanation
for why S has evidence E, regardless of whether S is aware that p is the best explanation for why
he has evidence E. Having such an awareness requirement would overintellectualize
justification because then beliefs held by unreflective adults and children wouldn’t be justified.
But EX-WF doesn’t allow for reliability to play a role in the justificatory status of a belief unless
the person holding the belief is aware of the reliability. It’s this claim that I will argue against
next.
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Bergmann (2006) argues that there cannot be an awareness requirement on epistemic
justification. That is, there cannot be an epistemic requirement that a person be either actually or
potentially aware of the relevant J-factor (or as Bergmann puts it “justification-contributor”) that
justifies a belief in order for that belief to be justified for that person. Bergmann argues that if
there is such an awareness requirement on justification, then we run into a dilemma. The
awareness requirement must be either strong or weak. Strong awareness involves conceiving of
the J-factor that is the object of awareness as being in some way relevant to the justification or
truth of the belief. Weak awareness does not involve conceiving of the J-factor that is the object
of awareness as being in some way relevant to the justification or truth of the belief.
Bergmann’s claim is that if the awareness requirement for justification is strong, then vicious
regress problems arise and if the awareness requirement is weak, then the motivation to think
that justification is internal is lost. Either way there cannot be an awareness requirement on
epistemic justification. Let’s look at his argument in more detail.
One of Bergmann’s main goals is to argue against internalism. In doing so, he argues
that all forms of internalism require, for a belief’s justification, that the subject holding the belief
be aware (or potentially aware) of that which contributes to its justification.81 That is, if there is
no actual or potential awareness of anything that contributes to the belief’s justification, then the
belief is not justified. Bergmann calls this the awareness requirement.
The Awareness Requirement: S’s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something, X, that
contributes to the justification of B—e.g. evidence for B or a truth indictor for B or the
satisfaction of some necessary condition of B’s justification—and (ii) S is aware (or
potentially aware of X (Bergmann, 2006, p.9).

For Bergmann’s defense of this claim see Bergmann (2006) Chapter 3. My purpose here is not to discuss
Bergmann’s argument against internalism. Instead, I’m focusing on Bergmann’s important argument against any
awareness requirement for epistemic justification. My two-component view of justification is compatible with there
not being such a requirement and actually relies on there not being one.
81
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Bergmann cites Bonjour’s famous ‘Norman the Clairvoyant’ case as the most influential
motivation for an awareness requirement (and one of the most influential arguments against
externalism) (2006, pp.11-12). Recall that Bonjour thinks Norman lacks justification for his
clairvoyant belief about the whereabouts of the President of the U.S. Norman’s belief lacks
justification because he is unaware of any relevant J-factor. From Norman’s perspective, his
belief is accidental, arbitrarily formed, or the result of luck (or something).
Bergmann calls Bonjour’s objection to externalism the Subject’s Perspective Objection
(SPO).
SPO: If the subject holding a belief isn’t aware of what that belief has going for it, then she
isn’t aware of how its status is any different from a stray hunch or an arbitrary conviction.
From that we may conclude that from her perspective it is an accident that her belief is true.
And that implies that is isn’t a justified belief (2006, p.12).
Bergmann points out that the SPO is used to argue against externalism but it is also used to
motivate internalism. He thinks that this motivation for internalism is also the strongest
motivation for the awareness requirement. Now let’s see how all of this fits in with Bergmann’s
dilemma.
This first horn of Bergmann’s dilemma is that a strong awareness requirement on
justification gives rise to vicious regress problems leading to radical skepticism. Strong
awareness involves conceiving of the J-factor that is the object of awareness as being somehow
relevant to the justification of the belief. There are different types of strong awareness: doxastic
and non-doxastic versions of strong awareness and actual and potential strong awareness.
Doxastic strong awareness involves the belief that the object of awareness in somehow relevant
to the justification of the belief in question. Non-doxastic strong awareness is simply strong
awareness that isn’t doxastic. An actual strong awareness requirement holds that the person be
aware, while the potential strong awareness requirement holds that the person be able on
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reflection alone to be aware. Each type of strong awareness falls prey to the vicious regress
problem (Bergmann, 2006, p.14).
Bergmann first considers the Actual Doxastic Strong Awareness Requirement (ADSAR).
ADSAR: S’s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something, X, that contributes to the
justification of B and (ii) S is actually aware of X in such a way that S justifiedly believes
that X is in some way relevant to the appropriateness of holding B (Bergmann, 2006,
pp..14-15).
ADSAR leads to regress problems. In order for S’s belief B to be justified, S must have the
further justified belief (with respect to something, X1, that contributes to the justification of B)
that:
P1: X1 is somehow relevant to the justification of believing B.
According to ADSAR, in order for S’s belief that P1 to be justified, S must have the additional
justified belief (with respect to something, X2, that contributes to the justification of P1) that:
P2: X2 is somehow relevant to the justification of believing that [X1 is somehow relevant
to the justification of believing B].
And in order for S’s belief that P2 to be justified, S must have the further justified belief ((with
respect to something, X3, that contributes to the justification of P2) that:
P3: X3 is somehow relevant to the justification of believing that [X2 is somehow relevant
to the justification of believing that [X1 is somehow relevant to the justification of
believing B]].
This regress continues ad infinitum. The implication, given ADSAR, is that B is justified for S
only if S actually holds an infinite number of justified beliefs of ever-increasing complexity. The
issue is that it is difficult enough for anyone to grasp a proposition like P5 or P6, let alone believe
it with justification. Thus, ADSAR leads to the conclusion that none of our beliefs are justified.
Therefore, we have good reason to reject ADSAR.
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A similar line of reasoning applies if we switch from actual strong awareness to merely
requiring potential strong awareness. I will not go into Bergmann’s argument against potential
strong awareness, but briefly the issue is that it falls prey to the same regress in which S must
hold an infinite number of beliefs of ever-increasing complexity (see Bergmann, 2006, p.16).
This vicious regress also occurs if we switch to a non-doxastic awareness requirement. Instead
of beliefs, the issue becomes that a person would have to have an infinite number of concepts of
ever-increasing complexity. Again, I will not discuss Bergmann’s argument for this either (see
Bergmann, 2006, pp.17-18). For my purposes, the above discussion suffices to show that there is
very good reason to doubt that a strong awareness requirement is necessary for a belief to be
justified. But what about a conceptual weak awareness requirement? This brings us to the
second horn of Bergmann’s dilemma.
First, it will be instructive to see why a non-conceptual weak awareness requirement
won’t work. If the sort of awareness that is required is non-conceptual, then S can have the
required awareness of the relevant J-factor without conceiving of it in any way (without
classifying the J-factor according to any classificatory scheme). But then S can be nonconceptually aware of the relevant J-factor without conceiving of it as relevant in any way to the
justification of his belief. SPO, says however, that if S does not conceive of the relevant J-factor
as something relevant to the justification of his belief, then from S’s perspective his belief is an
accident, lucky, arbitrary, etc. Thus, in order for a weak awareness requirement to work it must
be conceptual. However, Bergmann argues that such a switch doesn’t work either since S could
meet this requirement simply by being aware of the relevant J-factor and applying some concept
or other to it (such as the concept of being a physical token process). This would mean S can
have a conceptual weak awareness of the relevant J-factor without conceiving of it as relevant in
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any way at all to the justification of his belief. However, the result is that a conceptual weak
awareness requirement would be vulnerable to the SPO, but this violates the very intuition that
motivated internalism to begin with. According to the SPO, it would still be an accident from
S’s subjective perspective that his belief is true. Even though S applies a concept to the relevant
J-factor, it’s not the correct type of concept. That is, the concept is irrelevant to whether the Jfactor contributes to the justification of his belief. Thus, the only way to guarantee that S applies
the correct concept to the relevant J-factor is to have his belief satisfy a strong awareness
requirement. But if satisfying a strong awareness requirement is what is demanded, then we
must deal with the vicious regress problem (Bergmann, 2006, pp.20-21).
There are good reasons to think that Bergmann’s dilemma isn’t successful, but a full
exploration of this issue goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, I want to briefly
discuss why Bergmann’s dilemma isn’t a problem for EX-WF. First, McCain’s account of
justification doesn’t require strong awareness. He points out that A person S need only be
disposed on the basis of reflection alone to recognize (have a seeming) that p is part of the best
(maybe the only one she is aware of) answer to the question "why E?" or "why do I have E?" or
“why do I have this?” (where ‘this’ refers to some relevant body of evidence). Having a strong
awareness requirement would over-intellectuallize justitication. A person need not have robust
concepts like “evidence”, “entailment”, “best explanation”, “logical consequence”, etc. McCain
is correct in pointing out that it is plausible to think that children and unreflective adults (I would
argue that most adults don’t reflect in the way that philosophers might about justification)
possess evidence that supports propositions for them, but surely they don’t form higher-level
beliefs about their epistemic support. Additionally, it is plausible that a person’s evidence can
support believing a proposition for him even if he hasn’t consciously considered the support
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relation between his evidence and that proposition. Thus, direct awareness of this support
relation doesn’t seem necessary for justification (McCain, p.78).
Even if some sort of weak awareness is required, I think EX-WF is safe from Bergmann’s
dilemma. At most, McCain’s view requires that S be disposed to either have a seeming that p is
part of the best explanation available to S at t for why S has the evidence he does or have a
seeming that p is logically entailed by the best explanation available for why S has the evidence
he does in order for p to be supported by his evidence. Lacking this ‘seeming’ requirement
would seem to imply that S could have epistemic support for a proposition that he lacks the
requisite concepts to even understand. It’s highly implausible that S can have epistemic support
for propositions he can’t understand (Ibid).
Jason Rogers and Jonathan Matheson (2011) argue that ‘weak awareness internalism’
does not succumb to the SPO. They provide an account of 'seemings’ in which they are neither
conceptual nor beliefs. Rogers and Matheson offer an account of ‘seemings’ that appeals to
‘seemings’ as justification-contributors. McCain uses ‘seemings’ in a different sense. On
McCain’s account, ‘seemings’ are not justification-contributors. On McCain’s view, ‘seemings’
allow us to have weak awareness of the relationship between some body of evidence and a
proposition. However, McCain can still appeal to the general idea behind Rogers and
Matheson’s view to support his own. Rogers and Matheson argue that “A subject may "host" a
seeming without conceiving of—or even having higher-order awareness of—the seeming itself
in any way. Likewise, the seeming may result for the subject as a result of merely weak
awareness of some object of first-order awareness” (Rogers and Matheson, pp.60-1). The idea is
that S can be in a state wherein he hosts a seeming while remaining in a state of weak—nonconceptual—awareness of that seeming, or while having no higher-order awareness of the
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seeming whatsoever, and all while staying in a state of weak awareness concerning the object of
first-order awareness that causes that seeming (Rogers and Mathson, p.61).
Rogers and Matheson think that such states of seeming can make a relevant difference
from the subject’s perspective, i.e.—that the relevant belief is appropriate to hold.82 Apply this
to McCain’s view, i.e.—hosting a seeming state, such as one that involves it seeming that p is the
best explanation of some body of evidence, renders p non-accidental from S’s perspective.
Norman the Clairvoyant’s belief just ‘pops’ into his head. From his perspective his belief is
accidental, arbitrary, or something else. On the other hand, S’s seeming state makes it the case
that, from his perspective, p isn’t accidental, arbitrary, etc. Having the seeming can make p
reasonable from S’s perspective. From Norman’s perspective, his belief is inexplicable. Hence,
no (higher-order) awareness of or conceptualization of the seeming itself is required for S's belief
to be relevantly "non-accidental" from his perspective (Rogers and Matheson, pp.61-2).
Consequently, McCain’s view can avoid the SPO.
Thus, Bergmann’s dilemma does nothing to undermine the view that a belief’s being the
best explanation a person has for why he has some body of evidence is, at the very least,
minimally justifying. That is, if a belief p is the best explanation the person has for why he has
evidence e, then p is justified full-stop for S. This is because evidential relations hold
necessarily. What is at issue is whether rebutting evidence or undermining evidence are the only
things that can bear negatively on the justificatory status of a well-founded belief. I have argued
that this is not the case. I have argued that whether someone engages in virtuous or vicious
inquiry can make a justificatory difference in the degree to which a belief is justified. On my
two-component view there need not be an awareness requirement on the reliability of inquiry in

Again, Rogers and Matheson are concerned with a somewhat different sense of ‘seeming’, but the basic idea of a
‘seeming’ and therefore the general approach to resisting Bergmann’s dilemma is applicable to McCain’s view.
82
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order for it to play a role in epistemic justification. In order for reliability of inquiry to play a
role along FD, a person must be aware (have evidence) that the evidence he gathered wasn’t
gathered reliably. However, along RD the person need not be aware of the reliability (or
unreliability) in order for it to play a role in the belief’s justificatory status. It is this latter view
that Bergmann’s arguments support.
Again, if a person has evidence that he engaged in virtuous inquiry then he has good
reason to believe that the evidence he gathered is not misleading. And if the person has evidence
that he engaged in vicious inquiry then he has good reason to believe that the evidence he
gathered is more than likely misleading. Such evidence will affect the degree to which that
belief is justified for that person. But McCain says that if a person is not aware (actually or
potentially) of any evidence regarding the nature of the inquiry he engaged in, then the reliability
(or lack thereof) cannot bear on the justificatory status of his belief. I agree with this but only as
it applies to FD. Evidence can’t bear on the justificatory status of a belief unless the person is
aware of that evidence. However, as I’ve said before, whether someone engaged in virtuous
inquiry can have an effect on the justificatory status of a belief along RD. Again, there is the
metaphysical fact that, other things being equal, virtuous evidence-gathering significantly
increases the probability that the evidence gathered is veridical. There is also the crucially
important epistemic fact that falls out directly from this metaphysical fact: other things being
equal, the metaphysical fact that virtuous evidence-gathering significantly increases the
probability that the evidence gathered is veridical, means that the degree to which a wellfounded belief p is justified for S increases when the evidence supporting p was virtuously
(reliably) gathered (and vice versa for vicious inquiry). Bergmann’s argument against an
awareness requirement on justification helps support my claim. That is, it is not required that a
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person be aware of this metaphysical fact (or the epistemic fact) in order for it to have an
epistemic bearing on the justificatory status of his belief. Thus, the reliability of one’s inquiry
can have a positive bearing on the degree to which a person’s belief is justified even if the nature
of the inquiry has no bearing on evidential relations. Let me explain.
Evidential relations hold regardless of the reliability of the inquiry the person used to
gather his evidence. That is, p either fits a body of evidence or it doesn’t. If p fits a body of
evidence, then it does so necessarily. Reliability does nothing to undermine this relation between
a belief and the evidence which supports it. This means the evidence one has justifies the same
regardless of how it was gathered. Therefore, absent any defeating evidence, a person’s belief is
justified period as long as that belief fits the evidence he has. But the degree to which the belief
is justified can be affected by virtuous (reliable) or vicious (unreliable) inquiry. To see how this
works it will be instructive to apply my view to some cases.
IV.4 – Applications
What will be helpful to understand my two-component theory is to see how my view
applies to two persons in similar and dissimilar epistemic conditions. Person A and Person B are
both epistemic agents who I’ll place in different epistemic conditions. Both A and B can be in
either the ‘actual world’ (the verific world we inhabit) or the ‘demon-world’ (the world in which
an evil-demon manipulates all of the evidence one has by always providing misleading evidence,
i.e.—evidence that points to the truth of some proposition, but that proposition is false). Further,
A and B can either engage in virtuous (reliable) inquiry or vicious (unreliable) inquiry when
gathering evidence. Importantly, A and B are equally capable cognitive agents.
My two-component theory of epistemic justification holds that, other things being equal,
someone’s well-founded belief p that is based on evidence that was gathered via virtuous inquiry
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is justified to a higher degree than someone’s well-founded belief p that is based on evidence that
was gathered via vicious inquiry. The key is the 'other things being equal' requirement. In a
demon-world, other things are not equal. The demon manipulates the evidence you gather no
matter what method of inquiry you use. So, all things considered, how you inquired in the
demon-world has no positive epistemic bearing on whether your evidence is veridical because it
is always misleading (I will say more about this below). In fact, virtuous inquiry is always an
unreliable evidence-gathering process in the demon-world. On the other hand, in the 'actual'
world it does matter if you inquire virtuously because virtuous inquiry is normally a reliable
evidence-gathering process, since normally other things are equal.
I’d like to make one more point about virtuous inquiry before I discuss the different
applications of my two-component view. It might seem inconsistent to say that virtuous inquiry
can be unreliable since I’ve stipulated that virtuous inquiry is a reliable belief-forming process.
This is true, but only when we fail to consider the ‘other things being equal’ condition. In a
verific world (the actual world), other things being equal, virtuous inquiry is reliable. Key to
understanding this is recognizing that inquiring virtuously entails performing activities such as
reasoning open-mindedly and fair-mindedly, reasoning consistently, engaging in careful visual
observation, etc. Thus, in the actual world, other things being equal, performing these types of
activities (among others) is a reliable way to gather and sort through evidence. But in a demonworld these activities are rendered completely unreliable. This is because all things considered
performing these activities is always an unreliable way to gather evidence. Thus, there is no
inconsistency in saying that virtuous inquiry can be unreliable. It is equivalent to saying that X
is a reliable belief-forming process under normal conditions, but that X can be unreliable in
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conditions that are not normal. Now I will look at how my two-component view applies to
different cases.
My two-component theory commits me to the following list. Assume that in each case,
A's and B's beliefs are equally well-founded (they have precisely the same total body of
evidence) and are therefore equally justified along FD. Further, assume that they have no
evidence of whether their inquiries were virtuous or vicious.
1. A and B inquired virtuously and both are in the actual world = A’s belief p and B’s belief
p are equally justified.
2. A and B inquired viciously and both are in the actual world = A’s belief p and B’s belief
p are equally justified.
3. A and B inquired virtuously and both are in the demon-world = A’s belief p and B’s
belief p are equally justified.
4. A and B inquired viciously and both are in the demon-world = A’s belief p and B’s belief
p are equally justified.
5. A inquired viciously and B inquired virtuously and both are in the demon-world = A’s
belief p and B’s belief p are equally justified.
6. A inquired viciously and B inquired virtuously and both are in the actual world = B’s
belief p is more justified than A’s belief p.
7. A inquired viciously and is in the actual world, while B inquired virtuously and is in
the demon-world = A’s belief p and B’s belief p are equally justified.
8. A inquired virtuously and is in the actual world, while B inquired viciously and is in
the demon-world = A’s belief p is more justified than B’s belief p.
9. A inquired virtuously and is in the actual world, while B inquired virtuously and is in
the demon-world = A’s belief p is more justified than B’s belief p.
10. A inquired viciously and is in the actual world, while B inquired viciously and is in
the demon-world = A’s belief p and B’s belief p are equally justified.
Notice that in 1-10 the evidentialist will say that A and B are equally justified because evidence
is all that matters for justification and by stipulation they have precisely the same evidence. But
on my view, some of these will be diagnosed differently. I think numbers 1-4 are
uncontroversial since A and B are in identical epistemic conditions and inquired the same way. I
also think numbers 8 and 10 are diagnosed correctly on my view. Number 6 seems diagnosed
correctly on my view as well, which is also most important to my theory (I will discuss this
below). Numbers 5, 7, and 9 are the most controversial and will require more support.
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Number 5 says that A and B are both in the demon-world, have the same well-founded
belief p, but A inquired viciously while B inquired virtuously. The reason that their respective
beliefs p are equally justified is because we have to consider both FD and RD. On FD, A and B
have equally well-founded beliefs. However, on RD, A’s and B’s inquiries are both unreliable
because they are in a deeply impoverished epistemic condition, i.e.—they are both in a demonworld. Thus there is no epistemic difference between A’s belief and B’s belief along RD.
Virtuous and vicious inquiry are equally unreliable in the demon-world. One initial objection
here might be that 5 conflicts with 6. That is, if virtuous inquiry makes a positive epistemic
difference in the actual world, then it should make an epistemic difference in the demon-world.
But this objection fails to take into consideration two important points. First, in the demonworld other things are not equal. That is, this objection fails to grasp just how epistemically
impoverished someone’s condition is in the demon-world. This is where the ‘other things being
equal’ constraint is crucial. The Evil Demon manipulates all of your evidence all of the time,
making sure that your evidence is always misleading regardless of whether your inquiry was
conducted in what is a normally reliable manner. So, in this case all things are not equal. All
things considered, in the demon-world it is not a metaphysical fact that virtuous inquiry
increases the likelihood that your evidence is veridical because one’s evidence is always
misleading in the demon-world. Consequently, in the demon-world, virtuous inquiry cannot
increase the degree to which a belief is justified. Second, and related to the first response, when
we talk about epistemic justification we are talking about a positive normative status that makes
a belief a much better candidate for amounting to knowledge than it would be otherwise.
Whether it is such a candidate has a lot to do with truth-conducivity. In the demon-world,
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virtuous inquiry just can’t get your belief any closer to knowledge because you’re in a global
deception scenario. Thus, my diagnosis of 5 holds.83
Of course, one might ask why it is that justification still holds along FD in a demonworld if the evidence one has can never amount to anything like knowledge. That is, if when we
talk about epistemic justification we are talking about a positive normative status that makes a
belief a much better candidate for amounting to knowledge than it would be otherwise, how
would this apply to evidence in the demon-world that is by its very nature misleading? Conee
(2004) argues that a proposition is epistemically justified for a person when it is evident to the
person that the proposition is true. Further, any support a person has for a proposition is some
sort of indication to the person that the proposition is true. Evidence is what indicates the truth
of a proposition. The stronger a proposition’s truth is indicated to a person, the better that
proposition is epistemically justified for that person. Epistemic justification of a proposition is
evidence of its truth. The relation of evidential support is its truth connection (Conee, 2004,
pp.252-53).84
Furthermore, evidential relations are necessary, regardless of what world you are in. In
the actual world a body of evidence can still be strongly supportive of some proposition even if
that evidence is misleading. Thus, belief p can still be the best explanation available to a person
for why he has evidence e even if that evidence is misleading. Likewise, being in a demonworld has no bearing on whether evidential relations hold. Evidence still justifies the same in the
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There is another possible world that is relevant to mention here. There could be a world that is antithetical to the
demon-world, say a ‘Good Angel’ world, in which a good-angel makes all inquiries reliable. That is, there could be
a world in which a good-angel makes vicious inquiry always reliable so that even vicious inquiry always yields
veridical evidence. This would be the opposite scenario that we see in number 5. Thanks to EJ Coffman for
suggesting this ‘angel-world’.
84
I should point out that truth is the unifying concept in my two-component theory of epistemic justification. That
is, along FD the relation of evidential support is its truth connection. Along RD, the truth connection has to do with
the fact that a reliable process yields true beliefs or veridical evidence. Thus, FD and RD do not rely on disparate
fundamental concepts. Instead, FD and RD both rely on the same fundamental unifying concept, i.e.—truth.
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demon-world as it does in the actual world. That is, no matter what world you are in, evidence
still indicates the truth of a proposition. On the other hand, the reliability of some method of
inquiry does not stay consistent between the actual world and the demon-world. Epistemic
justification along FD is still an important sort of normative status required for a belief to
ultimately amount to knowledge, even if that evidence isn’t strong enough to support a belief to
the degree required for knowledge. An unreliable method of inquiry can never confer the type of
normative status a belief needs to amount to knowledge. Another way of putting this is to say
that a well-founded belief is a rational belief, but a belief that isn’t based on any evidence is not
rational. Think about what evidence does for a believer. Evidence indicates that something is
true (evidence is evidence that something is true, i.e.—evidence is always truth indicative).
When you have evidence for a proposition (even misleading evidence) you have something that
indicates the truth of that proposition. That is, when you have evidence of p you have reason to
believe p. Having a reason to believe p is necessary for knowledge. It doesn’t make sense to say
that ‘I know p but I have no reason to believe p’. Thus, having evidence (even when that
evidence is always misleading—and you have no evidence of its misleading nature) does make a
belief a better candidate for knowledge than it would be otherwise.
What about 7? Number 7 says that A is in the actual world and inquired viciously, while
B is in the demon-world and inquired virtuously. Their beliefs are equally justified along FD
because both of their beliefs are equally well-founded and thus justified period. Now, along RD,
A engaged in vicious inquiry which decreases the degree to which A’s well-founded belief is
justified. Now, because B is in the demon-world, his virtuous inquiry does not increase the
degree to which his belief is justified. In the demon-world, virtuous inquiry is completely
unreliable and hence it decreases the degree to which B’s well-founded belief is justified, i.e.—
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all things considered, in the demon-world it is not a metaphysical fact that virtuous inquiry
increases the likelihood that your evidence is not misleading because one’s evidence is always
misleading in the demon-world. In the demon-world virtuous inquiry is unreliable, so it is a
metaphysical fact that virtuous inquiry increases the likelihood that your evidence is misleading.
Furthermore, A’s engaging in vicious inquiry in the actual world is also a form of evidencemanipulation, albeit not of the demon variety. That is, in an important sense, a person who
engages in vicious inquiry in the actual world or the demon-world is having his evidence
systematically manipulated. Rather than a global deception like that in the demon-world, a
person in the actual world who engages in vicious inquiry is part of a localized ‘deception’. Just
like with 5, in order to appreciate 7, one must appreciate the impoverished epistemic condition
one is in when in the demon-world and how similarly manipulated the vicious thinker’s evidence
is in the actual world. Thus my diagnosis of 7 holds.
What about 9? The correctness of number 9 should be easy to see by now. Number 9
involves person A inquiring virtuously in the actual world and person B inquiring virtuously in
the demon-world. Obviously, person A’s well-founded belief p is justified to a higher degree
than person B’s well-founded belief p because virtuous inquiry is a reliable evidence-gathering
process in the actual world but is an unreliable evidence-gathering process in the demon-world.
Thus, the degree to which B’s belief p is justified decreases in the demon-world because virtuous
inquiry is completely unreliable.
Now, of primary importance to my two-component theory is the truth of number 6 (A
inquired viciously and B inquired virtuously and both are in the actual world, so B’s belief p is
more justified than A’s belief p). This is because what we are primarily concerned with is the
epistemic status of our beliefs in the actual world and my view makes good sense of how our
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beliefs get justified in the actual world. In the actual world, other things are normally equal. I
say ‘normally’ because someone might have the concern that people can, and often do,
manipulate evidence in the actual world (a localized deception), so other things are not always
equal in the actual world. The concern is that sometimes the actual world can be similar to the
demon-world in this respect. I am happy to grant this fact (and I think it’s true), but this doesn’t
impugn my view. If someone is manipulating the evidence in the actual world, then other things
are not equal, so all things considered, engaging in virtuous inquiry may not increase the
likelihood that the evidence is veridical. However, unlike in the demon-world, it is very possible
to discover (and often is discovered) that the evidence has been manipulated (i.e.—tampered
with or planted, etc.). This is not possible in the demon-world because the person has no way to
confirm or disconfirm that he is in a demon-world or that his evidence is being manipulated. So,
in the actual world, virtuous inquiry can still be effective in sorting through manipulated
evidence and therefore can have a positive epistemic bearing on one’s belief in the actual world.
What’s important to notice about number 6 is that A and B have the same belief p. This
is crucially different than a case in which A and B are in the actual world but have different
beliefs about the same subject matter. For example, A might have belief p1 about some subject
X and B might have belief p2 about subject X (suppose both beliefs are well-founded). Further,
A inquired viciously when gathering his evidence E1 in support of p1 and B inquired virtuously
when gathering his evidence E2 in support of p2. It is highly probable that E2 provides stronger
evidential support for B’s belief p2 than E1 provides for A’s belief p1. For example, take
Gerry’s case in which his belief about second hand smoke (that it’s not harmful) fits his
evidence, but he inquired viciously. Now suppose Gerry* gathered his evidence virtuously and
thinks that second hand smoke is harmful. It is highly probable that Gerry’s belief will have
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much weaker evidential support than Gerry*’s belief. Gerry’s belief is well-founded but his
supporting evidence is very likely not as strong as Gerry*’s. Thus, along FD, B’s belief p2 is
better justified than A’s belief p1. However, we must also consider how A’s and B’s beliefs are
justified along RD. Along RD, B’s belief p2 receives a justificatory boost because he inquired
virtuously and the justificatory status of A’s belief p1 is diminished because he inquired
viciously. Therefore, my two-component view yields the verdict that B’s belief p2 is much
better justified than A’s belief p1. In contrast to this case, I think number 6 requires more
defense. I turn to this now.
Let’s look at the Biologist case again as a way to understand number 6. I want to look at
two versions of the Biologist case that might be a potential problem for my diagnoses of number
6. In each case, the biologist is in the actual world.
Virtuous Biologist: A field biologist is trying to explain a change in the migration patterns
of a certain endangered bird species. Collecting and analyzing the relevant data is tedious
work and requires a special eye for detail. The biologist is committed to discovering the
truth, and so spends long hours in the field gathering data. He remains focused and
determined in the face of various obstacles and distractions (e.g., conflicting evidence,
bureaucratic roadblocks, inclement weather conditions, boredom, etc.). He picks out
important details in environmental reports and makes keen discriminations regarding the
composition and trajectory of numerous observed flocks. As a result of his determination
and careful methods of inquiry, he uncovers strong evidence supporting a particular
hypothesis for why the birds have altered their migration patterns.
Call the reason that the birds have altered course ‘p’. The best explanation available for why the
Virtuous Biologist has the evidence he has is p. Furthermore, the biologist’s belief is wellfounded. Thus, along FD, p is a belief that is strongly justified for the biologist. Although the
biologist’s belief is strongly justified along FD, the degree to which p is justified is increased
because he engaged in virtuous inquiry. Engaging in virtuous inquiry makes it more likely that
the evidence he gathered is not misleading (i.e.—veridical) evidence. Thus, engaging in virtuous
inquiry increases the degree to which his belief p is justified. This increase in epistemic
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justification occurs whether or not the biologist is aware of the virtuous nature of his inquiry.
Now let’s consider a different case.
This next case is a different version of the Biologist case above.
Vicious Biologist: A field biologist is trying to explain a change in the migration patterns
of a certain endangered bird species. Collecting and analyzing the relevant data is tedious
work and requires a special eye for detail. The biologist wants to discover the truth, but he
is lazy and so spends very little time in the field gathering data. He remains unfocused and
lacks determination in the face of various obstacles and distractions (e.g., conflicting
evidence, bureaucratic roadblocks, inclement weather conditions, boredom, etc.). He fails
to pay close attention to important details in environmental reports and makes poor
discriminations regarding the composition and trajectory of several observed flocks.
Despite his lack of determination and careless methods of inquiry, he uncovers the same
evidence as the Virtuous Biologist.
In this case, the Vicious Biologist engaged in vicious inquiry. Yet suppose he uncovers the same
evidence that the Virtuous Biologist uncovers and forms the same belief p on the basis of this
evidence. Also, neither biologist is aware of the virtuous or vicious nature of his own inquiry. In
this case, both biologists’ beliefs are equally justified along FD. However, things are different
along RD. Other things being equal (there is no evidence tampering/manipulation or other factor
such as mental illness, etc.), belief p is justified to a higher degree for the Virtuous Biologist than
for the Vicious Biologist because the former inquired virtuously and the latter inquired viciously.
Here’s the concern with the above comparison cases and therefore a problem for my
view: If the Virtuous Biologist and the Vicious Biologist uncover precisely the same evidence in
normal circumstances, then the reliability or unreliability of their inquiries cannot make a
justificatory difference. That is, the Virtuous Biologist inquired virtuously (reliably) and
uncovered evidence E1 in support of belief p, and the Vicious Biologist inquired viciously
(unreliably) and also uncovered E1 in support of belief p. On my view, the fact that the Virtuous
Biologist inquired virtuously increases the degree to which p is justified because virtuous inquiry
increases the probability that the evidence is veridical. But also on my view, the fact that the
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Vicious Biologist inquired viciously decreases the degree to which p is justified because vicious
inquiry decreases the probability that the evidence is veridical. The issue then is how E1 can be
both misleading and veridical at the same time under normal conditions. This seems to be an
inconsistency. There is a simple reply to this concern.
First, the claim that the Virtuous and Vicious Biologist would have uncovered the same
evidence lacks plausibility. It is implausible that these two biologists could have gathered the
same evidence when trying to answer a difficult scientific question having to do with the
complexities of the migratory pattern of some bird species. Along FD, the two biologists will
have beliefs with very different degrees of justification because they will surely have different
evidence. The Vicious Biologist’s belief is not likely to be justified whatsoever given that his
belief will likely have poor evidential support. But suppose for the sake of argument that the
Vicious Biologist does have sufficiently strong evidence to justify his belief along FD. If so,
then along RD, the unreliability of the Vicious Biologist’s inquiry will increase the probability
that his evidence is misleading and therefore the degree to which his belief is justified will
decrease. On the other hand, the Virtuous Biologist’s belief will be better justified than the
Vicious Biologist’s belief along both FD and RD. The Virtuous Biologist will have stronger
supporting evidence and the reliability of his inquiry will increase the probability that his
evidence is veridical and therefore increase the degree to which his belief is justified.
Even in cases where two people are gathering evidence in order to answer simple
questions, the reliability or unreliability of their evidence gathering methods will often make a
justificatory difference. For example, suppose person A and B are inquiring as to whether there
is a cookie in the cookie jar. If person A carefully examines the content of the cookie jar and
person B gives a very hasty or cursory examination of the contents, it could result in very
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different evidence. Person A might perform a careful visual examination of the cookie, feel it in
his hands, smell it, attempt to bite and taste the cookie, etc., and in the process discover the
cookie is fake (made of plastic). Person B might open the cookie jar briefly and inattentively
glance at the cookie and conclude that it is fake. Even two simple but different inquiries can
yield different evidence. Person A clearly has stronger supporting evidence than person B.
Furthermore, person A’s inquiry was highly reliable and therefore the probability that his
evidence is veridical is high. On the other hand, person B’s inquiry was unreliable (or at best
only somewhat reliable) and therefore the probability that his evidence is veridical is much lower
than A’s.
Second, in cases where two people get precisely the same evidence (where inquiry is
involved) it is because they engaged in sufficiently similar inquiries (whether virtuous or vicious)
or because the reliability or unreliability of their respective inquiries didn't play a sufficiently
strong role in determining what body of evidence they gathered. Either way there is not going to
be a justificatory difference between their beliefs along either FD or RD. Thus, my diagnosis of
number 6 holds.
My two-component view contrasts with the evidentialist’s intuition that if two people are
alike mentally (i.e.—have the exact same evidence), then their beliefs are always alike
justificationally (again, we are concerned with well-foundedness). That is, the evidentialist says
that Person A’s belief p and Person B’s belief p are equally justified if they have the same body
of evidence, regardless of the difference in how they gathered that evidence. On my view, this is
not the case. On RD, the degree to which p is justified for Person A or Person B, can depend
(other things being equal) on whether they engaged in virtuous or vicious inquiry, which in turn
means there can be a justificatory difference between their two beliefs even though they have the
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exact same evidence. My view also entails that vicious inquiry cannot render a well-founded
belief unjustified. This is in contrast to any view of reliabilism which says that if a person
engaged in vicious inquiry (i.e.—unreliable evidence-gathering methods), then belief p is not
justified for that person, regardless of whether p is the best explanation available to that person
for why he has that body of evidence. What is important to remember is that when considering
the justificatory status of a belief, we have to evaluate it along both FD and RD. Of course, the
belief must be justified along FD for it to be justified at all, so if it’s not justified along FD, then
there’s no reason to evaluate it along RD.
My view preserves the intuition behind the New Evil Demon Problem that because
Person A (actual world) and Person B (demon-world) possess the same strong evidence, their
respective beliefs p are both justified, but my view adds that the belief is justified period
(categorically justified along FD). I think any theory of epistemic justification worth its salt,
must yield the result that belief p for Person B is justified. Regardless of the epistemic condition
Person B is in (being deceived by an evil demon), there is no other belief he should rationally
hold than what his evidence supports (in the explanationist sense). In this case B ought to
believe p. What my view does not preserve is the intuition that the justificatory status of A’s and
B’s beliefs are the same as long as they have (are either actually or potentially aware of) the
same evidence. This is because we have to consider RD. If Person A (who is in the actual
world) engaged in virtuous inquiry, while Person B (in the demon-world) also engaged in
virtuous inquiry, then there will be a justificatory difference in their respective beliefs even
though they have precisely the same body of evidence. Belief p for Person A will be justified to
a higher degree than for Person B because unlike in the demon-world, engaging in virtuous
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inquiry (reliable evidence-gathering) in the actual world is likely to yield veridical evidence.
Virtuous inquiry in the demon-world is unreliable.
I’d like to make one more point. There is an important asymmetry between the virtuous
and vicious inquirers who have the same evidence in the actual world. The asymmetry is that the
virtuous thinker used a reliable process to gather evidence and the vicious thinker did not.
Where there is a symmetry between the virtuous and vicious inquirers in the actual world is in the
availability of reliable processes to each thinker. They both have the opportunity to utilize
reliable evidence-gathering methods. It just so happened that the vicious thinker inquired
viciously but he could have inquired virtuously. Importantly, this is the advantage that the
vicious inquirer in the actual world has over both the vicious and the virtuous inquirer in the
demon-world. That is, the vicious thinker in the actual world had the opportunity to use a
reliable method of inquiry, but failed to take advantage of that opportunity. On the other hand,
the thinkers in the demon-world did not have the same opportunity because any process of
inquiry they use is unreliable. However, the vicious thinker’s belief in the actual world is not
thereby better justified because she could have inquired virtuously, it’s just that he would have
been better justified if he had availed himself of the reliable method. On the other hand, the
virtuous thinker in the actual world had the opportunity and did use a reliable evidence-gathering
method, so this does make a justificatory difference in his resulting belief.
V. Conclusion
The goal of this dissertation has been to defend a two-component view of doxastic
justification that makes sense of the role that evidence and virtuous (reliable) inquiry play in
fixing the justificatory status of a belief. In particular, the goal has been to defend the view that
the justificatory status of a belief can be fixed along two dimensions: 1) the fittingness-dimension
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which provides necessary and sufficient conditions for categorical doxastic justification and
along 2) the reliability-dimension which often plays a salient role in increasing the degree to
which a belief is justified.
In Chapter Two I distinguished between two different kinds of intellectual virtue
properties—roughly, properties of inquirers (e.g., being open-minded) vs. properties of inquiries
(e.g., being conducted open-mindedly). I raised objections to theorizing justified belief in terms
of "inquirer-focused" properties. I argued that these objections do not foreclose the possibility of
theorizing justified belief at least partly in terms of "inquiry-focused" properties. Further, I gave
a rough, preliminary statement of an evidentialist view of justified belief in which the
exemplification of "inquiry-focused" properties can increase the degree to which a doxastic
attitude is justified. In Chapter Three I argued that epistemic justification is not just a species of
instrumental rationality. I also argued that methodological epistemic rationality is not merely a
form of instrumental rationality but also plays a salient role in fixing the justificatory status of a
belief. I also argued that evidentialist views such as Kelly’s and Conee and Feldman’s provide a
plausible account of when a belief is categorically epistemically justified for a person. I also
offered a preliminary defense of a diachronic account of epistemic justification. In Chapter Four
I defended explanationist evidentialism as providing necessary and sufficient conditions for
categorical doxastic justification.
Finally, in this final chapter I provided a more thorough defense of my two-component
view of epistemic justification. In part I, I discussed how the evidentialist can make sense of
how flawed evidence-gathering methods can undermine the justification of a belief. Specifically,
I argued that evidentialists can appeal to EFEG as an undercutting defeater. Further, I argued
that EFEG is a higher-level belief that serves as an undercutting defeater for first-level (object-
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level) beliefs. That is, if one is aware that one’s evidence gathering methodology was unreliable,
then one has a defeater for the belief that the pertinent evidence bears directly on. I then
provided an account of how evidentialists can make sense of defeaters in explanatory terms.
Finally, I discussed how NED captures the intuition that two people who are alike mentally will
both have the same categorically justified belief. I then made the argument that this outcome
allows room for reliability to play a further role in increasing the degree to which a belief is
justified.
In part II of this final chapter I briefly argued that EX-WF provides a satisfactory account
of one dimension of epistemic justification, i.e.—the fittingness-dimension (FD). I argued that
as long as a person’s belief is justified along FD, then that belief is justified period. The point
being that being justified along FD is all that is required for a belief to be justified, i.e.—it is the
bare minimum for a belief to be justified.
In part III of this final chapter I argued that beyond the justification conferred by one’s
evidence along FD, reliability, when relevant, can make a positive difference on the justificatory
status of one’s beliefs. Thus, a person’s belief p can be justified along FD and along the
reliability-dimension (RD). That is, a person’s belief is epistemically justified to varying degrees
depending on how strongly that person’s belief fits the evidence that person has at a given time,
but that in addition, there is an externalist justification factor (namely reliability) that is often
directly relevant to the positive justificatory status of that belief. Specifically, I argued that if a
person’s evidence was gathered in a reliable way, then (other things being equal) the belief that
evidence bears on will have an even higher degree of epistemic justification than it would if it
were only justified along FD.

233

The upshot of my two-component theory of epistemic justification is that it provides
strong reasons to believe that an evidentialist-cum-reliabilist view of epistemic justification is a
tenable one. Even if the reader isn’t entirely convinced of my two-component view, I hope that
my insights have applications into other areas of epistemology.
There are still important issues that need to be worked out. One issue that needs to be
addressed more carefully is the specifics behind how virtues construed as inquiry-focused
properties increase the reliability of inquiry. For example, how precisely does conducting your
inquiry open-mindedly, consistently, fair-mindedly, etc., contribute to the reliability of inquiry?
Additionally, it would be helpful to understand when such virtues of inquiry contribute to a
decrease in the reliability of an inquiry and even render an inquiry unreliable. For example,
when is conducting an inquiry open-mindedly detrimental to the reliability of that inquiry? Also,
are there intellectual virtues that aren’t strongly correlated with reliable inquiry whatsoever (e.g.,
inquiring courageously)?
Another issue to explore is how my two-component view would deal with some of the
traditional objections to evidentialism and reliabilism (e.g., the problem of forgotten evidence,
the generality problem for reliabilism, etc.). My hope is that many of the problems that plague
evidentialists and reliabilists could be fixed by a view in which both evidence and reliability play
a salient role in epistemic justification. This would go a long way in strengthening the case for
my two-component theory of epistemic justification. Also, I think more work needs to be done
in accounting for the connection between best explanation and justified belief. That is, more
work needs to be done on understanding the nature of best explanation and how it determines the
justificatory status of a belief. Incidentally, this would also be another way to understand the
role that virtue plays in epistemic justification. More precisely, such a project would help us
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better understand the role that virtues as properties of explanation (simplicity, explanatory
power, scope, etc.) play in epistemic justification.85
Ultimately, my hope is that I’ve made progress toward developing a two-component or
“hybrid” view of epistemic justification and that my insights will motivate others to continue to
develop such a view.

85

Ted Poston (2014) offers a thoughtful discussion on the connection between best explanation and epistemic
justification (including insights into the role that explanatory virtues play).
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